Pyle, J.
James A. Cassity (“Cassity”) appeals his convictions, following a bench trial, for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine1 and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.2 Cassity argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine and paraphernalia into evidence because the arresting officer was not wearing a distinctive uniform as required by INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2 (“the Police Uniform Statute”). Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
We reverse.
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Specifically, Cassity argues that the traffic stop initiated by Officer Gage did not satisfy the requirements of INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2 because Officer Gage was not wearing a distinctive uniform and badge. INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2(a).
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A law enforcement officer’s compliance with this statute is not optional, it is required. “‘The purpose of this statute is to protect drivers from police impersonators and to protect officers from resistance should they not be recognized as officers.’” Porter v. State, 985 N.E.2d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Ervin v. State, 968 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). “The statute seeks to help distinguish law enforcement officers from those on our highways who, for illicit purposes, impersonate law enforcement officers.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evidence obtained in an unlawful arrest may be excluded upon proper motion by the defendant. Id.
We first turn our attention to whether the Police Uniform Statute applies to Officer Gage’s traffic stop. In Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), this Court recognized, for purposes of the Police Uniform Statute, that the risks inherent with an investigatory stop are identical to those inherent to an arrest. We further explained that the purpose of the Police Uniform Statute – “to protect drivers from police impersonators and to protect officers from resistance should they not be recognized as officers” – was “implicit in the language” of the statute. Bovie, 760 N.E.2d at 1199. Thus, we held that, for purposes of the Police Uniform Statute, “there is no difference between an actual arrest or an investigatory stop.” Id. Thus, as soon as Officer Gage initiated the traffic stop on Cassity’s car, the Police Uniform Statute applied. See id. (holding that an officer neither wearing a uniform nor driving a marked car could not properly conduct a stop based on a traffic violation); see also Davis v. State, 858 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the officer “was precluded from conducting a traffic stop and effectuating either an arrest or simply an investigatory stop based on his lack of uniform and marked police vehicle”).
We recognize that our legislature did not define the term “distinctive uniform” in the Police Uniform Statute. “If the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word its plain, ordinary and usual meaning, consulting English language dictionaries when helpful in determining that meaning.” Moriarity v. Ind. Dept. of Nat. Res., 113 N.E.3d 614, 621 (Ind. 2019). From its earliest uses from Old French and Latin, the word “distinctive” has been used as an adjective describing a noun as being in a different division or class. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 277 (1966). Originating from Middle French and Latin, the noun “uniform” means “distinctive clothes worn by members of [a] group . . . .” THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 213 (1995). In addition, we consider how the word “uniform” has been used in statutes regulating police uniforms. See INDIANA CODE § 1011-2-18 (Indiana State Police required to file description or picture of the design, color, insignia, and hat relating to its uniform); I.C. § 10-11-2-17 (uniforms and equipment provided to Indiana State Police officers remain the property of the state); I.C. § 21-17-5-2 (trustees of educational institutions may prescribe distinctive police uniforms to be worn on campuses); I.C. § 36-8-1010.6 (special deputies shall wear a uniform the design and color of which is easily distinguishable from the uniforms of the Indiana State Police, the regular county police force, and all municipal police and fire forces located in the county); I.C. § 36-8-10-20.1 (a uniform commission is created and directed to establish a police uniform of standard design and color for sheriffs and their deputies); I.C. § 36-8-4-4 (uniforms provided by a city remain the property of the city); I.C. § 36-8-10-4 (a county police force is established in each county and the county is to provide officers with uniforms).
These statutes direct the State Police, county sheriff, municipalities, and police forces of educational institutions to design distinctive uniforms that set their respective officers apart from each other by color and design. Furthermore, these uniforms remain the property of the respective departments. It is not the accoutrements that make the uniform. Instead, a “distinctive uniform” is the specific design, color, and patches officially adopted by the governmental authority employing the police officer so as to inform the public that the person stopping them is, in fact, a police officer employed by that respective department.
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The State argues that Officer Gage’s clothing satisfied the Police Uniform Statute because he was wearing a vest that contained “all of the various accoutrements common to police uniforms[.]” (State’s Br. 10). The State argues that these accoutrements make the vest a “distinctive uniform” as required by the Police Uniform Statute. However, the State cites to no authority supporting this argument, and we are not convinced by such an argument. None of the accoutrements cited by the State are items that are exclusively purchased or possessed by police officers. An individual in possession of a taser, a firearm, a flashlight, a pen, a notepad, a handheld radio transponder, and a body cam worn on a plain vest with the word “POLICE” written on it is not dressed in a “distinctive uniform,” as required by the Police Uniform Statute. In addition, the presence of the accoutrements on Officer Gage’s vest did not transform his civilian clothes into a “distinctive uniform.” This is certainly true in the context of an officer driving an unmarked car at night and wearing civilian clothing, including a sweatshirt and jeans, beneath the vest. Further, none of the accoutrements affixed to Officer Gage’s vest clearly identified him as an Elkhart police officer except his badge, which is a separate requirement of the Police Uniform Statute. See I.C. § 9-30-2-2(a)(1) (requiring officers to be wearing a distinctive uniform and a badge of authority).
Accordingly, we hold that the vest worn by Officer Gage does not satisfy the “distinctive uniform” requirement in the Police Uniform Statute. As a result, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine and paraphernalia obtained as a result of this invalid traffic stop.
Reversed.
Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.