Pyle, J.
A jury convicted Michael Bass Chatman (“Chatman”) of Level 3 felony aggravated battery1 for injuries he inflicted on J.M.C., his ten-month-old son. At trial, a pediatric nurse practitioner testified, based on information she had acquired from other medical professionals, that J.M.C.’s injuries were likely caused by abuse. On appeal, Chatman contends that the pediatric nurse practitioner’s testimony about what the other medical professionals had told her was inadmissible hearsay, and he asks us to vacate his conviction and order a new trial. Finding that the nurse practitioner’s testimony was admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 703, we affirm Chatman’s conviction.
We affirm.
…
Chatman contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Nurse Gordon to testify that (1) J.M.C. was in or near a state of shock when he arrived at the hospital; (2) J.M.C. scored the lowest possible score on the Glasgow Coma Scale; and (3) J.M.C.’s MRI indicated that he had suffered hypoxic brain injuries from lack of oxygen and that he had severe swelling and bruising in his right flank and thigh. Chatman claims this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because it was based on the statements of other medical professionals.
…
Nurse Gordon’s testimony about J.M.C.’s medical condition, based on information she acquired from the other medical professionals, was not admissible under the hearsay exception in Evidence Rule 803(4).
…
However, Nurse Gordon’s testimony was admissible under Evidence Rule 703, which provides: “An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. Experts may testify to opinions based on inadmissible evidence, provided that it is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.” To be sure, “such hearsay is inadmissible where it is merely a restatement of another’s conclusion ‘as a conclusory answer to an ultimate fact in issue,’ such that the veracity of the statement is not ‘subject to the test of cross-examination.’” Barrix v. Jackson, 973 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Miller v. State, 575 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. 1991)), trans. denied. In such circumstances, the expert’s testimony is “merely ‘a conduit’” for placing another medical professional’s diagnosis into evidence “without meaningful opportunities for cross-examination.” Est. of Benefiel v. Wright Hardware Co., 128 N.E.3d 485, 490–91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Faulkner v. Markkay of Ind., Inc., 663 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
…
Nurse Gordon’s expert opinion as to the cause of J.M.C.’s injuries was based upon evidence of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the medical field—histories provided by emergency first responders, medical records, and testing. Therefore, Nurse Gordon’s testimony about what she had learned about J.M.C.’s condition from other medical professionals was admissible pursuant to Evidence Rule 703.
Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Tavitas, J., concur.