Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, Tiffance Fields (Fields), appeals the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Appellee-Defendant, Constance Gaw (Gaw).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Fields presents this court with two issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following: Whether any genuine issue of material fact exists that landlord Gaw was an “owner” of her tenants’ dogs for purposes of establishing liability under Indiana’s Liability for Dog Bites Statute (Dog Bite Statute).
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The term “owner” is defined in the Dog Bite Statute as “the owner of a dog. The term includes a person who possesses, keeps, or harbors a dog.” I.C. § 15- 20-1-2. The terms “possesses, keeps, or harbors” are not further defined within the Statute itself. Fields does not contend that there is any factual dispute that Gaw owned, possessed, or kept the dogs at issue. Rather, Fields argues that the undisputed facts show that Gaw, through entering into a lease which permitted Jason to have dogs at the rental property, harbored the dogs, rendering her an “owner.”
In addressing Fields’ claim, we initially observe that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed because we assume that “the legislature does not intend by a statute to make any change in the common law beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication.” L.N.K. ex rel. Kavanaugh v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.E.2d 303, 306-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Neither party has directed us to any Indiana authority construing the term “harbors” in the context of the Dog Bite Statute. Therefore, we will begin our analysis by determining whether the term is clear and unambiguous. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1285. Gaw argues that the term “harbors” is unambiguous, while Fields takes no position and offers us alternate arguments regarding whether the term is ambiguous. However, we note that in Cook, our supreme court considered who is an “owner” while addressing Cook’s argument that she was not an owner under the Statute because she was not in possession of her dog at the time it bit a postal worker. Id. at 274-75. Although the precise issue before us was not addressed by the court, the Cook court did not find the part of the Statute defining “owner” to be ambiguous; rather, it simply applied its terms and rejected Cook’s argument. Id.
We hold that the word “harbors” as used in the Statute is unambiguous and that it has a specific meaning within the context of a statute that concerns dogs. See Carter v. Carolina Tobacco Co., Inc., 873 N.E.2d 611, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that, when interpreting a statute, it is necessary to consider the context of the words “because words that have one meaning in a particular context frequently have a different significance in another”). This court has resorted to the Corpus Juris Secundum to define the meaning of the term “keeper” for purposes of discerning liability in a general, common law dog bite case. See Williams v. Pohlman, 146 Ind. App. 523, 526, 257 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970). We do so here as well. “A person “harboring” a dog . . . is a person who affords lodging, shelters, or gives refuge to a dog for a limited purpose or time[.]” C.J.S. Animals § 379. In Cook, our supreme court noted that the then-current version of the Statute, Indiana Code section 15-5-12-2, expanded the definition of “owner” to include those who possess, keep, and harbor a dog, a class of people to whom the court referred as “custodians” of the animal, which indicates to us that something more than a mere rental agreement allowing pets must exist for a landlord to be a harborer of a dog for purposes of the Statute. Cook, 796 N.E.2d 274.
We conclude that it is a person who directly lodges, shelters, or gives refuge to a dog who is harboring the dog, as opposed to a person who merely owns and rents out the place where the dog is lodged, sheltered, or provided refuge. Our reading of the Statute finds support in the law of other districts that have construed the term “harbor” or “harboring” in animal injury liability statutes similarly defining “owner”. See, e.g., Whitten v. Luck, 6 N.E.3d 866, 868-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (holding that landlords did not harbor tenant’s dog and were thus not “owners” for purposes of the Illinois strict liability statute for damages caused by an animal defining “owner” in part as one who “harbors” an animal, where there was no evidence landlords provided food and shelter on at least a semipermanent basis, even where the lease allowed pets on the rental property and landlords knew tenants owned a dog), trans. denied; see also Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Minn. 2012) (holding that for purposes of Minnesota’s strict liability dog injury statute defining “owner” as including “any person harboring” the dog, a person “harboring” a dog is one who “affords lodging, shelters, or gives refuge to a dog for a limited purpose or time” and noting that, under prior decisions, neither the mere right to exclude nor the possession of the land on which an animal is kept, even where coupled with permission given to a third person to keep it, is sufficient to convert a landlord into a “harborer” of the animal).
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CONCLUSION
We hold that no genuine issue of material fact exists precluding summary judgment as to whether Gaw was an “owner” of the dogs at issue pursuant to the Dog Bite Statute. [19] Affirmed.
Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur