Brown, J.
Mark A. Wilson (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s dissolution decree and challenges the court’s division of the marital property and calculation of his child support obligation. We reverse and remand.
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Father maintains the court failed to enter findings addressing the statutory factors to support a deviation from the presumed equal division of marital property. He further argues the court should have set aside the personal injury funds he received before dividing the marital property, and asserts that the funds were kept in a separate account, he will continue to incur substantial medical costs, and awarding Mother a portion of the funds results in a windfall to her.
Mother contends the court’s deviation from an equal division was just and reasonable but states that she “concedes that the Decree does not specifically make these findings or state its rationale under the [s]tatutory factors, other than the conclusory ‘based on all the facts and evidence provided’ language” and that she “does not dispute that limited remand is necessary under the [s]tatute for the trial court to elaborate on its findings supporting the unequal division of property in [her] favor.”
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The trial court must divide the marital property in a just and reasonable manner, including property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before the final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint efforts. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4. The “one pot” theory specifically prohibits the exclusion of any asset from the scope of the court’s power to divide and award. Kendrick v. Kendrick, 44 N.E.3d 721, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. While the court may ultimately determine a particular asset should be awarded to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its consideration as to how the marital estate should be divided.
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The court’s distribution of the marital property resulted in Mother receiving $50,540 more than Father and “reflect[ed] a 54% to 46% division of the marital estate.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 16. While the evidence may support an unequal division of property, the court’s decree is devoid of any reason or explanation for its deviation from the presumption of an equal division. The court did not issue findings addressing the factors in Indiana Code § 31-15-7-5 including the parties’ contributions, economic circumstances, conduct, and relative earning abilities. Further, we are unable to infer from the findings that the court considered the factors. See Eye, 849 N.E.2d at 703 (finding the trial court addressed one but not the other factors in Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5 and, “[a]lthough we acknowledge that ‘[t]he trial court’s exclusion of these factors from its written findings does not mean that it did not consider them,’ Shumaker v. Shumaker, 559 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), we are unable to infer from the findings that the trial court did so”). Also, we are prohibited from reweighing the evidence. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to either follow the statutory presumption or to set forth its rationale for deviating from the presumption that an equal division is just and reasonable.
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Father further argues the trial court erred when it did not consider E.’s Social Security disability payments in calculating his child support obligation. He argues the Child Support Guidelines provide that Social Security disability based on a parent’s disability is included in the parent’s income in calculating child support. He states: “The present case differs from the scenarios specifically addressed in the guidelines because the social security disability award for the benefit of the child is not based on a parent’s disability but upon the adult child’s own disability. Nevertheless, the guideline commentary states disability income should be considered even though it is not listed as [a] specific line item on the child support worksheet.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. Mother argues the court ordered that she continue to receive E.’s Social Security income and thus did take her benefit into consideration. She argues E.’s benefit is not based on a parent’s disability but on E.’s own decreased earning capacity.
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The Indiana Child Support Guidelines contain statements which appear to relate primarily to Social Security benefits paid based upon the disability of a parent. Nevertheless, we note that the commentary to Indiana Child Support Guideline 3G states, “[a]lthough Social Security benefits are not reflected on Line 7 of the child support Worksheet, the benefit should be considered, and its effect and application shall be included in the written order for support of that child.”
Here, Mother testified that E. receives a monthly Social Security disability benefit of approximately $840. The court ordered that Father pay $262 per week in support, which is the amount recommended in Mother’s proposed child support worksheet. Her proposed worksheet included amounts for the weekly gross incomes of the parties but did not include any adjustments. 4 The court heard testimony regarding the amounts spent on behalf of E. for housing, groceries, and school fees, E.’s Medicaid coverage, the amount held in a trust for E., and the extent to which E.’s expenses were covered by her disability income. In light of the record, we remand for the trial court to determine and make findings as to whether E.’s overall financial needs are satisfied in whole or in part by the Social Security benefit she receives and for entry of Father’s support obligation which, if appropriate, includes an adjustment for the income E. receives in Social Security benefits.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.