Tavitas, J.
Case Summary
If the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the trial court do not act in the child’s best interests, who will? In this case, we reiterate the fundamental purpose behind the statutes governing children in need of services (“CHINS”) cases—the protection of children—and we highlight the crucial role guardians ad litem and court appointed special advocates play in advocating for the children’s best interests. That role comes into sharper focus here, where it is apparent that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the trial court inexplicably ignored the best interests of the child.
DCS filed a petition that alleged Z.H., X.H., Lm.H., and J.H. (collectively, the “Children”) were CHINS as to Le.H. (“Mother”) and J.G. (“Father”).1 The trial court adjudicated the Children CHINS as to Father; however, before the trial court held a fact-finding hearing regarding the same allegations against Mother, DCS moved to dismiss the CHINS cases. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) objected to the dismissal of Z.H.’s CHINS case. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed the CHINS cases, including Z.H.’s, because the Children had not yet been adjudicated CHINS as to Mother.
Z.H. was left in the care of her twenty-one-year-old sister, V.H. (“Sister”), without the establishment of a guardianship. Legal custody remained with Mother, who is alleged to have repeatedly abused Z.H. and faces criminal charges therefor. On behalf of Z.H., the GAL appeals and argues that the trial court erred by dismissing Z.H.’s CHINS case. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand.
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The GAL argues that the trial court erred by dismissing Z.H.’s CHINS case. The GAL contends that the trial court determined that dismissal was mandatory solely because Z.H. had not yet been adjudicated a CHINS as to Mother. Based on the record before us, this appears to be the trial court’s reason for dismissing Z.H.’s CHINS case, and we find that this reason is erroneous. [Footnote omitted.]
This case largely turns on Indiana Code Section 31-34-9-8 (the “dismissal statute”), upon which this Court has had little occasion to opine….
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Here, subsection (b) of the dismissal statute requires the person seeking to dismiss the petition to “set[] forth the reasons” that the petition should be dismissed. Ind. Code § 31-34-9-8(b). Meanwhile, subsection (c) of the statute gives the trial court the option to either “summarily grant” the motion to dismiss or “set a date for a hearing” on said motion. Id. § 31-34-9-8(c). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, the statute permits the court to appoint a guardian ad litem, court appointed special advocate, or both “to represent and protect the best interests of the child.” Id. § 31-34-9-8(d).
A plain reading of the statute reveals that the Indiana General Assembly did not intend for the filing of a motion to dismiss to mandate dismissal of a CHINS case. Rather, the General Assembly intended for trial courts to review the reasons proffered in support of dismissal in light of the evidence and allegations and then determine whether dismissal is in the child’s best interests. In other words, the decision regarding whether to dismiss the CHINS case rests in the trial court’s sound discretion.
The history of the dismissal statute confirms our interpretation. A prior version of the dismissal statute read, “Upon motion by the person representing the interests of the state, the juvenile court shall dismiss any petition the person has filed.”…
Then, in 2005, the General Assembly amended the dismissal statute to reflect its current language. In so doing, the General Assembly removed the “shall dismiss” language and replaced it with the procedures described above. …
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Dismissal of a CHINS case must be in the best interests of the child. Before a trial court can dismiss a CHINS petition, at a minimum, the child needs a qualified legal custodian—an adult that has the legal authority and responsibility to care for the child’s needs. Currently, Mother has that authority—which she has abused. The trial court misconstrued the dismissal statute and failed to determine whether dismissal was in Z.H.’s best interests. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court determine whether dismissal is in Z.H.’s best interests.
Conclusion
The trial court erred by dismissing Z.H.’s CHINS case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court determine whether dismissal is in Z.H.’s best interests.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.