Foley, J.
This appeal stems from an eviction case. [Footnote omitted.] Darleana Johnson (“Johnson”) and her four children rented a home from the Housing Authority of South Bend (“HASB”). Johnson reported to a property manager the following complaints: that the home was not habitable due to mold; a burnt, sparking outlet; water damage caused by leaks in sinks and pipes; and a backed-up sewage line resulting in sewage in the house. HASB offered Johnson alternative housing, and Johnson declined, asserting that the alternatives were just as uninhabitable. HASB filed an eviction notice, and, after a small claims hearing, Johnson was evicted. After a damages hearing, Johnson was then ordered to pay owed rent. Our review of the record reveals several deficiencies in the hearings afforded Johnson, such that she was deprived of her constitutional right to due process. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
….
Johnson claims that the hearing resulting in the final possession order was deficient for two reasons: (1) the small claims court failed to comply with statutory requirements; and (2) the trial court denied Johnson due process by refusing to allow her to assert a defense. In small claims court: “The trial shall be informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law, and shall not be bound by the statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence . . . .” Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A). This informality, however, is not limitless. It cannot supplant fundamental rights or constitutional protections. See, e.g., Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. 2008) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution supersedes the informality format of a small claims case); Harris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (tenant in rent dispute denied due process by small claims judge who failed to remain impartial); Herren v. Dishman, 1 N.E.3d 697, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Lowry v. Lanning, 712 N.E.2d 1000, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing small claims court that denied litigant the fundamental right to cross-examine witnesses). It remains true that: “despite the informality of the proceedings, the parties in a small claims court bear the same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same issues.” Martin v. Ramos, 120 N.E.3d 244, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing LTL Truck Serv., LLC v. Safeguard, Inc., 817 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
….
We first note that we are concerned with the small claims court’s apparent reticence to allow Johnson to call witnesses or to consider her documentary evidence. Furthermore, despite the small claims court’s recognition that Johnson was entitled to cross-examine HASB’s witness, see Tr. Vol. II p. 22, it does not appear that Johnson was ever actually given that opportunity. Towards the end of the hearing, the following colloquy occurred:
MS. JOHNSON: Can I call my witness before [ ] we proceed, please?
THE COURT: It’s going to be the same thing. Without any sort of jurisdiction . . .
MS. JOHNSON: I know. But I have a witness that works for Housing Authority that knows the procedures and the way they are supposed to do things.
THE COURT: [ ] [A]nd that’s not really going to matter because that’s a federal situation.
Id. at 44. Johnson was not permitted to call the witness.
It is true that pro se litigants are generally held to no different a standard than represented parties. See, e.g., Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). But parties, represented or not, must not be expected to insist on being given the protections to which they are guaranteed and should automatically receive. And, as we have recently recognized, our courts play an important role in facilitating pro se litigants: “We also note that the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct gives guidance to trial courts and provides: ‘[a] judge may make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented litigants, to be fairly heard.’” Atkins v. Crawford Cnty. Clerks Off., 171 N.E.3d 131, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2) (emphasis added).
The core of Johnson’s due process argument, however, is that the small claims court refused to hear her defense(s). Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that Johnson raised or sought to raise the following defenses: (1) that HASB violated federal laws and/or regulations and was, therefore, not entitled to take possession of the property; (2) that the fact that HASB violated federal laws and/or regulations means that it also violated the lease, and thus was not entitled to take possession of the property as a matter of state contract law; or (3) both. The small claims court repeatedly stated its belief that Johnson’s defenses could only be raised in a federal court. To the contrary, “‘where there is not exclusive federal jurisdiction the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.’” In re Beck’s Superior Hybrids, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 352, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Jaskolski v. Daniels, 905 N.E.2d 1, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (cleaned up), trans. denied, cert. denied). Johnson was entitled to raise both her federal law defense and her contracts defense in a state court.
We are not insensitive to the realities of small claims courtroom adjudications. Dockets are crowded and litigants are frequently unrepresented by counsel. Nonetheless, we find that the small claims court did not provide Johnson with sufficient due process when it refused to hear her defense(s). If proven, her defense(s) may establish that she was not in breach of the lease, that HASB was in breach of the lease, and Johnson did not unlawfully retain possession of the property. The consequence of such a finding would be that HASB would fail to shoulder its burden of proof. We reverse the small claims court’s order on final possession and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.