Brown, J.
Brandon Lee Kendall appeals his conviction for identity deception as a level 6 felony. He raises three issues which we revise and restate as: I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an unredacted arrest warrant; II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and III. Whether the identity deception statute violated the Proportionality Clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.
We affirm.
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The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the arrest warrant. Kendall argues the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to know that he had a warrant for escape substantially outweighed any probative value and should not have been allowed. He contends that the use of the escape charge on the warrant to link his alleged previous escape to his conduct in this case was prohibited by Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b).
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The record reveals that the State introduced the arrest warrant to show Kendall’s motive. We cannot say that State’s Exhibit 2 was not relevant or that the probative value of the exhibit was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Further, the probable impact of any error in admitting the arrest warrant, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect Kendall’s substantial rights. Reversal is not required on this basis.
The next issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Kendall’s conviction for identity deception as a level 6 felony. Kendall argues that the statute requires that he profess to be another person and the State presented no evidence that Tyler Cliver was an actual person. He asserts the State must establish that he used the identifying information of “a real person, natural or juridical.”
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The legislature amended Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a) effective July 1, 2021, which now provides that “a person who, with intent to harm or defraud another person, knowingly or intentionally obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses identifying information to profess to be another person, commits identity deception, a Level 6 felony.” (Emphasis added). The legislature amended Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(i) effective July 1, 2021, such that the statute now provides in part:
“Identifying information” means information, genuine or fabricated, that identifies or purports to identify a person, including: (1) a name, address, date of birth, place of employment, employer identification number, mother’s maiden name, Social Security number, or any identification number issued by a governmental entity; (2) unique biometric data, including a fingerprint, voice print, or retina or iris image . . . .
Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-234(a) provides that “‘person’ means a human being, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, unincorporated association, or governmental entity.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2160 defines a “Human being” as “an individual who has been born and is alive.”
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Based upon the amendment to Ind. Code § 35-43-53.5(a), which criminalized the use of identifying information “to profess to be another person” and the amendment to Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(i) defining identifying information as “information, genuine or fabricated, that identifies or purports to identify a person,” we cannot say that the current version of the statute requires that the identifying information must coincide with any real person or an existing human being. Even assuming that the current version of the statute requires that the identifying information coincide with a real person, we note that, when asked what he discovered when he ran the name Tyler Cliver, Patrolman Aerne answered: “That the date of birth did not match.” Transcript Volume II at 202. The reasonable inference is that Patrolman Aerne found a real person named Tyler Cliver. Based upon the record, we conclude the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier of fact could find Kendall guilty of identity deception as a level 6 felony.
The next issue is whether the identity deception statute violated the Proportionality Clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. Kendall argues that the crime of identity deception under Ind. Code § 35-43-53.5, as applied to him, violates the Proportionality Clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. He asserts that he was convicted of identity deception as a level 6 felony and that his conduct of giving a false name to a police officer could also support a prosecution for false informing as a class B misdemeanor pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1). He contends that there are no additional facts present here that warrant prosecuting his conduct under the identity deception statute versus the false informing statute.
Article 1, Section 16 provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” It is violated only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1091, 135 S. Ct. 978 (2015). Though we “cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely because it seems too severe,” Article 1, Section 16 requires us to review whether a sentence is not only within statutory parameters, but also constitutional as applied to the particular defendant. Id. at 1290. “A sentence violates the Proportionality Clause when ‘offenses with identical elements [are] given different sentences.’” Johnson v. State, 103 N.E.3d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Poling v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1270, 1276-1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied), trans. denied.
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3 governs the offense of false reporting or informing and provided at the time of the offense: (d) A person who: (1) gives: (A) a false report of the commission of a crime; or (B) false information to a law enforcement officer that relates to the commission of a crime; knowing the report or information to be false; * * * * * commits false informing, a Class B misdemeanor.
Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a) provides that “a person who, with intent to harm or defraud another person, knowingly or intentionally obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses identifying information to profess to be another person, commits identity deception, a Level 6 felony.” (Emphases added). Thus, the statute governing identity deception includes elements not contained in the statute governing false informing. Accordingly, we conclude that the crime of false informing, which requires no such intent or use of identifying information, is distinguishable from the crime of identity deception. We do not find a violation of Article 1, Section 16.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.