Molter J.
After Ball State University switched to providing only online instruction for the 2020 spring semester due to the COVID‐19 pandemic, Plaintiff Keller Mellowitz sued the university for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. He seeks to recover tuition and fees for in‐person instruction and services he alleges the university promised him. Critical here, he wants to litigate his claims as a class action, representing similarly situated students to recover their tuition and fees too. But after he sued, the General Assembly passed, and Governor Holcomb signed, Public Law No. 166‐2021, which, retroactive to March 1, 2020, prohibits class action lawsuits against postsecondary educational institutions for contract or unjust enrichment claims to recover losses stemming from COVID‐19.
Based on that law, the trial court entered an order directing that while Mellowitz may pursue his claims against Ball State on his own behalf, he may not pursue a class action on behalf of other students. Through an interlocutory appeal of that order, the Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with Mellowitz that the class action restriction was unconstitutional. We granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, and we now affirm the trial court’s order.
First, we conclude the law does not violate the constitutional separation of powers because its limited scope (applying only to a narrow category of claims arising from COVID‐19 against a defined group of defendants during a narrow period of time) reflects that it predominantly furthers a public policy objective—reducing postsecondary educational institutions’ litigation exposure for their emergency responses to the pandemic—rather than a judicial administration objective. Second, the law does not unconstitutionally take Mellowitz’s property without just compensation because he has no property right to sue on behalf of others through a class action. And finally, the law does not unconstitutionally impair Mellowitz’s contract with Ball State because the General Assembly did not relieve Ball State of any of its contractual obligations to Mellowitz, which is why the trial court is permitting him to pursue his individual claims against the university.
….
Mellowitz raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues Section 7 runs afoul of the constitutional separation of powers because it limits class actions, which he contends is the prerogative of the judiciary, not the legislature. As we explain below, our recent decision in Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 590 (Ind. 2022), forecloses this argument because the statute predominantly furthers a public policy objective rather than a judicial administration objective.
Second, Mellowitz argues that retroactively applying the statute to his claim has the effect of taking his property without just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions because the statute eliminates his cause of action. We conclude the trial court was correct to reject this argument because Mellowitz’s cause of action is for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and the trial court is permitting him to continue pursuing those claims. Mellowitz has no property right to sue on behalf of others through a class action.
Third, Mellowitz argues the statute impairs his contract with Ball State, again in violation of the state and federal constitutions. This argument fairs no better because the General Assembly did not relieve Ball State of any contractual obligations to Mellowitz, and, again, the trial court is permitting Mellowitz to pursue his individual claims against the university.
Because the trial court correctly concluded the statute is constitutional and precludes a class action in this case, we affirm.
I. Shielding postsecondary educational institutions from pandemic‐related class action claims is within the General Assembly’s legislative authority.
….
A. Our Constitution generally precludes the legislature from micromanaging court procedures.
….
B. Our judiciary may accommodate statutes altering procedures if the statutes predominantly further public policy objectives and do not interfere with the orderly dispatch of judicial business.
….
C. Section 7 does not encroach on the judicial power.
….
Because Section 7 predominantly furthers public policy objectives rather than judicial administrative objectives, and because it does not undermine the truth‐seeking function of litigation or the courts’ constitutional obligations, the trial court was correct to conclude it is a valid legislative enactment.
II. Section 7 is not an unconstitutional taking.
….
III. The statute does not unconstitutionally impair Ball State’s contract obligations to Mellowitz.
….
…Mellowitz argues that precluding him from representing a class deprives him of his only effective remedy to enforce his own individual rights under his alleged contract with the university. But we must reject that argument for the same reason we rejected it in the takings context—we cannot accept the invitation to simply assume Mellowitz is without an effective contract remedy because Section 7 is presumed constitutional unless Mellowitz demonstrates otherwise, and he has not demonstrated that his suit against Ball State to recover his own tuition and fees is an inadequate means for enforcing his alleged contract rights.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.