May, J.
Red Lobster Restaurants LLC (“Red Lobster”) appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment in a personal injury action filed against it by Abigail Fricke. [Footnote omitted.] Red Lobster raises two issues, which we revise, restate, and reorder as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Red Lobster’s motion to strike Fricke’s affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred when it denied Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment because:
(2.1) Fricke was judicially estopped from pursuing her claim against Red Lobster because she belatedly disclosed her claim to the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee; or
(2.2) Fricke lacked standing to bring a claim against Red Lobster.
We affirm.
….
Red Lobster asserts a lack of standing because Fricke sued in her own name rather than in the name of the bankruptcy estate. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6009 provides:
With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal.
….
Nevertheless, Red Lobster contends a debtor can only act on behalf of the estate when the debtor has disclosed the cause of action to the bankruptcy court, trustee, and creditors. Therefore, Red Lobster argues, Fricke was not acting on behalf of the estate when she brought the instant personal injury suit in her own name. We disagree.
Fricke had standing because she sustained a direct injury. Lorenz v. Anonymous Physician #1, 51 N.E.3d 391, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“the bankrupt party does have standing to sue because he is the party who sustained a direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue”). We also do not accept Red Lobster’s argument that Fricke was not acting on behalf of the estate in pursuing her personal injury lawsuit. The trustee did not intervene when Fricke disclosed the nature of her personal injury claim and the terms of her compensation agreement with the law firm representing her in the personal injury action. Fricke remained “in possession and control of the Claim and [had] the authority to settle.” (App. Vol. III at 90.) Fricke was also under an obligation to advise the trustee upon the resolution of her claim and to not dispose of any funds without first obtaining the consent of the trustee. Thus, had Fricke’s bankruptcy petition not been dismissed, any recovery would have been available to satisfy her creditors. The trial court properly rejected Red Lobster’s argument that Fricke lacked standing. See, e.g., Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1030 (Ind. 1995) (holding bankrupt party had standing to sue and motion to amend complaint to substitute name of bankruptcy trustee as real party in interest related back to filing of original complaint).
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Red Lobster’s motion to strike Fricke’s affidavit. The trial court also did not err when it denied Red Lobster’s motion for summary judgment because Fricke had standing to bring suit in her own name and a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Fricke intentionally concealed her personal injury lawsuit from the bankruptcy court. Therefore, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.