Molter, J.
After a juvenile court entered an order in a child in need of services (“CHINS”) proceeding which concluded Richard A. Means, II was likely not responsible for the abuse of his girlfriend’s son—E.H.—the State of Indiana investigated further and charged Means with Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to E.H., a child under fourteen years old, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) and -1(g)(5)(B). The criminal court entered an order in limine excluding from evidence the juvenile court’s CHINS order and then certified the order in limine for a discretionary interlocutory appeal under Appellate Rule 14(B). A Court of Appeals motions panel accepted jurisdiction over the appeal, but then a different Court of Appeals panel assigned to consider the merits dismissed the appeal sua sponte, reasoning that orders in limine are only tentative rulings, so the appealed order was not ripe for appellate review.
Means requests we grant transfer and reverse the trial court’s order in limine. Amicus Indianapolis Bar Association Appellate Practice Section takes no position on the admissibility of the CHINS order, but it requests we grant transfer to provide guidance for procedural issues the Court of Appeals’ opinion presents in discretionary interlocutory appeals. We grant transfer to provide that guidance, concluding: (1) after the Court of Appeals accepts a discretionary interlocutory appeal, it may later dismiss the appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds, although its general reluctance to do so is appropriate; and (2) orders in limine are eligible for discretionary interlocutory review. As for the merits of Means’ appeal, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order because the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury substantially outweigh the order’s probative value.
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To resolve this appeal, we begin by considering whether a Court of Appeals panel may dismiss on non-jurisdictional grounds a discretionary interlocutory appeal which an earlier panel properly accepted. Concluding that it may, we turn next to whether orders in limine are categorically excluded from discretionary interlocutory appeals, explaining that they are not. Finally, we consider Means’ evidentiary argument, affirming the trial court because it did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order and remanding to the trial court for further proceedings.
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I. The Court of Appeals may dismiss a discretionary interlocutory appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds.
Before we reach Means’ evidentiary argument, the Appellate Practice Section argues there is a threshold procedural problem, contending that once the Court of Appeals exercises its discretion to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal, it may not later dismiss the appeal on non-jurisdictional grounds. We disagree. For as long as it has jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals retains the inherent authority to reconsider its decision to accept a discretionary interlocutory appeal, and it makes no difference whether it is the court’s motions panel or writing panel exercising that authority.
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All that said, we agree with Means and the Appellate Practice Section that transfer is necessary because the explanation in the Court of Appeals’ published opinion for dismissing this appeal sweeps too broadly. While the Court of Appeals may dismiss a discretionary interlocutory appeal as improvidently accepted, the published opinion seems to suggest mistakenly that the court must do so when the appeal is from an order in limine. We grant transfer to make clear that while the Court of Appeals does not have to exercise its discretion to accept jurisdiction over discretionary interlocutory appeals of orders in limine, those orders are not categorically excluded from review under Appellate Rule 14(B).
II. Orders in limine are eligible for discretionary interlocutory appeals.
When explaining its decision to dismiss this appeal, the Court of Appeals began by noting that in limine rulings are tentative rulings, subject to revision at trial when a party seeks to introduce the evidence at issue. Means, 193 N.E.3d at 435. That is correct, and that is why, for example, the denial of a motion in limine is insufficient to preserve an issue for later appellate review. Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Ind. 2008) (“Only trial objections, not motions in limine, are effective to preserve claims of error for appellate review. Failure to object at trial to the admission of the evidence results in waiver of the error, notwithstanding a prior motion in limine.”).
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Appellate Rule 14(B) allows for early appellate review of “other interlocutory orders” beyond those for which there is an early appeal as of right through Appellate Rule 14(A), and Appellate Rule 14(B) does not limit the orders subject to discretionary review. App. R. 14(B). Orders in limine are eligible for appellate review under Appellate Rule 14(B) to the same extent, and with the same prerequisites—trial court certification and Court of Appeals acceptance—as any other interlocutory order. The tentative nature of orders in limine does not result in the categorical exclusion of those orders from discretionary interlocutory review, which is why our appellate courts have long reviewed orders in limine through interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104, 106 (Ind. 1997) (interlocutory appeal reviewing a trial court’s order granting the State’s motion in limine to exclude certain expert testimony). Indeed, aside from law of the case limitations, all trial court rulings are subject to revision until there is a final judgment, Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 971 (Ind. 2014), so the tentative nature of a trial court ruling cannot mean interlocutory review is unavailable.
Having determined that orders in limine are eligible for interlocutory review, we review the trial court’s order.
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order.
Turning to the merits of the appeal, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order.
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To begin with, the CHINS order presents a great risk that the jury will be too deferential to a judge’s assessment of the facts. See Clary v. Lite Machines Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing that the opinion of a trial judge who made findings in a previous case related to the same underlying issues “would likely carry tremendous weight with the jury, risking unfair prejudice”). If the juvenile court judge had concluded Means was in fact the perpetrator, Means would rightly argue it would be unfairly prejudicial to his defense for the State to introduce into evidence that conclusion. It is no less unduly prejudicial to the State’s case to allow Means to introduce evidence that another judge exonerated him. See Sigo v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 946 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that “in an action to recover on a fire insurance policy, evidence of the insured’s acquittal of related arson charges is at best marginally relevant and raises the concern of unfair prejudice”), trans. denied.
Moreover, introducing the CHINS order is misleading in the criminal proceeding. The juvenile court judge reached her conclusion in the CHINS order based on DCS’s evidentiary presentation in a civil proceeding following its own investigation, not the prosecutor’s evidence in this criminal proceeding based on additional police investigation. That is especially problematic because the juvenile court reached its conclusion in the CHINS case before the State completed its investigation in the criminal case.
To be clear, the trial court’s ruling is limited to the admissibility of the CHINS order; it does not extend to the underlying evidence that led the juvenile court to conclude it was likely someone at the daycare who abused E.H. Nothing in the trial court’s order or this opinion precludes Means from introducing that evidence in his defense.
Finally, because we affirm the trial court’s order based on Rule of Evidence 403, we need not address the parties’ remaining evidentiary arguments, and we agree with the State that Means waived his argument that the CHINS order collaterally estops the State from prosecuting him because he did not first make that argument in the trial court. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 98 (Ind. 2021) (“By not raising the issue before the trial court, he has waived this argument on appeal.”).
For these reasons, we grant transfer, affirm the trial court’s order in limine, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.