Shepard, S.J.
Devun York challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss a charge which alleged he was in possession of a machine gun in violation of Indiana Code section 35-47-5-8 (2014). In this interlocutory appeal, we are asked to determine whether: (1) the facts set forth in the charge constitute a crime; and, (2) whether the statute defining a machine gun is unconstitutionally vague under the United States and Indiana constitutions. We affirm.
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York was charged with Level 5 felony possession of a machine gun. Ind. Code § 35-47-5-8. “Machine gun” is statutorily defined as: “a weapon that: (1) shoots; or (2) can be readily restored to shoot; automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-190 (2012).
York says, “the facts alleged in the information—a handgun ‘equipped with a switch device’—do not constitute the offense of possession of a ‘machine gun.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. He observes that his Glock pistol is a “handgun” as defined by Indiana Code section 35-47-1-6 (1983), and that the Glock-switch device is classified as a “firearms accessory” by Indiana Code section 35-47-15.1 (2011), but argues “possessing a firearm with an accessory” is not a criminal offense. See Appellant’s Br. p. 10-11. He also argues that because the statutory definition of “machine gun” does not contain terms such as “adapt” or “convert” as used in the firearm and handgun statutes respectively, but, rather, includes language that it can be “readily restored,” the legislature did not intend for the definition of “machine gun” to include “devices that have been adapted or converted by accessories.”
We believe the straightforward language of Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-190 focuses on what the gun can do, and in this case, under subsection (1), the gun can shoot “automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” Ind. Code §35-31.5-2-190. And we need not address York’s arguments under subsection (2) as the statute is written in the disjunctive. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the charge states a crime.
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York presents arguments, citing both of the Brown decision’s independent reasons, as support for his claim that the machine gun statute is unconstitutionally vague. More specifically, he claims the language of the machine gun statute “is vague because ‘there must be something in a criminal statute to indicate where the line is to be drawn . . . . It cannot be left to juries, judges, and prosecutors to draw such lines…” York also suggests that the statute allows “‘the possibility that it authorizes or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement,’” Appellant’s Br. pp. 15-16 (quoting Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 467), though he connects that claim with his notice argument and does not make a separate claim about discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement here.
The first Indiana case to address the possession of a Glock with a switch was A.W. v. State, 192 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), involving a different kind of facts from the present case, but addressing knowledge that the weapon was a machine gun. In A.W., the juvenile did not dispute his possession of the weapon; rather, he disputed his knowledge that it was a machine gun. The Glock in that case similarly had a switch attached that converted it from a semiautomatic weapon to a machine gun. We held that knowledge and intent are mental states, and absent an admission by the defendant, are established by resort to reasonable inferences drawn from direct and circumstantial evidence. Id. at 231. In that case, the juvenile’s flight from law enforcement, led to the inference that he knew he was in possession of a machine gun, and on appeal, we declined to reweigh the evidence, affirming the adjudication. Id.
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Here, the machine gun statute, as examined in light of the facts of the case at hand, notifies the public and law enforcement officers that if a gun shoots “automatically more than one (1) shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger,” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-190, then it is a machine gun. Forensic testing of this particular gun established that the switch converts the semiautomatic Glock 19 pistol to fire in a fully automatic mode, or more than one shot without manual reloading when fired.
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Additionally, York seems to argue that the statute is vague because it does not tell him that the use of firearms accessories to make a gun a machine gun is prohibited. Appellant’s Br. p. 15. However, the focus of the machine gun statute is on what the gun can do, not on how or when it is made. And Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-190 makes clear that York’s gun was a machine gun. Thus, his comparison of the language in Indiana Code section 35-47-2-7(a) (2019), involving prohibited sale or transfer of ownership of handguns and machine guns, is inapposite.
Because we use the same analysis in determining whether the statute is vague under the federal and state constitutions, we conclude that York has not met his burden of overcoming the presumption that the machine gun statute is constitutional. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
The trial court did not err by concluding that the facts of the case state a crime or by concluding that the machine gun statute is not impermissibly vague under the federal and state constitutions.
We affirm.
Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.