May, J.
Rachel W. Baker appeals her conviction of Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine at a penal facility.1 She presents three arguments, which we consolidate and restate as: 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the methamphetamine found on Baker during a search incident to arrest; and 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence Baker was voluntarily in the Cass County Jail as required to elevate her conviction of possession of methamphetamine from a Level 6 felony to a Level 5 felony.
We affirm.
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Baker argues she was not required to identify herself under the [Indiana Seatbelt Enforcement Act] ISEA and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine found in her pocket during a subsequent search.
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The ISEA states, in relevant part, “a vehicle may be stopped to determine compliance with this chapter. However, a vehicle, the contents of a vehicle, the driver of a vehicle, or a passenger in a vehicle may not be inspected, searched, or detained solely because of a violation of this chapter.” Ind. Code § 9-19-10- 3.1(a). Law enforcement officers can initiate a traffic stop pursuant to the ISEA “only where they [have] reasonable suspicion that a seat belt violation [has] occurred.” State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. 2010). The plain language of the statute requires “‘that when a stop to determine seat belt compliance is made, the police are strictly prohibited from determining anything else, even if other law would permit.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 339 (Ind. 1999)). However, we have held,
when circumstances arise after the initial stop that create reasonable suspicion of other crimes, further reasonable inspection, search, or detention is no longer “solely” because of a seatbelt violation and does not contravene the plain language of the statute. The officer may only expand his or her investigation subsequent to the stop if other circumstances arise after the stop, which independently provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.
State v. Morris, 732 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Baker argues “when Trooper Babbs approached the vehicle, there was no indication of any criminal activity inside the vehicle beyond the seatbelt violation…” Thus, she contends, Trooper Babbs’s search of the vehicle violated the ISEA. However, we disagree with Baker based on the holdings of Trigg v. State, 725 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and Richardson.
In Trigg, a panel of this Court held an officer, Detective Stone, had reasonable suspicion to investigate further after initiating a traffic stop based on an alleged violation of the ISEA. 725 N.E.2d at 449. In that case, Detective Stone initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Trigg was riding after observing Trigg and the other occupants of the vehicle not wearing their seatbelts. Id. at 448. Upon approaching the passenger side of the vehicle, where Trigg was sitting, Detective Stone noted “Trigg appeared nervous and [was] ‘fidgeting down in his seat as if he may be attempting to hide something[.]’” Id. (citation to the record omitted). Detective Stone testified he feared Trigg was hiding a weapon and asked Trigg to exit the vehicle. Id. When Trigg exited, Detective Stone observed a “pipe used to smoke crack cocaine, lying on the seat of the car where Trigg had been sitting.” Id. Based thereon, Detective Stone searched the passenger area of the vehicle and found another crack pipe. Id. The State subsequently charged Trigg with Class D felony possession of paraphernalia.
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Our court rejected that argument based on the ISEA. Id. Noting waiver of any argument regarding “the validity of the subsequent searches” as part of the traffic stop, our court addressed the issue waiver notwithstanding in an effort to clarify the ISEA:
A limited search for weapons after an investigative stop is not a search “solely because of a violation” of the seatbelt law. Rather, such a search is the result of actions or behavior on the part of the defendant after the initial stop that lead a police officer to fear for his safety. For this reason, a limited search for weapons does not raise concerns about pretextual stops, where police stop motorists under the guise of enforcing seatbelt laws when the police are actually seeking to search and detain motorists for other reasons. The impetus for a limited weapons search arises after the stop has been made, and the purpose for the search “is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear for his safety or the safety of others.” State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. Thus, [the earlier version of Indiana Code section 9-19-10- 3.1] cannot reasonably be interpreted to prohibit police officers from conducting limited weapons searches to ensure their safety so long as circumstances exist over and above the seatbelt violation itself.
Id. at 448-9. Because Detective Stone testified he believed Trigg possessed a weapon, we then considered whether the search was reasonable[.]
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Our court held that, because Detective Stone reasonably believed Trigg possessed a weapon, he could ask Trigg to exit the vehicle. Id. Then, because the crack pipe was located in plain sight in Trigg’s seat, Detective Stone could seize it under the plain view doctrine. Id. We therefore concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Trigg’s motion to suppress the crack pipes. Id.
Conversely, in Richardson, our Indiana Supreme Court held Officer Tanya Eastwood did not have reasonable suspicion to investigate further after initiating a traffic stop based on an alleged seatbelt violation. 927 N.E.2d at 384. Officer Eastwood initiated a traffic stop of Richardson’s car after she noticed Richardson was not wearing a seatbelt. Id. at 381. Richardson was cooperative with Officer Eastwood and admitted he had not been wearing his seatbelt. Id. Officer Eastwood noticed “a very large, unusual bulge” in Richardson’s pocket. Id. Officer Eastwood asked Richardson what was in his pocket, and Richardson told her it was his handgun. Id.
Officer Eastwood requested Richardson’s handgun permit and asked him to exit the vehicle. Id. Richardson complied, and Officer Eastwood performed a background check on Richardson after she noticed the expiration date on the handgun license was illegible. Id. Officer Eastwood discovered Richardson had prior convictions of possession of cocaine and public intoxication but the sentence for the conviction of possession of cocaine made her question whether it was truly a conviction. Id. Officer Eastwood did not investigate the matter further and arrested Richardson for “having a firearm with a prior felony conviction within the last fifteen years.” Id. (citation to the record omitted). Richardson resisted arrest but was eventually subdued. Id. at 382. The bulge in Richardson’s pocket was later determined to be cocaine he had stashed in his underwear. Id.
Richardson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with the seat belt violation. Id. The trial court granted Richardson’s motion to suppress, and the State appealed. Id. On appeal, the State contended Officer Eastwood’s inquiry regarding the bulge in Richardson’s pants was proper based on our Indiana Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Washington v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1207-8 (Ind. 2008), which held law enforcement’s inquiry regarding whether a motorist has a weapon during a traffic stop did not violate that motorist’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 383. The Richardson Court determined Washington did not control because Washington had not involved a seat belt stop. Id.
The Richardson court discussed Trigg, noting Trigg held “[a]n officer may conduct a limited search of inquiry concerning weapons without obtaining a search warrant if the officer reasonably believes that he or others are in danger.” Id. at 383-4. Our Indiana Supreme Court stated, based on Baldwin, that the ISEA “simply does not permit investigatory behavior based solely on a seat belt violation unless circumstances arise after the stop that independently provide the officer with reasonable suspicion of other crimes.” Id. at 383.
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Ultimately our Indiana Supreme Court held: While Officer Eastwood did observe an “unusual bulge,” this fact standing alone did not provide the independent basis of reasonable suspicion that Baldwin requires, especially in light of Richardson’s immediate compliance and Officer Eastwood’s prior peaceful exchanges with Richardson. On these facts, we agree with the trial court that Officer Eastwood’s questioning about the “unusual bulge” contravened the [Indiana Seatbelt Enforcement] Act. Id. at 384 (internal citation omitted).
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Like the officer in Trigg, Trooper Babbs had information to suggest criminal activity was afoot – specifically, a registration that did not match the vehicle. While Trooper Babbs would have violated the ISEA if he asked for the registration without reasonable suspicion, see Richardson, 927 N.E.2d at 383, Luther’s comment that he purchased the vehicle two weeks prior and had not properly registered the vehicle gave Officer Babbs reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Luther may have committed auto theft or a related crime. See, e.g., Browder, 77 N.E.3d at 1216. Therefore, Officer Babbs’s request that Luther’s passengers, including Baker, provide identifying information did not run afoul of the restrictions on investigation set forth in the ISEA.8 See, e.g., Morris, 732 N.E.2d at 228 (officer can extend stop for alleged violation of the ISEA if he has a reasonable suspicion criminal activity is afoot).
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Therefore, given our reading of the record and the holdings of Trigg and Richardson, we disagree with Baker that Trooper Babbs’ request for Baker’s identification was improper under the ISEA.
As this is the only basis on which Baker challenges the trial court’s admission of the methamphetamine, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the methamphetamine found on Baker during Officer Kennedy’s search at the Cass County Jail.
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Luther’s admission that the vehicle he was driving was not properly registered gave Trooper Babbs reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to allow him to inquire about the identities of Luther’s passengers, including Baker. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine found on Baker. Additionally, Baker voluntarily committed Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine in a penal facility when she chose not to heed Trooper Babbs’s warning that any felony related to possession of any illegal substances would be enhanced when she took those substances into a penal facility. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.