Crone, J.
Case Summary
WEOC, Inc. d/b/a Wings, Etc. (Wings) and Romo, LLC d/b/a El Cantarito (El Cantarito) (collectively Defendants) bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of their joint motion to dismiss Count 3 of the wrongful death suit brought by Leah Niebauer, special representative of the Estate of Nathan Blount, deceased (the Estate). Defendants argue that the Estate’s common law claim for negligent furnishing of alcoholic beverages does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that it does and therefore affirm.
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Count 3 alleges that Defendants violated “their common law duties in furnishing alcoholic beverages to [Adair].” El Cantarito’s App. Vol. 2 at 27. In a negligence claim, a defendant is liable to a plaintiff if “(1) the defendant has a duty to conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with the plaintiff, (2) the defendant has failed to conform its conduct to that standard of care, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff was proximately caused by the breach.”…
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The parties vigorously dispute the impact of the 1986 passage of the Dram Shop Civil Provision on the common law duty of a furnisher of alcoholic beverages to third parties to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in furnishing alcoholic beverages….
Defendants proclaim that our courts have not yet “squarely decided whether common-law negligence claims untethered to a statutory violation survive [Section 15.5’s] enactment [and] ask [this] Court to expressly determine that common-law negligence claims untied to [Section 15.5] fail to state cognizable claims.”2 Wings’s Br. at 10. We emphasize that this case is in its early stages, and therefore the broad proclamation that Defendants seek is inappropriate. Given the procedural posture of this case, we address only whether Count 3 states any set of circumstances that would entitle the Estate to relief claims.” [Footnote omitted.] Wings’s Br. at 10. We emphasize that this case is in its early stages, and therefore the broad proclamation that Defendants seek is inappropriate. Given the procedural posture of this case, we address only whether Count 3 states any set of circumstances that would entitle the Estate to relief.
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In this case, the Estate has brought a civil action for damages proximately caused by Adair’s impairment or intoxication against those who furnished Adair with alcoholic beverages. Thus, the Estate’s common law negligence claim falls squarely within the scope of Section 15.5. In this case, then, Section 15.5 provides a defense to liability in the absence of actual knowledge of visible intoxication. The Estate alleged that Defendants “knew or should have known” that Adair was visibly intoxicated. The allegation that Defendants “should have known” that Adair was visibly intoxicated does not state a claim because that would not satisfy the requirement of Section 15.5 that “the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage had actual knowledge that the person to whom the alcoholic beverage was furnished was visibly intoxicated at the time the alcoholic beverage was furnished.” However, under notice pleading, the allegation that Defendants “knew” that Adair was visibly intoxicated is sufficient to state a claim under which relief could be granted under Section 15.5.
As for the Estate’s allegations that Defendants were negligent in allowing Adair to drive a motor vehicle from their premises, failing to notify law enforcement, and failing to obtain alternative transportation for him, Defendants argue that these do not state claims because Defendant did not owe such duties to Blount, a third-party motorist…
Our courts have considered whether a furnisher of alcohol is liable for damages caused to a third person where the furnisher of alcohol had a duty to the third person that stemmed from circumstances in the particular case that went beyond the mere fact that the defendant furnished alcohol. Compare Gariup Constr. Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind. 1988) (employer owed duty to third-party motorist to supervise employee at employer party because party was held on employer’s premises, employer provided the alcohol, the game encouraging drinking that employee participated in occurred at the party, and the intoxicated person was an employee), and BGC Ent., Inc. v. Buchanan ex rel. Buchanan, 41 N.E.3d 692, 702-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (bar owner not entitled to summary judgment on third-party pedestrian’s claim based on common-law theory of negligent supervision of employee), with Weida, 664 N.E.2d at 751 (facility where wedding reception was held did not owe duty to third-party motorist to supervise or control wedding guest’s behavior), and Est. of Cummings by Heck v. PPG Indus., 651 N.E.2d 305, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (employer did not owe duty to third-party motorist to supervise or control behavior of minor employee who consumed alcohol at off-premises employer event), trans. denied (1996). We note that none of these cases involved a motion to dismiss.
To determine whether a duty exists when it has not been established by law, three considerations are balanced: “(1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm, and (3) public policy concerns.”…
Although the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court, it is also dependent upon the specific facts of a given case. [Footnote omitted.] See Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 386. At this early stage in the proceedings, it would be inappropriate to make such a determination. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.