Foley, J.
L.T. Garrett (“Garrett”) bought a truck from Nissan of Lafayette, LLC (“the Dealership”). He alleges that the Dealership lied to him when it informed him that the truck had a replacement engine, and that the replacement engine was covered by a two-year warranty issued by the manufacturer. After the engine failed, and the Dealership refused to replace it, Garrett filed a complaint in the Bartholomew Circuit Court asserting an array of claims: several types of fraud and a violation of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (“IDCSA”). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Dealership. [Footnote omitted.] Garrett appeals, and the Dealership filed a cross-appeal contending that the trial court erred when it declined to rule that a set of requests for admission should be deemed admitted. We reject the cross-appeal and agree with Garrett. The trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for additional proceedings.
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We address the dealership’s cross-appeal first. The Dealership seeks to reverse the trial court’s order regarding the RFA, thereby reintroducing as factors the admissions of material elements adverse to Garrett’s claims. “A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(B) set forth in the request, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request.” Ind. Trial Rule 36. Failure to respond to requests for admission can have a severe consequence. “The matter is admitted unless, within a period designated in the request . . . the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney.” T.R. 36(A).
“Matters admitted are deemed conclusively established, unless the trial court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.”…
Because the penalty for a failure to respond to RFA is so severe, and because every trial lawyer knows, or certainly should, of the risk of that penalty, Garrett here should have availed himself of one of several options. He should have arrived at a consensus with respect to the timeliness of the requests. If no consensus could be reached, he should have sought a ruling from the trial court. In any event, he had nothing to lose by simply drawing up denials of the RFA and serving them on the Dealership—thereby ensuring that his client’s interests were protected—regardless of whether he believed he was under an obligation to do so. Garrett’s counsel admits as much….
Nevertheless, we are reluctant to intrude upon the trial court’s discretion, especially as it pertains to discovery disputes. Such disputes are, unfortunately, common. Our rules convey a preference that they be resolved informally, or at least, that attempts to do so must be made before involving the trial court. T.R. 26(F). If the trial court does become involved, it enjoys “broad discretion with regard to rulings on discovery matters based upon its duties to promote discovery of the truth and to guide and control the proceedings.” State v. McKinney, 82 N.E.3d 290, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Miller v. State, 825 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied) (emphasis added). “‘Therefore, such rulings will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.’” Id.
“An important purpose of [Rule 36] is to more quickly and efficiently reach a resolution based on the actual facts[.]”…
Rule 36 is part of an overarching preference of our court system: when possible, to resolve cases on the merits. The rule seeks to streamline the process by allowing parties to essentially stipulate to matters which are not seriously in dispute: things like the authenticity of an exhibit.
But that is not what the Dealership’s RFA were used for. It, rather, employed an increasingly frequent tactic entirely at odds with the spirit of the rule: “he sent them because he hoped [the opposing party] would not respond, rendering the matters admitted by operation of Rule 36.” Costello, 55 N.E.3d at 353. Far from streamlining the process of arriving at a final judgment on the merits, the admissions sought here were basically an invitation for Garrett to plead himself out of court. These considerations, as well as the balancing of the equities of the situation, place the trial court’s granting of Garrett’s motion regarding the RFA firmly within the trial court’s discretion. We do not disturb its ruling.
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Reversed and remanded.
Altice, C.J., and May, J., concur