Molter, J.
Defendant Expert Pool Builders, LLC appeals the trial court’s default judgment for Plaintiff Paul Vangundy, which the trial court entered because Expert Pool did not timely file a response to Vangundy’s complaint. Expert Pool opposed Vangundy’s motion for a default judgment three times: first through a written response, then through oral argument at a hearing before the court entered judgment, and lastly through an unsuccessful Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error after the court entered judgment. But a divided Court of Appeals panel nevertheless concluded Expert Pool waived its challenge to the default judgment. The majority understood our decision in Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1983), as requiring Expert Pool to reassert its argument in a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment before it could obtain appellate review and dismissed the appeal.
Judge Vaidik dissented, explaining that Siebert’s requirement to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion applies only to a default judgment that a trial court enters before a party responds to the motion for default judgment. The requirement does not apply to a default judgment entered over a party’s objection based on the same argument that the party advances on appeal and that the trial court already rejected. We granted transfer, and we now embrace Judge Vaidik’s analysis.
On the merits, we must affirm the trial court. After considering the parties’ conflicting representations and evidence, the trial court concluded the parties never agreed to extend Expert Pool’s deadline for a responsive pleading and that Expert Pool simply chose to ignore Vangundy’s complaint. On appeal, Expert Pool asks us to reweigh the trial court’s factual determinations, including its credibility determinations, and to rebalance the equities. But our standard of review does not permit that. Thus, we hold that Expert Pool preserved its issues for appeal but affirm the trial court’s entry of default judgment against Expert Pool.
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To resolve this appeal, we first consider whether Expert Pool preserved its challenge to the default judgment or instead needed to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment before pursuing its appeal. Concluding that Expert Pool’s opposition to the motion for default judgment preserved its challenge for appeal, we hold that Expert Pool did not need to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Turning to the merits, we hold that Expert Pool’s challenge to the default judgment requires us to reweigh the evidence and rebalance the equities, which our standard of review does not permit. We therefore affirm the trial court.
I. Expert Pool was not required to file a Rule 60(B) motion to preserve its right to appeal.
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Expert Pool sufficiently preserved its argument for appellate review. When Vangundy moved for default judgment based on Expert Pool’s failure to answer the complaint or file a motion to dismiss, Expert Pool filed a written response arguing that the trial court should deny the motion because the parties had agreed to extend Expert Pool’s deadline. Then, Expert Pool made the same arguments at a hearing on the motion. And after the trial court entered the default judgment over Expert Pool’s objection, Expert Pool then filed a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error— based on the same substantive arguments it advanced before—asking the trial court to reconsider its decision, which the trial court denied. That is ample appellate preservation.
Vangundy disagrees, arguing that our decision in Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1983), required that before Expert Pool could pursue an appeal, it had to make its argument a fourth time through a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment…
But unlike the defendant in Siebert, Expert Pool appeared in the case, filed a written opposition to the motion for default judgment, and appeared at a hearing to oppose the motion, all before the trial court entered the default judgment. Because Expert Pool obtained a definitive ruling from the trial court rejecting its argument that a default judgment was improper because the parties had agreed to extend the responsive pleading deadline and there was no prejudice from any delay, Expert Pool was not required to do anything further to preserve the issue for appeal.
Siebert did not create a special appellate preservation rule for default judgments. Rather, it simply applied the general rule that a party may not assert an argument on appeal that it has not first made in the trial court. When—as is usually the case and was the case in Siebert—a default judgment is entered before the defendant has made any argument in opposition, the only remaining vehicle for the defendant to make an argument in the trial court is a Trial Rule 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment. But when a defendant has presented its argument opposing default judgment before judgment is entered, there is no need to file a post‐judgment motion. After all, efficient judicial administration underlies the general appellate‐preservation rules, and requiring parties to keep futilely reasserting arguments undermines efficiency.
Still, Vangundy worries our approach blurs the Court of Appeals’ easy‐ to‐apply, bright‐line rule that no party can appeal from a default judgment unless they first file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion. But rather than blurring any lines, we are merely holding that the same appellate‐ preservation requirements that apply in every other context apply just the same for default judgments. Once a party obtains a final ruling from the trial court, the party has preserved the issue for appellate review. See Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ind. 1999) (explaining that a party must obtain a “final ruling” to preserve an issue for appellate review).
Having concluded that Expert Pool was not required to file a Trial Rule 60(B) motion before appealing, we next turn to the company’s argument that the trial court exceeded its discretion by entering a default judgment.
II. The trial court did not exceed its discretion by entering a default judgment.
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No doubt this is a close case because the prejudice to Vangundy appears relatively minimal, and had the trial judge denied the motion for default judgment, we likely would have affirmed that decision too. But the trial court’s decision turns on the sort of credibility assessments, factual determinations, and equitable balancing to which we must defer. Nothing in the trial court’s decision is unlawful, illogical, or unreasonable, and the default judgment did not come at the expense of professionalism, civility, or common courtesy.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of default judgment.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.