Pyle, J.
A jury convicted Leon Tyson (“Tyson”) of murder in 2017. This Court affirmed Tyson’s conviction on direct appeal. See Tyson v. State, No. 20A03-1704-CR-789, 2017 WL 5761227 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017), trans. denied. In 2018, Tyson filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In May 2021, Tyson, represented by attorneys Jimmy Gurulé (“Attorney Gurulé”) and Elliot Slosar (“Attorney Slosar”), filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. Also, in May 2021, Tyson filed a motion for a change of judge pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). The post-conviction court denied Tyson’s change of judge motion, and this interlocutory appeal concerns only the post-conviction court’s denial of that motion. Tyson specifically argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied his motion for a change of judge. Concluding that the postconviction court did not clearly err, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Tyson’s change of judge motion.
We affirm.
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Tyson argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied his motion for a change of judge. We disagree.
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In post-conviction cases, parties seeking to overcome the presumption of judicial impartiality must move for a change of judge under Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). That rule provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Within ten (10) days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the petitioner. The petitioner’s affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the attorney of record that the attorney in good faith believes that the historical facts recited in the affidavit are true. A change of judge shall be granted if the historical facts cited in the affidavit support a rational inference of bias or prejudice.
(Emphasis added).
This rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 939 (Ind. 2009). A change of judge is neither automatic nor discretionary but calls for a legal determination by the post-conviction court. Id. We presume that the post-conviction court is not biased against a party and disqualification is not required under the rule unless the judge holds a “personal bias or prejudice.” Id. (quoting P.-C.R. 1(4)(b)). Typically, a bias is personal if it stems from an extrajudicial source, which means a source separate from the evidence and argument presented at the proceedings. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939. “Such bias or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before [her].” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018).
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We restate Tyson’s first argument as whether the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying his motion for change of judge because the post-conviction court’s 2018 order in the unrelated Royer case finding that Attorney Slosar had violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson….Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” Id. Although the mere assertion that certain adverse rulings by a judge constitute bias and prejudice does not establish the requisite showing, there may be circumstances in which a rational inference of bias or prejudice may be established if a judge’s order is sufficiently egregious. Id.
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Here, however, we find nothing egregious in the July 2018 order that the trial court judge, who is the post-conviction court judge in Tyson’s case, issued in the unrelated Royer case. Rather, the trial court simply concluded that Attorney Slosar’s press conference statements regarding systemic police misconduct in Elkhart, which he had made before the adjudication of Royer’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion, violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a). Further, and more importantly, the trial court’s July 2018 order does not mention Tyson or anything about Tyson’s case, which occurred ten years after Royer’s case. In sum, we find nothing in the Royer order that supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson.
We restate Tyson’s second argument as whether the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge because the postconviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. In Calvert v. State, 498 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), this Court concluded “that a trial judge must disqualify [her]self from a proceeding in which [s]he has actively served as an attorney for one of the parties regardless of whether actual bias or prejudice exists.” Here, there is no allegation that the post-conviction court judge actively served as a deputy prosecutor on Tyson’s case. Indeed, this would have been an impossibility because the post-conviction court judge left the prosecutor’s office in 2002, thirteen years before the State charged Tyson with murder in 2015 and twenty-one years before Tyson’s upcoming hearing on his postconviction petition. Given the remoteness in time of the post-conviction court’s tenure in the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the charges against Tyson and his upcoming post-conviction hearing, Tyson has failed to show the post-conviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. See Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the proximity in time of the historical facts alleged in the affidavit to the matter concerning the motion for a change of judge is a relevant inquiry).
Lastly, we restate Tyson’s third argument as whether the post-conviction court clearly erred in denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge because the postconviction court judge’s 1992-2003 marriage to Cappelletti supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. We note that the post-conviction court judge’s marriage to Cappelletti ended ten years before the State charged Tyson with murder and twenty years before Cappelletti’s potential testimony in Tyson’s post-conviction case. Tyson’s affidavit does not allege that any relationship existed between Cappelletti and the post-conviction court judge after their marriage had been dissolved. Indeed, in her order denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge, the post-conviction court judge specifically noted that she had not had contact with Cappelletti since their marriage had been dissolved in 2003. Given the remoteness in time of the post-conviction court judge’s marriage to Cappelletti to the charges against Tyson and his upcoming post-conviction hearing, Tyson has failed to show that this prior marriage supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson. See Bloomington Magazine, 961 N.E. 2d at 66. See also McKinney v. State, 873 N.E.2d 630, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that where the personal relationship between the trial court judge and her former employee, who was the murder victim’s mother, had ended twenty years before the defendant’s trial and the defendant had not alleged any facts suggesting that any relationship existed between the two after that employment had been terminated, the trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s motion for a change of judge), trans. denied.
In sum, the recited historical facts on which Tyson based his motion for a change of judge simply do not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Tyson as contemplated by Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). We further note that the post-conviction court has neither expressed an opinion on the merits of Tyson’s case nor attacked his character. Accordingly, because we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not clearly err in denying Tyson’s motion for a change of judge. See Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 433. We, therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Tyson’s motion. See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939 (explaining that where Pruitt’s post-conviction court judge was the same judge who had presided over his trial and where Pruitt’s affidavit in support of his motion for a change of judge had shown no historical facts that had demonstrated personal bias on the part of the post-conviction court judge, Pruitt had been provided with a full and fair post-conviction relief hearing before an impartial judge).
Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.