Brown, J.
Lacey Ann Murphy appeals the trial court’s denial of her Motion to Set Aside Body Attachment. Finding the requirements of Ind. Trial Rule 64(A) were not satisfied and the body attachment was expired, we reverse and remand.
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Murphy maintains the trial court failed to provide the protections mandated by Ind. Trial Rule 64(A) and erred in denying her motion to set aside. She argues the body attachment was invalid because she was not served with a rule to show cause in accordance with Trial Rule 64(A)(2) and the body attachment failed to contain sufficient information to identify her. She asserts that, even if the body attachment had been valid, it should have been recalled when she appeared on May 25, 2021. She further argues the body attachment expired more than a year before she was arrested. She states, “[h]aving spent a weekend in jail on a warrant which had expired fourteen months earlier and for no valid reason, [she] is understandably concerned it could happen again” and “the scope of noncompliance in this court raises concerns that other trial courts in Indiana may not have fully implemented these basic procedural safeguards.” Appellant’s Brief at 22-23.
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The record reveals that several of the requirements of Trial Rule 64(A) were not satisfied. Rule 64(A)(2) provides that a court may issue a body attachment if a rule to show cause was issued and served upon the judgment debtor “by delivering a copy of the same to the judgment debtor personally” and that personal service “includes certified mail signed by the judgment debtor.” The court issued a rule to show cause on March 24, 2021, which included an address for service in Floyds Knobs, and an amended rule to show cause on March 30, 2021, which included an address for service on Harvard Drive in Clarksville. Entries in the CCS related to both orders state: “Left & mailed copy.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 7-8. There is no indication that the orders were served by delivering a copy to Murphy personally or that service was made by certified mail signed by Murphy. Further, Rule 64(A)(2) provides a body attachment “shall contain sufficient information to identify the judgment debtor.” While the May 6, 2021 body attachment attached to the motion to set aside includes a line drawn around Murphy’s name in the caption, the text of the order states: “You are hereby commanded to attach the person of Justin Bond . . . .” Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Also, the body attachment contains a date of birth, and Murphy states in her affidavit that the date of birth appearing on the order is not her date of birth.
Moreover, the May 6, 2021 body attachment had expired. Rule 64(A)(4) provides that “a writ of attachment for a person expires one hundred eighty (180) days after it is issued” and “the expiration date shall appear on the face of the writ.” Here, the body attachment was issued on May 6, 2021, and thus expired 180 days later in November 2021. We observe that no expiration date appears on the face of the May 6, 2021 body attachment as required. Rule 64(A)(4) also provides that “[a] sheriff who has an expired writ of attachment for a person shall make a return on the writ stating it has expired and shall return it to the clerk of the court that issued it” and that the clerk “shall enter the fact that the writ of attachment for a person has expired on the chronological case summary.” There is no indication in the record or CCS that these steps were taken with respect to the expired body attachment.
The record reveals that Murphy was arrested on January 6, 2023, and spent three nights in the Floyd County Jail based on the May 6, 2021 body attachment which had expired over a year earlier. Also, as she notes, Murphy appeared in court on May 26 and June 23, 2021.
Based on the record, we conclude that Murphy has established prima facie error. We reverse and remand to the Floyd Superior Court with instructions to grant Murphy’s April 4, 2023 Motion to Set Aside Body Attachment. We urge courts to be mindful of the provisions and requirements of Trial Rule 64(A) with respect to issuing a body attachment including the provision that such an attachment for a person expires 180 days after it is issued and the requirement that the expiration date shall appear on the face of the writ.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and May, J. concur.