Goff, J.
Joseph Albert Oberhansley was convicted of burglary and the murder of his former partner, Tammy Jo Blanton—crimes he concedes were “horrific and brutal.” The jury recommended, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In this direct appeal, Oberhansley argues that the jury failed to determine that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances—a statutory prerequisite for an LWOP sentence. We conclude that the jury’s LWOP recommendation implicitly reflected the necessary determination and, thus, the trial court did not err in imposing the sentence. Oberhansley also claims that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the severe mental illness he was suffering when he committed these crimes. Considering his character and the nature of his crimes, we cannot agree with him. Consequently, we affirm his sentence.
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Oberhansley argues that the jury, lacking the verdict form for weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, failed to make a determination on this issue, and, thus, that the trial court lacked the authority to impose an LWOP sentence. He further claims that imposition of the LWOP sentence without the necessary jury finding violated his right to due process under the federal constitution. Oberhansley also seeks revision of his sentence, asserting that it was inappropriate because he committed his crimes due to severe mental illness.
While we reject the State’s assertion that Oberhansley waived his claims of sentencing error, our review of the record convinces us that the jury did, in fact, make the necessary weighing determination. And reviewing Oberhansley’s sentence, we do not find compelling evidence casting his crimes or his character in a positive light. Consequently, we decline to revise his LWOP sentence.
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Before the jury may recommend LWOP, it must: (1) find at least one aggravating circumstance proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) provide a special verdict form for each aggravating circumstance alleged, and (3) find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (Ind. 2008) (citing I.C. §§ 35-50-2- 9(d), (e), (l)).
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Here, Oberhansley claims that the jury failed to take the third required step and find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
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Turning to the merits of the statutory issue, we are satisfied that the record shows the jury did make the required weighing determination. First, both the preliminary and final instructions to the jury repeatedly hammered the point that the jury could not recommend LWOP without finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
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The record of the sentencing process relieves any lingering doubt as to whether the jury properly determined the issue. Oberhansley’s case in the sentencing hearing was dedicated to showing that his mental illness constituted mitigating circumstances. Tr. Vol. VIII, pp. 162, 181, 245–46. He offered expert testimony that his mental illness deprived him of the capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his actions. Id. at 163, 229. The State, in its closing argument in the penalty phase, specifically asked the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to find that “these aggravators outweigh the mitigated factors of his mental illness.” Id. at 237. All in all, we do not doubt that the jury was conscious of its duty to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that it made the determination it had to make, and that its final recommendation of LWOP reflected this. The trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing an LWOP sentence.
Oberhansley claims that the trial court deprived him, without due process, of a “liberty interest” in not receiving an LWOP sentence “absent the jury finding required” by statute. Appellant’s Br. at 34. He cites as authority Hicks v. Oklahoma, in which the Oklahoma courts denied the defendant the opportunity, required by state statute, to have a jury determine his sentence. 447 U.S. 343, 345 (1980). The United States Supreme Court held that, when a state leaves sentencing to the discretion of a jury, the defendant “has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion.” Id. at 346. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained, a defendant may not be arbitrarily deprived of this liberty interest without “due process of law.” Id.
As in Hicks, Oberhansley had “a statutory right to have a jury fix his punishment in the first instance.” See id. at 347. But here, unlike in Hicks, the issue was submitted to the jury. And we have already inferred from the instructions and the trial record that the jury did make the necessary weighing determination. Thus, Oberhansley’s due process claim necessarily fails.
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Oberhansley asks us to review and revise his sentence.
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In short, neither the nature of Oberhansley’s crimes nor the content of his character mark this case as an outlier warranting revision of his LWOP sentence.
Oberhansley’s penalty-phase jury determined, as required by statute, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. His LWOP sentence is not inappropriate. Consequently, the sentence is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Slaughter, J., concurs except as to footnote 4.