Altice, C.J.
Eighteen-year-old Chase Turner was driving a car when two of his passengers, one of whom was Chordae Spearman, fired several gunshots at another car that had just crashed on I-65 in Indianapolis. Turner acknowledged that his group had been following the car, trying to determine whether a particular individual was inside whom they wished to confront about a friend’s death, but Turner claimed that the shooting was unplanned and surprised him.
Following a jury trial, Turner was convicted of Level 5 felony criminal recklessness based on accomplice liability. On appeal, he claims that Indiana State Police (ISP) Sergeant Christopher Hanson launched an evidentiary harpoon at trial by testifying that Spearman – an unavailable witness – “gave [a] complete confession of everything.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 110. Turner argues, as he did below, that this placed him in grave peril and that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his request for a mistrial.
We reverse and remand for a new trial.
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Turner argues that Sergeant Hanson willfully jabbed an evidentiary harpoon into the trial when he testified that Turner’s co-defendant had made a complete confession of everything, placing him in grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Thus, Turner contends that the only proper remedy was a mistrial and that we should remand for a new trial.
An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the State deliberately places inadmissible evidence before the jury to prejudice the jurors against the defendant. Perez v. State, 728 N.E.2d 234, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. The harpoon may also be launched by a police officer witness. Id. (noting that the detective understood the significance of his improper testimony yet deliberately injected inadmissible evidence). Error alone, however, is not sufficient for reversal, as it must result in grave peril to the defendant. Id.
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Here, the trial court determined that the State, through Sergeant Hanson, had launched an evidentiary harpoon against Turner, and the State did not argue otherwise below.2 That said, the trial court denied a mistrial on the basis that the error did not rise to the level of grave peril because there was other, properly admitted evidence, tending to prove the same facts – that Spearman fired shots toward the Kia while Turner drove past the crash scene. The court expressly disagreed with Turner’s argument that Sergeant Hanson’s improper testimony that Spearman gave a compete confession of everything implied more than Spearman’s own involvement in the shooting. The trial court also believed that the error could be cured through either an admonishment or additional questioning of Sergeant Hanson, with Turner choosing the latter.
Turner argues that this case presented a close call for the jury regarding whether he knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused Spearman to shoot at the Kia. He claims that Sergeant Hanson’s testimony that Spearman gave a complete confession of everything was “an improper shortcut to making that showing,” one likely to influence the verdict. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Turner also notes that the testimony was elicited by the State in response to cross-examination that highlighted the lack of digital evidence of planning or coordination between himself and Spearman or the other occupants of the Ford. Indeed, Sergeant Hanson testified that police did not need to investigate the suspects’ social media accounts because Spearman gave a complete confession of everything. In sum, Turner argues that even with the follow-up questioning, it was “impossible to cabin the confession to exclude Turner,” as “[r]easonable jurors may have been left with the impression that Spearman really did implicate Turner in his confession, but Sergeant Hanson was not supposed to talk about it.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11, 12.
We agree with Turner. While there was sufficient evidence here to support the verdict, as Turner concedes, the evidence of his knowledge that Spearman and Luna planned to shoot at the Kia was too weak for us to say with certainty that the improper testimony did not influence the verdict. The prejudicial impact of testimony that Turner’s codefendant gave a complete confession of everything cannot be denied; it placed him in grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. And the peril was not eliminated by Sergeant Hanson’s subsequent clarification that, by said testimony, he meant only to communicate that Spearman confessed to firing the shots. The jury was still left to wonder to what extent Spearman’s confession implicated Turner, especially given that ISP stopped investigating Turner’s social media accounts after obtaining the confession. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Turner’s motion for a mistrial.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
Riley, J. and Pyle, J., concur.