Goff, J.
The Indiana Constitution guarantees the same right to a jury trial in a civil case as existed at common law when the current constitution was adopted in 1851. The question here is whether this jury-trial right applies in an action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute. Our historical survey leads us to conclude that it does. We thus affirm the trial court and remand for trial by jury.
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Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution ensures that in “all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 20. This fundamental guarantee secures the right to a jury trial “as it existed at common law” at the time Indiana adopted its current constitution. Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added) (citing City of Crown Point v. Newcomer, 204 Ind. 589, 595, 185 N.E. 440, 443 (1933)). For cases or claims deemed equitable, by contrast, “it is a well-settled tenet that a party is not entitled to a jury trial.”1 Id. See also Ind. Trial Rule 38(A). To resolve the question before us, we first ask whether the cause of action existed in 1851.2 If so, then history settles the matter. Gates v. City of Indianapolis, 991 N.E.2d 592, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). But if the cause of action did not exist in 1851, we must decide whether the claim is analogous to one at law or one in equity, as those terms were then understood. Id. at 594.
The question here is whether a claimant in an action brought under Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute has a constitutional right to trial by jury.3 In defending this right, Kizer traces civil actions to forfeit property “used in violation of law” to the colonial common-law courts, which drew on the English in rem procedure with trial by jury. Pet. to Trans. at 12–14.
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In resolving this dispute, our opinion proceeds in two parts. In Part I, we clarify the proper framework for analyzing claims to a jury trial under Article 1, Section 20. Part II applies this framework to address the merits of Kizer’s claim.
- The State’s “special statutory procedure” theory takes an “unduly restrictive view” of Article 1, Section 20.
The State insists that Kizer has no right to a jury trial because “[i]n rem civil forfeitures pursuant to Indiana’s drug forfeiture laws are a special statutory procedure” intended exclusively for trial by the court. Resp. in Opp. to Trans. at 13; Appellant’s Br. at 9 (citing I.C. §§ 34-24-1-3, -4). Kizer disagrees, arguing that the State’s theory would effectively deprive Hoosiers of a jury trial when filing suit under any modern statutory scheme. Pet. to Trans. at 16.
We agree with Kizer.
In Midwest Security Life Insurance Co. v. Stroup, the beneficiaries of a health-insurance plan sued the plan’s administrator for breach of contract and bad faith and sought a jury trial. 730 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 2000). The administrator argued that the claims were preempted by ERISA (the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) and moved to strike the request for a jury trial. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ERISA preempted the state-law claims and that, because ERISA embodied “a relatively recent statutory scheme” and “did not exist at common law,” the plaintiffs “had no right to a jury trial to determine [their] benefits under the Plan.” Midwest Sec. Life Ins. v. Stroup, 706 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), vacated. On transfer, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals on the preemption issue but expressly declined to “address whether a jury trial would be allowed for either the state law claims or for claims under ERISA.” Stroup, 730 N.E.2d at 168–69.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Boehm wrote separately to address the plaintiffs’ claim to a jury-trial right. The Court of Appeals’ conclusion on that issue, he opined, took “an unduly restrictive view of Article I, Section 20.” Id. at 169 (Boehm, J., concurring). Under such an approach, he emphasized, “parties filing suit under any statutory scheme that has been developed since 1852 would not be entitled to a jury trial because the cause of action did not exist at common law.” Id. at 170. “The crucial inquiry” in his view was “not, as the Court of Appeals put it, whether a cause of action existed at common law” but, rather, “whether the cause of action is essentially legal or equitable, as those terms were used in 1852.” Id. at 169.
Indiana courts have applied Justice Boehm’s analytical framework in several cases. In Cunningham v. State, for example, the Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant was entitled to a jury trial for a traffic infraction. 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Given the absence of “1852 statutes governing speed zones,” the court, using the “alternative path of analysis” urged by Justice Boehm in Stroup, determined “whether an action for a traffic infraction would have been considered equitable had it existed in 1852.” Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). Because it “would not have been an equitable action,” the court held that a jury right existed. Id. See also Gates, 991 N.E.2d at 595 (quoting Cunningham, 835 N.E.2d at 1078) (concluding “that the mandatory fines imposed in this case are akin to claims for money damages, which were ‘exclusively legal actions in 1852’”).
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We agree with this latter line of authority and now clarify the proper test for Article 1, Section 20’s jury-trial right, adapting Justice Boehm’s formula in Stroup: Parties in a civil case have a right to trial by jury in a cause of action (1) that was triable by jury at the adoption of the current constitution in 1851; or (2) if no such cause existed at the time, one that is essentially legal, rather than equitable, as those terms were understood in 1851, considering “the complaint, the rights and interests involved, and the relief demanded.” Stroup, 730 N.E.2d at 170 (Boehm, J., concurring) (cleaned up).
- Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil forfeitures.
In applying the analytical framework set forth above, we conclude that Article 1, Section 20 of the Indiana Constitution protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil forfeitures. As explained below, the historical record—consisting of statutes and judicial decisions reflecting contemporary practice—strongly suggests that Indiana continued the common-law tradition of trial by jury in actions for the forfeiture of property. See Pt. II.A. We acknowledge, however, that the in rem procedure was infrequently used in Indiana during the first half of the nineteenth century and that the evidence on which we rely is largely circumstantial. We proceed, then, to the question of whether the forfeiture here is analogous to an action at law or to an equitable claim. See Pt. II.B. From this line of inquiry, we have little trouble concluding that the forfeiture here is not, as the State contends, akin to the equitable disgorgement of illegally obtained profits.
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In sum, we conclude that the present action for in rem forfeiture of money as the instrument and proceeds of crime is readily analogous to the traditional common-law forfeiture of property used in violation of the law—not to equitable disgorgement. And, in keeping with Indiana’s constitutional guarantee, this is an essentially legal action that triggers the right to trial by jury.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, we hold that a claimant in an action brought under Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute has a constitutional right to trial by jury. We thus affirm the trial court and remand for trial by jury.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.