Crone, J.
Russell G. Finnegan appeals the trial court’s finding that he was in indirect criminal contempt of court. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to act on his notice of intent to file an insanity defense and appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his criminal contempt hearing. We agree and therefore reverse and remand.
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Finnegan raises two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his criminal contempt hearing. [Footnote omitted.] Specifically, he argues that a trial court “abuses its discretion when it improperly denies a defendant the evaluations contemplated by statute when a Notice of Mental Disease or Defect has been filed.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. We agree.
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Here, well before the final criminal contempt hearing, Finnegan’s counsel alerted the trial court that there is a “mental health issue with [Finnegan]” and that he was in the process of having mental health evaluations completed in an unrelated criminal case also pending in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. In response, Judge Chidester remarked that he personally did not believe that Finnegan was mentally ill based upon prior observations of and interactions with him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court scheduled the final criminal contempt hearing for January 27, 2023. On January 19, 2023, Finnegan’s counsel filed a notice of his intent to raise the defense of mental disease or defect along with a request for the appointment of medical personnel to examine Finnegan pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Defense counsel informed the court that one of the evaluations had been completed in the unrelated criminal matter and that the other evaluation was still pending. The trial court never ruled on Finnegan’s notice or request, and the criminal contempt hearing proceeded on January 27, 2023, after which Finnegan was found in contempt and sentenced to just under six months of jail time.
The State’s sole response to the trial court’s “fail[ure] to act upon Finnegan’s request to assert an insanity defense” is its claim that Finnegan was simply “not entitled” to file that notice and obtain the statutory mental health evaluations because a contempt proceeding is not a “trial of a criminal case” as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Appellee’s Br. at 17-18. The State likens contempt proceedings to “other civil matters[,]” see id., and directs us to case law in which Indiana courts have recognized the general proposition that contempt is a “sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in nature, although both of those labels are used to describe certain categories of contempt.” Buford v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1990)).
It is well established that contempt proceedings are categorized as either civil or criminal, according to the nature and purpose of the sanction imposed…
Indeed, this Court has recognized that “[o]ne who is subject to criminal contempt is afforded many of the same constitutional safeguards that a defendant in a criminal trial enjoys because of the penalties that may be imposed.”…
We conclude that a criminal contempt proceeding is a “trial of a criminal case” as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. [Footnote omitted.] Accordingly, defendants like Finnegan, who are held to answer for criminal contempt and face the same array of punishments as do other criminal defendants, are entitled to the same statutory protections afforded other criminal defendants, including the right to file a notice of insanity defense and obtain the appointment of appropriate experts to testify at the contempt proceedings. Therefore, the trial court here abused its discretion in failing to act upon Finnegan’s notice and thereby denying him the mental health evaluations required by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2.
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The State suggests that Judge Chidester did not need assistance from experts because he was essentially able to and did determine, based upon his prior observations and familiarity with Finnegan, that Finnegan did not suffer from a mental disease or defect that rendered him incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. However, we emphasize that criminal contempt is a specific intent offense, as it requires that the defendant’s conduct be “willful.” Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1. Accordingly, the only relevant mental condition is Finnegan’s condition at the time of this offense.
We recognize that “even when experts are unanimous in their opinion, the factfinder may discredit their testimony—or disregard it altogether—and rely instead on other probative evidence[,]” such as lay testimony or demeanor evidence, “from which to infer the defendant’s sanity.” Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1003 (citing Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind. 2010)). Be that as it may, Finnegan should have had the opportunity to obtain and offer the requested expert evaluations, and it would have then been the trial court’s prerogative to disregard that testimony if it was unpersuasive or inconsistent with other probative evidence. Under the circumstances presented, we simply cannot say with confidence that the absence of expert opinion testimony had no bearing on the outcome of this case. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 (noting basic premise of harmless error analysis that criminal conviction may stand when error had no bearing on outcome of case). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s finding of indirect criminal contempt and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.