Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
In this interlocutory appeal, the Marion Superior Court Probation Department (“Probation Department”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment regarding claims brought by Cheryl Trapuzzano and Jennifer Trapuzzano, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Nathan Trapuzzano (“Trapuzzano”) (collectively, “the Estate”). The Estate brought claims against the Probation Department after a probationer shot and killed Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery. On appeal, the Probation Department argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department has common law immunity and immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) from liability for the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. We find one issue dispositive and hold that the Probation Department has quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Issue
The Probation Department raises three issues. We find one issue dispositive, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by determining that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Probation Department has quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims.
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Although the parties discuss both common law quasi-judicial immunity and immunity under the ITCA, we resolve this matter on the basis of common law quasi-judicial immunity. “It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction.” H.B. v. Indiana-Elkhart Div. of Fam. & Child., 713 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. “The underlying purpose of the immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process.” Id. “[T]he same policies that underlie the grant of absolute judicial immunity to judges justify the grant of immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-judicial functions.” Id. “Absolute judicial immunity therefore extends to persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id. “In determining whether a person is entitled to judicial immunity, the United States Supreme Court has established a functional approach, where the court looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988)).
“Probation in Indiana is a court function, and probation officers are trained, tested, hired, and supervised directly by the judiciary.” Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ind. 2005); see also Ind. Code Chapter 11-13-1 (discussing probation administration); Ind. Admin. Rule 18 (discussing the governance of county probation departments). Probation officers “serve at the pleasure of the appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c).
This Court has held that individual probation officers were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where the plaintiff alleged that the probation officers “exceeded the scope of their authority as probation officers by failing to maintain accurate records and providing the sentencing court . . . with knowingly false information.”…
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Here, as in Thornton, the Estate alleges that the Probation Department withheld vital information from the petition for modification and intentionally provided false information. We find little to distinguish the actions at issue here from the actions at issue in Thornton. The Estate, however, argues that Thornton is inapplicable because quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to governmental entities. In support of this argument, the Estate cites federal cases addressing Section 1983 claims. Our Court, however, has applied quasi-judicial immunity to governmental entities in connection with other types of claims. In Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation action against several governmental entities, including the Indianapolis Police Department (“IPD”) after IPD executed a trial court’s order to seize the property owner’s bookstore. We held that IPD was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because IPD’s actions were in furtherance of the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we held that the City of Indianapolis could “not be held liable for protected actions by IPD . . . .” Mendenhall, 717 N.E.2d at 1227.
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Finally, we note that the trial court focused on what it described as genuine issues of material fact as to whether the probation officer intentionally withheld vital information. Quasi-judicial immunity, like judicial immunity, is “absolute.” Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “Such immunity totally insulates officials from liability for actions taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity; the shield of absolute immunity cannot be pierced even if the official acts in error, maliciously, or corruptly.” Id. at 655. Regardless of whether the probation officer’s conduct was intentional or negligent, quasi-judicial immunity applies. Because the Probation Department has immunity from the Estate’s claims, we need not address the parties’ other arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion for summary judgment.
Conclusion
The Probation Department is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the Estate’s claims, and the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.