Foley, J.
Fred Kreigh (“Kreigh”) partially constructed a home for Bernard Lash (“Lash”) in 2019 and 2020. The parties did not sign a contract relating to the work. Kreigh subsequently brought suit, seeking damages pursuant to the theory of quantum meruit, after Lash refused to pay his bill. Lash raises a lone issue: whether the trial court’s calculation of damages was clearly erroneous. Kreigh cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied his request for pre-judgment interest. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Lash asserts the trial court committed reversible error by calculating damages based upon the reasonable value of Kreigh’s labor and costs of materials rather than the difference between the fair market value of the real estate prior to and after the completion of the improvements constructed by Kreigh. “To prevail on a claim of quantum meruit, also referred to as unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish that a measurable benefit has been conferred upon the defendant under such circumstances that the defendant’s retention of the benefit would be unjust.” King v. Terry, 805 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Inlow v. Inlow, 797 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
We note that Indiana caselaw often uses the terms “quantum meruit” and “unjust enrichment” interchangeably. See, e.g., Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 298 (Ind. 2012); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991). The two are discretely different, however, and the distinctions between them are instructive with respect to the question of the appropriate measure of damages. “The measure of recovery for services furnished or goods received depends on whether the claim is for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.” 66 Am. Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 35 (emphasis added). “Quantum meruit, for instance, is a claim or right of action for the reasonable value of services rendered, or as otherwise stated, the reasonable value of work and material provided by a contractor is the issue in a quantum meruit case . . . .” Id. “[W]hereas in an unjust-enrichment case, the inquiry focuses on the benefit realized and retained by the defendant as a result of the improvement provided by a contractor.” Id. For purposes of this appeal, however, we need not resolve the myriad of conflicts that arise from treating the two terms interchangeably.
We do note that a careful reading of Indiana case law suggests that we have correctly recognized that claims for unjust enrichment sound in the law of restitution, rather than the law of contract….
It is less clear to us whether quantum meruit should be rightly located in the law of restitution as opposed to that of contract… Indeed, in this case, we find an action in quantum meruit based upon a contract implied in fact. Such a finding casts serious doubt on pronouncements such as “a contract precludes application of quantum meruit because (1) a contract provides a remedy at law and (2)—as a remnant of chancery procedure—a plaintiff may not pursue an equitable remedy when there is a remedy at law.” King, 805 N.E.2d at 400 (citing Bayh, 573 N.E.2d at 408). We believe this statement should more accurately refer to express contracts. See, e.g., Troutwine Ests. Dev. Co., LLC v. Comsub Design & Eng’g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Lash does not dispute that this action is governed by the doctrine of quantum meruit. We decline to adopt his theory as to the measurement of damages. Quantum meruit requires that the measure of damages be viewed from the supplier’s end. We conclude that the trial court did not commit clear error by calculating damages based upon value of Kreigh’s services. The trial court reviewed evidence of the number of hours expended by Kreigh and his associates and heard testimony that the hourly rate was normal—or at the very least, not exorbitant—in the industry. The trial court also reviewed documentation of the materials costs accrued by Kreigh and heard testimony that a twenty percent markup of those costs—billed to the hiring party—is not uncommon in the industry. Accordingly, the trial court’s valuation of the amount owed by Lash was not clear error.
Our analysis is not concluded, however. On cross-appeal, Kreigh contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for pre-judgment interest….
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The reason that this distinction matters is that a contract implied in fact is a contract, whereas a quasi-contract is not. Our case law regarding pre-judgment interest finds its home within the boundaries of contract law. Thus, the absence of a contract suggests that pre-judgment interest is inappropriate, whereas a contract implied in fact may justify such an award… Here, based on the actions of the parties and their testimony regarding their communications, it is clear that services were requested, offered, and accepted. It is clear that Kreigh expected to be compensated for those services (and the materials), and that Lash reasonably expected to provide the compensation. The fact that an exact price was not agreed upon is of no moment when the question is one of formation of contract. [Footnote omitted.]We find that, given that the parties had a contract, an award of prejudgment interest may be appropriate.
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Here, we agree with the trial court. The amount of Kreigh’s claim upon Lash’s breach is not ascertainable from the parties’ contract. The lack of any express term with respect to how Lash would be billed is exactly why the action was brought in quantum meruit. The eventual calculation may have been simple, but it required discretion on the part of the trial court to determine which factors should comprise the calculation. The trial court also exercised judgment when it decided to incorporate some of Lash’s list of construction deficiencies as an offset. That certainly is not something that the parties clearly contemplated at the formation of the contract. This was a fashioned remedy, not of the rote type that pre-judgment interest tends to accompany. The trial court did not err in denying Kreigh’s request for pre-judgment interest.
Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.