Shepard, S.J.
In credit time calculations, how should a trial court treat pre-trial confinement served solely for an offense that is dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement? Two decisions from this Court appear to offer differing analyses on how to calculate credit time for pre-trial confinement served solely for an offense that is dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. See Glover v. State, 177 N.E.3d 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We write to clarify that the test for awarding credit for pre-trial confinement remains whether the defendant’s pre-trial confinement is the result of the criminal charge for which the sentence is being imposed, including where plea agreements involving multiple cases are involved.
Here, the State agrees with Donald L. Keene that he is entitled to credit for more time spent in pre-trial confinement than was awarded by the trial court, but argues that he is only entitled to an additional nine days of credit. Finding that the reasoning in this Court’s decision in Glover informs our decision here, we reverse and remand with instructions to award Keene an additional nine days of credit for his pre-trial confinement for his conviction after pleading guilty to one count of Level 6 felony auto theft.
…
Keene argues that the trial court failed to award him the correct amount of credit time and the State agrees. The parties disagree, however, with the number of days to which Keene is entitled.
…
Here, Keene pleaded guilty to one count of auto theft, first charged under F6- 714, which was later dismissed, and subsequently refiled under F5-1588. The State agrees that Keene should receive credit for his pre-trial confinement as to that charge leading to his conviction and sentence as the factual basis alleged for both charges was the same. The trial court, however, indicated in its abstract and sentencing order that it was not crediting Keene with the sixteen days he served between October 19, 2021 to November 3, 2021. This was error.
However, the court awarded Keene credit time for November 10, 2021 through November 16, 2021. Keene served pre-trial confinement during that time for F5-1531, a charge that was dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 Conf., pp. 40 (plea agreement), 64 (judgment of conviction and sentencing order). The State argues that the court erred by awarding Keene those seven days of credit. We agree. Keene should be awarded a net gain of nine days for his pre-trial confinement on his sentence under F5-1588.
Keene relies on language from our decision in Purdue to support his claim that he is entitled to those seven days of credit under F5-1531. In particular, Keene seizes on the language “wholly unrelated,” used in Purdue, 51 N.E.3d at 438, to suggest that a different test for awarding credit time applies, because the pretrial confinement was served for a “case [that] was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement,” arguing its reference in the plea agreement makes it not “wholly unrelated.” Reply Br. p. 3. Agreeing with the analysis in Glover, we believe Purdue is factually distinguishable and did not supplant the statutorily created test where multiple cases are mentioned in a plea agreement.
…
The Glover panel put it best, however, while distinguishing Purdue and explaining what was meant by “wholly unrelated” charges, when describing pre-trial confinement awards when separate charges are involved in a single plea negotiation.
…
We conclude that the test remains whether the pre-trial confinement results from the criminal charge for which the sentence was imposed. As such, Keene is entitled to a net gain of nine days of credit for his pre-trial confinement.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to award credit time consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.