Najam, S.J.
Statement of the Case
Jasmine McNeil, individually and on behalf of her three children, submitted a proposed complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance against Anonymous Hospital and other qualified health care providers (the “Hospital”). Appellants’ Conf. App. Vol. II, pp. 52-56. [Footnote omitted.] McNeil accuses the Hospital of medical malpractice based upon incorrect laboratory test results which led to a misdiagnosis and which caused an erroneous report of child abuse to be created. In her proposed complaint McNeil claims that the Hospital’s alleged malpractice was the proximate cause of the emotional distress and other damages she and her children have suffered as a result of an unsubstantiated child abuse investigation caused by the Hospital. Id. The gravamen of the complaint is that the Hospital laboratory produced negligent, inconclusive, and incorrect test results. McNeil requested that a Medical Review Panel be convened to conduct a thorough inquiry.
The Hospital sought an initial determination of law and asked the trial court to enter summary judgment against McNeil as to all claims raised in the proposed complaint. Id. at 20-21. The Hospital argued it enjoyed statutory immunity from McNeil’s claims under Indiana Code § 31-33-6-1(a) (2018), which generally grants qualified immunity to a person who makes or causes to be made a report of child abuse or neglect (the “reporting statute”). McNeil countered that under Indiana Code § 31-33-6-1(b) (2018), the immunity provided under the reporting statute does not apply to a qualified health care provider defending an action for medical malpractice. Appellants’ Br. p. 5.
The trial court granted the Hospital’s Motion for Preliminary Determination and Motion for Summary Judgment, and McNeil filed a motion to correct error, which the court summarily denied. McNeil now appeals.
We reverse and remand
Question Presented
This appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. We are asked to determine the meaning, operation, and effect of Indiana Code Section 31-33-6- 1(b) (“subsection (b)”), a provision which our legislature added to the child abuse or neglect reporting statute in 2018. The specific question presented is whether under the reporting statute, as amended by subsection (b), a qualified health care provider who has not acted with gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, retains immunity under Indiana Code Section 31-33-6-1(a) from a medical malpractice action for making or causing to be made a report of child abuse or neglect “even if the reported child abuse or neglect is classified by the department [of child services] as unsubstantiated.” Indiana Code § 31-33-6- 1(a)(1)-(6). And a necessary corollary to this question is whether the holding in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K., 920 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) survived the 2018 amendment of the statute.
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We conclude that subsection (a) and subsection (b) can easily be harmonized and reconciled. Clearly the legislature did not intend for the subsection (b) exception to swallow the subsection (a) rule as the Hospital alleges when it contends that the subsection (b) amendment “emasculates the legislative intent expressed in the same statute and by this Court.” Appellees’ Br. p. 5. Rather, it is apparent that the legislature determined that both reporting immunity under subsection (a) and an action for medical malpractice allowed under subsection (b) are mutually exclusive and can co-exist within the same statute.
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That is the plain meaning of subsection (b). Thus, we hold that the qualified immunity provided under subsection (a) does not preclude a cause of action for medical malpractice as provided under subsection (b) arising from the same facts. In other words, where medical negligence causes or contributes to an otherwise lawful report of suspected child abuse or neglect, the reporting statute does not preclude a medical malpractice claim arising from the same facts, evidence, and circumstances leading to the report. Subsection (a) and subsection (b) can be harmonized and, thus, the reporting statute and the Medical Malpractice Act are mutually exclusive. “Recognizing that a valid interpretation exists so as to reconcile and harmonize both provisions in the present case, we will – and must – give effect to both provisions.” Rodriguez v. State, 129 N.E.3d 789, 796 (Ind. 2019).
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Thus, we hold that Senate Bill 431 abrogated our holding in Anonymous Hospital v. A.K. Under subsection (a) of the reporting statute, as amended, where the person creating the report has not acted with gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct, the act of making or causing a report to be made is immunized. And under subsection (b) of the reporting statute, as amended, the same underlying facts may nevertheless support an action for medical malpractice, which is not immunized, and such an action would be an action for the underlying medical negligence, not an action for creation of the report.
Conclusion
We conclude that subsection (b) represents a deliberate legislative policy determination that notwithstanding the reporting immunity provided under subsection (a), the standard of care for qualified healthcare providers under the Medical Malpractice Act applies to child abuse reporting. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the Hospital, direct the trial court to deny the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.