Massa, J.
Adoptive Parents challenge a Court of Appeals’ decision requiring them to provide notice to biological Father of the temporary custody of Child, rendering the trial court’s order void for lack of personal jurisdiction. While the panel below erred in requiring notice in a temporary custody matter, we resolve this case on the narrower ground of no appellate jurisdiction.
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In June 2020, Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt Child, and separately moved for temporary custody, and to consolidate the adoption and temporary custody cases with the Hamilton Superior Court under Trial Rule 42(D). Father was not served the petition or motions. And while Father was entitled to notice of the adoption petition, Ind. Code §§ 31-19- 2.5-3, 31-19-9-1, the law requires no such notice of temporary custody actions, I.C. § 31-19-2-13.
The Hamilton Superior Court thus conducted a hearing on the motion for temporary custody with only Adoptive Parents and Grandparents present. On July 8, 2020, the court granted Adoptive Parents temporary custody, determining it was in Child’s best interest to be placed with Adoptive Parents while the adoption petition was pending. More than a year later, Father filed a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the trial court’s order of custody, arguing the order was void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction, based on a lack of notice to which he was not legally entitled.
The trial court denied Father’s motion, finding the temporary custody order was not void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction, and explained that Indiana Code section 31-19-2-13 authorizes an ex parte proceeding in temporary custody matters. Father appealed. In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred in denying Father’s Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the temporary custody order. P.L. v. M.H. and A.H., 194 N.E.3d 654, 2022 WL 3724896, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2022). The panel reasoned that because Adoptive Parents failed to serve Father with notice of their adoption petition, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Father, rendering the temporary custody order void. Id. at *2–3.
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The trial court consolidated the two cases pending before it under Trial Rule 42(D), thereby creating one case. But this one case had two separate matters pending before it: one was a motion for temporary custody and the other was a petition for adoption. On July 8, 2020, the Hamilton Superior Court issued one order addressing Father’s preliminary motion to set aside temporary custody, finding it in Child’s best interest to grant temporary custody pending the adoption under Indiana Code section 31- 19-2-13. Because the petition for adoption was still pending at the time the trial court issued this preliminary order—thus not disposing of all the claims—the trial court’s July 8 order was not a final judgment. Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451–52; App. R. 2(H)(1) (“A judgment is a final judgment if . . . it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”).
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Conclusion
Hamilton Superior Court granted only temporary custody while the adoption petition was still pending. Its order was not a final judgment under Appellate Rule 2(H) because it neither disposed of all claims for all parties, Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451, nor stated, “there was no just reason for delay,” T.R. 54(B). The appeal is dismissed.
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.