Molter, J.
When police were investigating whether Bryan D. Lyons molested his daughter, he agreed with the prosecutor that he would sit for a polygraph and that the State of Indiana could offer the results into evidence at trial in any resulting prosecution. But on the eve of trial, the deputy prosecutor disclosed that she would not do so because she had just learned that when Sergeant Dan Gress administered the exam years earlier, he had concerns about Lyons’ mental state, so he unilaterally changed the exam to a “nonstipulated,” inadmissible investigatory examination. Sergeant Gress had omitted those facts when testifying at a prior suppression hearing about the admissibility of the polygraph examination and Lyons’ related statements, and he failed to provide prosecutors his notes reflecting that change. Based on this late disclosure, the trial court continued the trial and released Lyons from custody. And as a discovery sanction for Sergeant Gress misleading the parties and the court, the judge suppressed the incriminating statements Lyons made to Sergeant Gress immediately after the exam.
Through an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with a unanimous, published opinion. The State then requested that we “grant transfer and affirm that the exclusion of admissible evidence as a discovery violation sanction is just only when that violation has been blatant and deliberate or it causes substantial prejudice to the defendant.” Pet. to Trans. at 5. We grant transfer today and hold that before excluding evidence as a Trial Rule 37 discovery sanction, a trial court must find that (1) the exclusion is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial prejudice, or (2) that the sanctioned party’s culpability reflects an egregious discovery violation. The trial court’s order enforced Trial Rule 37 within those limits, so we too must affirm.
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The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the State’s evidence as a discovery sanction. We conclude the trial court did not because it based its sanction on a finding that Sergeant Gress misled the court, and that finding is reasonably supported by the record.
Trial Rule 37 authorizes courts to impose sanctions for discovery violations through “such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” Ind. Trial Rule 37(B)(2), including orders prohibiting a party “from introducing designated matters in evidence,” T.R. 37(B)(2)(b); see also Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997). For sanctions addressing a party’s late disclosure of evidence, our cases have long recognized three governing principles: (1) we generally treat late disclosures the same whether the State or the defendant committed the discovery violation; (2) the two typical remedies are to continue the trial or to exclude the evidence; and (3) we exclude evidence only if (a) that is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial unfair prejudice, or (b) the discovery violation was intentional, flagrant, in bad faith, or otherwise reprehensible. Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988–92 (Ind. 1986); see also Armstrong v. State, 499 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. 1986) (discussing the exclusion of evidence for discovery violations which are “flagrant and deliberate,” “misleading,” or in “bad faith”); Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264, 274 (Ind. 1986) (discussing violations which are “grossly misleading” or “demonstrate[] bad faith”).
Courts treat defendants and the State the same because “the office of criminal discovery in Indiana is reciprocity,” the discovery rules must “be fairly balanced between the State and the defendant,” and the discovery rules are “most effective” through equal treatment. Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d at 990. Courts exclude evidence only as a last resort because that remedy frustrates a trial’s truth-seeking function. Id. Thus, “[w]hile sanctions for failure to comply with discovery are within the trial court’s discretion, the primary factors which a trial court should examine are whether the breach was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has resulted.” Id. at 988.
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From the trial court’s perspective, part of what made this an egregious discovery violation warranting the exclusion of Lyons’ statements to Sergeant Gress was the highly unusual context for both the statements and Sergeant Gress’ subsequent omissions. Lyons, who was not represented by counsel, signed the stipulation around the same time he believed shadows were speaking to him. The court credited the testimony of a defense polygraph expert concluding “that when a polygraph examiner determines in the pre-polygraph interview that the examinee has mental issues to such an extent as to render the stipulation invalid, the polygraph examiner should immediately terminate the encounter and end the meeting.” App. Vol. 3 at 15. After all, as the court explained, Sergeant Gress “changing the terms of the contract unilaterally without the permission of the prosecutor or the Defendant frustrated the entire purpose of the Defendant meeting with [Sergeant] Gress.” Id. at 17. And “but for the Defendant entering into the stipulated agreement (i.e. the contract), he would have never spoken to [Sergeant] Gress.” Id.
While the State has not concluded Sergeant Gress’ omissions rose to the level of perjury, it has acknowledged its own frustration and concerns with Sergeant Gress’ failure to timely share information with the prosecutors. Sergeant Gress’ only explanation was that he was relying on Detective Jones to relay to the prosecutor that the polygraph was no longer a stipulated evidentiary exam, but Detective Jones testified he does not recall any such conversation. Just the opposite, Detective Jones does not recall any point in his career—including this incident—when a polygraph examiner informed him that the examiner was changing a stipulated, evidentiary exam to a non-stipulated, investigatory exam. And counting on Detective Jones to relay the information to the prosecutor still does not explain why Sergeant Gress omitted this critical fact from his own testimony at the first suppression hearing, which was all about his polygraph examination.
In sum, our prior cases have explained that trial courts may exclude the State’s evidence when a discovery violation is “grossly misleading or demonstrates bad faith.” Thompson, 492 N.E.2d at 274. Because the trial court found that level of culpability here, and the record supports (even if it does not compel) that conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See, e.g., Whitaker, 960 N.E.2d at 117 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence when a party provided “false and misleading” responses to discovery requests); Cameron v. State, 274 Ind. 436, 444, 412 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1980) (“Where the violation is grossly misleading or demonstrates bad faith, exclusion of the evidence may be required.”).
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order excluding the State’s evidence as a discovery sanction.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.