May, J.
Jeremy W. Kelly appeals following his sentencing for Level 2 felony voluntary manslaughter. Kelly raises a single issue on appeal, which is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a morning-of-sentencing motion to replace Kelly’s public defender. We affirm. We reverse.
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Kelly alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to remove Attorney Henderson and assign a new public defender.
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To reiterate, Kelly challenges only the trial court’s refusal to replace Attorney Henderson on the morning of sentencing. The Sixth Amendment of our Federal Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in criminal cases. Bowie v. State, 203 N.E.3d 535, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Nevertheless, “an indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to the public defender of his choice.” Id. at 545 (citing U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). When a request for a new court appointed attorney is made, a trial court may deny that request “in the exercise of its sound discretion[.]” Luck v. State, 466 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Ind. 1984). We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, although Attorney Henderson asked to be removed as Kelly’s counsel, the trial court was not required to grant that motion on the morning of sentencing. See id. (decision left to trial court discretion). Nor was the trial court required to remove Attorney Henderson based on Kelly’s last-minute expression of displeasure with Attorney Henderson and his guilty plea. Trial courts have an obligation to move cases forward, and six weeks had passed between Kelly’s change of plea hearing and his sentencing. Nevertheless, Kelly waited until the morning of the sentencing hearing to express his displeasure with his appointed counsel. “We have several times reiterated our approval of the denial of a defendant’s motion to replace counsel during or immediately before trial.” Luck, 466 N.E.2d at 451. We see no logical reason why the same rule should not apply when Kelly wishes to avoid a sentencing hearing.
If Kelly wishes to challenge the validity of his plea agreement, he may do so via a post-conviction petition pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(c), at which time Kelly will have a chance to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, see, e.g., Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1234-35 (“if Davis can prove in post-conviction proceedings that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal, then his conviction can be vacated”), and accordingly Kelly cannot demonstrate he has been prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to change his counsel. For all these reasons, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to remove Kelly’s counsel on the morning of sentencing.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Attorney Henderson’s motion to withdraw on the morning of the sentencing hearing. As Kelly has raised no other allegation of error on appeal, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.