The State appeals the trial court’s grant of Elijah Parchman’s (“Parchman”) motion to correct error requesting a new trial after a jury had convicted him of murder and attempted murder. The trial court granted Parchman’s motion after concluding that Parchman had been denied a fair trial because the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when it failed to disclose the juvenile delinquency history of one of its witnesses. The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Parchman’s motion because the evidence that the State failed to disclose was not material. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Parchman’s motion, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Parchman’s motion because the evidence that the State failed to disclose was not material. We agree.
Here, the State acknowledges that Minor’s juvenile delinquency history was impeachment evidence that the State had inadvertently suppressed. Thus, this case turns on whether the nondisclosure was prejudicial to Parchman, i.e., whether the suppressed evidence was material.
We addressed the materiality of a witness’ ten-year-old theft conviction in McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). There, the State charged McKnight with Class A felony dealing in cocaine weighing three grams or more after he sold cocaine to the witness, who had been wired with a recording device. A police officer had also provided the witness with $500 to pay for the cocaine and to cover a debt that the witness owed to McKnight. After a jury had convicted McKnight as charged, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In this petition, McKnight argued that the State had committed a Brady violation when it had withheld impeaching information regarding the fact that the witness had a ten-year-old theft conviction. Assuming that the State had failed to disclose the witness’ prior conviction to McKnight, we determined that in light of all the evidence presented at trial, the witness’ ten-year-old theft conviction was “negligible, at best.” Id. Specifically, our review of the evidence revealed that the witness’ testimony was cumulative of the testimony of undercover officers as well as the audio recording of the controlled buy. Under those circumstances, we concluded that McKnight had not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel known about the theft conviction and attempted to impeach the witness with that conviction. Id. Accordingly, we concluded that McKnight’s Brady claim failed. Id.
Here, as in McKnight, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, Minor’s more than ten-year-old juvenile delinquency adjudication is negligible, at best. Specifically, our review of the evidence reveals that Minor’s testimony was cumulative of Detective Luecke’s testimony that Parchman was standing over one-hundred feet away from the victims when he began shooting at them. Minor’s testimony was also cumulative of Dr. Kiefer’s testimony that Bobby had been shot on his back side and hospital records that revealed Minor had also been shot on his back side. Based on these specific and particular facts, we conclude, as we did in McKnight, that Parchman has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel known about Minor’s juvenile delinquency adjudication and attempted to impeach him with questions about that remote adjudication. See id. Accordingly, Parchman’s Brady claim fails. See also Reid v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1264, 1271-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that the impeaching value of a twenty-four-year-old robbery conviction was negligible in light of all the evidence presented), trans. denied; Carroll, 740 N.E.2d at 1230 (concluding that the impeaching value of six-year-old misdemeanor conviction for false informing was negligible in light of all the evidence presented). Because Parchman’s Brady claim fails, the trial court abused its discretion when it granted his motion to correct error requesting a new trial.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.