Crone, J.
Case Summary
Ronald Morgan and Cheryl Morgan appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Dickelman Insurance Agency, Inc., Dickelman Insurance, Inc., Jason Dickelman, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. (collectively Defendants) on the Morgans’ complaint for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligence, and fraud. As for their breach of contract claim, they assert that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether an oral modification of their insurance policy to increase their dwelling coverage limit was formed. We find this argument irrelevant because the Morgans subsequently received and accepted easy-to-read renewal certificates clearly indicating the amount of their coverage. With respect to the remaining claims, they contend that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether they reasonably relied on an insurance agent’s alleged representations. Based on the easy-to-read, unambiguous renewal certificates, we conclude that as a matter of law, their reliance is unjustified. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Section 1 – Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Morgans’ breach of contract claim.
In their complaint, the Morgans alleged that Defendants breached an oral agreement to increase their dwelling coverage by $150,000. In support of their summary judgment motion on the breach of contract claim, Defendants designated evidence that established that State Farm paid the policy coverage limit on the Morgans’ claim, that the dwelling coverage limit never increased by $150,000, and that the Morgans never paid an increased premium for a nearly fifty-percent increase in coverage. Further, in an affidavit, Dickelman attested that the Morgans never authorized Dickelman Insurance to increase the dwelling limits and that he never informed the Morgans that State Farm would cover their losses. Thus, Defendants’ designated evidence established that they did not commit breach of contract.
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In this case, State Farm mailed renewal certificates to the Morgans that clearly and unambiguously informed them of the amount of their policy dwelling coverage. “[I]nsureds have a duty to read and to know the contents of their insurance policies.” Safe Auto Ins. Co. v. Enter. Leasing Co. of Indianapolis, 889 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). A casual scan by an unsophisticated customer of the first page of the two-page 2013 renewal certificate would inform that person that the dwelling coverage was limited to $297,100 and that the premium charged was for this amount of coverage. By retaining the policy and paying the premium through an escrow account held by their mortgage company, the Morgans accepted the offer to renew. Similarly, in 2014, the Morgans accepted the offer to renew the policy with a dwelling coverage of $300,700, and in 2015, they accepted the offer to renew with a dwelling coverage of $313,100.
The Morgans contend that “[p]olicy renewals extend existing insurance coverage [and] do not allow an insurer to silently and unilaterally alter a policy to an unsophisticated customer’s detriment.” Reply Br. at 12-13. They further assert that Defendants’ “argument implies an absurd and undesirable result: that an insurer can promise specific coverage in one year, then silently reduce that coverage the very next year by simply mailing policy documents that customers are unlikely to read or understand.” Id. at 13-14. These scenarios do not reflect the circumstances here. State Farm was not silent, and an ordinary customer would immediately recognize the dwelling coverage limit on the first page of an easy-to-read renewal certificate, which requires no expertise to understand. We conclude that the designated evidence establishes that State Farm paid the full amount of the policy dwelling coverage that the Morgans had accepted. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the Morgans’ breach of contract claim.
Section 2 – Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Morgans’ promissory estoppel claim.
The Morgans also argued that they were entitled to relief on a theory of promissory estoppel because they reasonably relied to their detriment on Defendants’ alleged promise to increase their dwelling coverage. The Morgans assert that summary judgment is improper because the designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether their reliance was reasonable….
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The Morgans contend that the “designated evidence demonstrates that a State Farm agent made false representations to [them] regarding the extent of their insurance coverage, and [they] have averred that they relied on those representations.” Appellants’ Br. at 24. They maintain that reasonable reliance is a question for the trier of fact…
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… the rationale for the exception to the duty to read leads us to conclude that it does not apply. First, the exception has been applied to whether a particular hazard has been covered, and there is no dispute here that the Morgans’ home was covered. Further, this case involves an unambiguous dollar amount that appears on the first page of the renewal certificates. At least under the facts of this case, the dollar amount does not qualify as technical or complex language. If the Morgans had glanced at the first page of the renewal certificates, they certainly would have immediately recognized the coverage limit of their policy. We also note that the renewal certificates were not contracts of adhesion, as the Morgans had a choice regarding the coverage limits. We agree with Defendants that “if the exception to the duty to read were extended to dollar amounts on the first page of a renewal certificate, an insured would have no duty to read any document.” Appellees’ Br. at 17. Accordingly, we conclude as a matter of law that the traditional rule, i.e., “reliance is not justified where the injured party has a written instrument available and fails or neglects to read it[,]” applies. Plohg, 583 N.E.2d at 1237.
Section 3 – Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Morgans’ negligence claim.
As for the Morgans’ negligence claim, they alleged that Defendants were negligent in fulfilling their duty to procure sufficient replacement cost coverage for their home. Defendants moved for summary judgment on this claim on the grounds that it was filed outside the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. The Morgans argued to the trial court that the statute of limitations was tolled by their reasonable reliance on the alleged representations made by Defendants in May 2012. The trial court reasoned that the statute of limitations began to run as early as April 4, 2013, because the Morgans could have discovered in the exercise of ordinary diligence that their policy limits had not changed by looking at the renewal certificate. The trial court concluded that their negligence claim was time-barred because they did not commence the action until September 2017.
The trial court’s conclusion is in accord with our supreme court’s decisions in Filip and Groce v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 5 N.E.3d 1154 (Ind. 2014)…
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… As discussed in the previous section, the Morgans easily could have ascertained that their coverage had not been increased by simply looking at the renewal certificate in April 2013. Accordingly, as a matter of law their negligence claim, filed in September 2017, is time-barred.
Section 4 – Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Morgans’ fraud claim. “Actual fraud exists when there is a material misrepresentation of a past or existing fact made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement to the detrimental reliance of a third party.” Munsell v. Hambright, 776 N.E.2d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003). “[R]eliance on the omission or misrepresentation must be justified before the fraud becomes actionable.” Medtech, 555 N.E.2d at 849. To demonstrate reasonable reliance, the plaintiff must show not only that he in fact relied on the misrepresentation, but also that he had a right to rely on it. Plymale, 419 N.E.2d at 761. As we have already discussed, the renewal certificates were simple and the amount of dwelling coverage was unambiguous. Had the Morgans looked at them, they would have seen that their coverage had not been increased by $150,000. Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the Morgans’ reliance on Defendants’ alleged statements was not justified. Based on the foregoing, we affirm summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Affirmed. May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur