Bailey, J.
Case Summary
G.H. appeals an involuntary commitment order which expired on May 13, 2023, and Richard L. Roudebush Veterans Affairs Medical Center (“the Hospital”) contends the appeal should be dismissed as moot. However, because we find the case presents an opportunity to develop case law on an issue that is likely to recur in this and other cases—i.e., the proof necessary to impose special conditions on a commitment—we choose to address it on the merits.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
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G.H. asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed upon him the special condition that he “shall not consume alcohol or drugs except as prescribed” if he is discharged on outpatient therapy to a “wet shelter.” Appealed Order at 2. Indiana law allows a court to impose special conditions when ordering an individual to enter outpatient therapy. Ind. Code § 12-26-14- 3. However, there must be sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude that such a “special condition” bears a reasonable relationship to the treatment of the individual and the protection of the individual and the public. M.L. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown Mental Health CMHC, 80 N.E.3d 219, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). Thus, we have struck down a special condition prohibiting the use of alcohol and drugs where a doctor requested that condition without any evidence that the individual had ever used or abused such substances. Id. at 224; see also M.M. v. Clarian Health Partners, 826 N.E.2d 90, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
In this case, there was no evidence that G.H. had ever abused alcohol or drugs in the past or that he was likely to do so in the future. Rather, Dr. Filipowicz stated that he did not know that “substance use” was ever an issue in G.H.’s life. Tr. at 23. The doctor did opine that he “would encourage anyone” who is on medications such as those prescribed for G.H. to “avoid taking illicit drugs or, you know, overindulging in alcohol.” Id. (emphasis added). However, the doctor never stated that G.H. should refrain from all alcohol and drug use, such as use of over-the-counter drugs. Because there was insufficient evidence in the record showing a reasonable relationship between the prohibition on the use of alcohol and drugs and G.H.’s treatment and safety or that of the general public, the special condition should not have been imposed. The trial court abused its discretion in doing so.
Conclusion
We address the merits of G.H.’s temporary commitment, despite its expiration, in order to develop the case law on the issue of the proof necessary to impose a special condition on an involuntary commitment to outpatient therapy. While we find clear and convincing evidence supporting the involuntary commitment, we find insufficient evidence to support the special condition imposed on G.H.’s outpatient treatment. We affirm the involuntary commitment order in part but reverse in part and remand with instructions to strike the special condition prohibiting G.H. from consuming alcohol and drugs during his outpatient treatment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. Judge Kenworthy concurs.
Judge Tavitas concur in part and dissents in part with opinion.
Judge Tavitas, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur that the evidence was sufficient to find G.H. gravely disabled. I dissent, however, from the majority’s determination that the evidence was insufficient to support the imposition of a special condition. G.H. anticipated returning to an apartment at a “wet facility” for veterans upon his release from inpatient care. Tr. Vol. II p. 37. When discussing the order to avoid using alcohol and non-prescribed drugs, Dr. Flipowicz testified that avoiding “illicit drugs” and “overindulging in alcohol” is encouraged when taking “a medication like Invega.” Id. at 23. Given the need to avoid non-prescribed drugs and alcohol during treatment with Invega and the implicit reduction in supervision after G.H.’s release from inpatient care, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special condition of avoiding the consumption of non-prescribed drugs or alcohol.