Molter, J.
Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 64, we exercised our discretion to accept the following certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: “Does the Indiana Code—in particular, §§ 3‐9‐2‐3 to ‐6— prohibit or otherwise limit corporate contributions to [political action committees] or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures?” In short, our answer is: Yes.
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The Seventh Circuit asks whether Indiana Code sections 3‐9‐2‐3 to ‐6 prohibit corporate contributions to Super PACs like the Victory Fund. When we interpret a statute, we “give its words their plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). As we do that, we are mindful of both what the statute says and what it does not say. Id.
Here, both sides agree that none of the relevant statutes say anything about corporate contributions to Super PACs for independent expenditures, but the parties disagree about what conclusion follows from that silence. The plaintiffs argue that silence means the contributions are prohibited, and the election officials argue that silence means the contributions are permitted. We agree with the plaintiffs that the plain, unambiguous meaning of the text is that the contributions are prohibited.
I.Corporate contributions to PACs are limited to contributions that are statutorily authorized, which do not include contributions to Super PACs for independent expenditures.
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II. The statutes are unambiguous.
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III. We cannot revise unambiguous statutes through judicial interpretation to avoid a constitutional defect.
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Conclusion
We hold that Indiana Code sections 3‐9‐2‐3 to ‐6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent campaign‐related expenditures. We are mindful that the parties expect this holding will lead the federal courts to enjoin the election officials’ enforcement of those statutes as applied to contributions like the one Sarkes Tarzian wishes to make to the Victory Fund. But we must leave it to the General Assembly to update its statutes to remedy any such constitutional defect, as statutory revision is beyond our authority.
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Slaughter concur.
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion.
Goff, J., dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority and would answer the certified question, “no.” I reach this conclusion by inferring what the legislature most likely intends the Indiana Election Code to mean in the aftermath of Citizens United.
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In giving an answer to this request, we must consider our own Court’s responsibilities. I see our duty as broader than merely to expound the meaning of texts. We represent one of three branches of government in a state that is itself bound into a wider national union. Our rulings should, where possible, support coherence in this constitutional order. That means offering the “cooperation that should be practiced between the independent branches of our government” and minimizing unnecessary inter-branch conflict. See State v. Bridenhager, 257 Ind. 699, 703, 279 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972). We can do this when interpreting statutes by favoring “a construction of the text that will make it consistent with the larger system of law in which it is embedded.” Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1275, 1295 (2016).
Here, conflict is needless because we can supply a workable remedy for an entirely hypothetical constitutional violation. We don’t have to upset the apple-cart by substituting our own rigid textualism for everybody else’s practical, commonsense understanding of the law….
This is an unusual case, calling for interpretive flexibility and sensitivity to this Court’s role in helping state government to function. Given the historical context, a focus on the plain statutory text leads us not towards but away from understanding the legislature’s intent and policy and frustrates our aim of bringing consistency and predictability to the law. Ultimately, I don’t believe that we have to throw a wrench into Indiana’s campaign-finance system. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.