Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Respondent, Jacquelyn Ivankovic (Wife), appeals the trial court’s division of marital property following the dissolution of her marriage to Appellee-Petitioner, Milan Ivankovic (Husband).
We reverse.
ISSUE
Wife raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when, after awarding Wife ownership of the family dog and requiring Wife to pay Husband for his one-half share of the dog’s value, it granted the minor children the right to take Wife’s dog to Husband’s residence during parenting time at the minor children’s discretion.
….
…. Our jurisprudence is in line with the majority of states which have declined to treat animals as anything more than personal property and which, contrary to the minority of jurisdictions, have refused to extend child custody precepts to dog disputes….
Because dogs are treated as chattel or personal property in Indiana, it is the property rights of the parties, rather than their respective abilities to care for the dog or their emotional ties to it, that are determinative. As a consequence, whichever spouse is awarded the canine will have sole possession to the complete exclusion of the other. While regrettably a harsh and seemingly unfeeling outcome, it is the only one that makes sense. It is no secret that our courts are inundated with child custody cases, cases in which the happiness and welfare of our most precious commodity, children, are at stake. To allow full blown dog custody cases, complete with canine forensics and attorneys representing not only the parties but the dog itself, would further burden the courts to the detriment of children. Such a drain of judicial resources is unthinkable. Therefore, there is no ‘best interests of the canine’ standard in Indiana.
Although the trial court awarded Roxy to Wife as her personal property, Husband now, in essence, attempts to create pet visitation by using the Children’s decision to bring Roxy with them to Husband’s residence during parenting time. Likening Roxy to a child’s cellphone or I-pad, Husband contends that while parents purchase this personal property given to children, it is the trial court’s discretion to allow children to bring that personal property with them during parenting time. In support of his argument, Husband points to the Indiana Child Support Guidelines wherein certain controlled expense items are required to go back and forth with the children.
According to the Indiana Child Support Guidelines, controlled expense items, such as clothing, winter coats, schoolbooks, personal care items, and even cellphones are typically purchased by the custodial or “controlled expense” parent. See Ind. Child Supp. G. 6, Comm. The parent who pays these controlled expenses is the parent who receives the child support, and the other parent may receive a parenting time credit off the child support which is paid. The controlled expense items are purchased for the child with the child support received by the custodial parent. Husband maintains that when items such as these travel back and forth between the parents’ homes with the children, the children are bringing along their own personal property and are not exercising decision-making authority over another person’s property.
Here, the trial court awarded Roxy to Wife in its Decree and ordered Wife to pay Husband an equalization payment of $400. If Roxy had been the Children’s personal property, the dog would not have been included in the marital estate or be subject to division by the trial court, and no equalization payment would have been required. See In re Marriage of Hendricks, 681 N.E.2d 777, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (transferred stock to a child under the Indiana Uniform Transfers to Minors Act rendered the stock outside the marital estate as the stock irrevocably belonged to the child).
Accordingly, while Roxy might be considered a member of the family, under Indiana law, she is Wife’s personal property, and the Children cannot be awarded discretionary decision-making authority to transport Wife’s personal property to Husband’s residence during parenting time. Although the trial court undoubtedly endeavored to reach a fair solution under difficult circumstances, the statute does not contain a provision for pet visitation, and it is not the province of this court to step in and fashion a remedy where the Legislature has abstained from doing so. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s Decree which allows Roxy to travel back and forth between the parties’ households during parenting time.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s decision granting the Children the discretionary right to bring Wife’s dog back and forth during parenting time at the Children’s discretion.
Reversed.
Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur