Goff, J.
In this case, Marquis David Young challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for murder and two counts of attempted murder. He claims the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that it was he who fired the shots which rang out at a gas station in Gary in 2020. And, in an unusual twist on a sufficiency claim, Young contends that the State’s own evidence proves he was not at the scene of the crimes when they took place. The State’s case did indeed contain conflicts and uncertainties that could have led the jury to harbor reasonable doubt as to Young’s guilt. We ultimately conclude, however, that the jury permissibly resolved these issues of fact against Young. We will not reweigh the evidence for ourselves. Consequently, we affirm Young’s convictions.
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A useful analog for our analysis here comes from Kriner. In that case, the defendant stood accused of murdering a guard in a foundry security booth. 699 N.E.2d at 660. This Court recalled that “a murder conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence” and held the following facts sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 663. Surveillance video from a camera several hundred yards from the crime scene captured the defendant parking his car, retrieving something from the back seat, and walking towards the security booth. Id. at 661. An hour later, the video captured him returning in a different shirt. Id. Police found a shotgun in bushes nearby. Id. A lead projectile recovered from the crime scene was consistent with that shotgun. Id. at 662. The defendant’s landlord testified to being the owner of the gun. Id. A pair of the defendant’s shoes bore a similar pattern to a footprint made in blood at the security booth. Id. Testimony revealed that the defendant and the victim had insulted and threatened one another and the defendant admitted to paying money to the victim earlier in the day. Id. at 661, 663. This money was not found on the victim or in the security booth after the murder. Id. at 663. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, this Court explained that the facts and permissible inferences in the case worked in “combination” to “reinforce one another” and showed more as a “composite” than each did in isolation. Id. at 664 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 541 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. 1989)). As such, “the evidence viewed as a whole and most favorably to the judgment” supported the defendant’s guilt. Id.
As in Kriner, the pieces of evidence before us here fit together into a coherent whole that incriminates the defendant. In other words, the totality of the evidence favorable to the State, and the reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from that evidence, were substantially probative of Young’s guilt.
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To summarize, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Young spotted the victims at the gas station, drove somewhere nearby with alleyway access, tossed his cigarette in the alleyway, ran to the gas station to carry out the shootings, walked back up the alleyway to get away, and later looked up how to clean the weapon he had used. His deactivated location data suggested he was concealing his activity. No single “smoking gun” was presented, but we cannot say that a reasonable factfinder was unable to draw the conclusion that Young was guilty.
The doubts Young raises about the evidence present factual disputes that the jury was entitled to resolve.
While Young recognizes our deferential standard of review, he urges us to find that the evidence necessarily left room for reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt may arise, he submits, “from the evidence presented, a lack of evidence presented, or a conflict in the evidence.” Appellant’s Br. at 11 (citing Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). He draws our attention to three alleged failures of proof: uncertainty whether the cigarette collected by police was the lit item captured on the Broadway video; differences in the appearance of the figure in the Broadway video from that of Young himself; and the apparent inconsistency in two videos placing him respectively in the alleyway and at the gas station at the exact same time.
We agree that the jury might have derived a reasonable doubt from the identified problems with the evidence. But the issues surrounding this evidence presented debatable questions of fact that the jury could reasonably have determined either for or against the defense. And, applying our standard of review, we may not substitute our weighing of the evidence for that of the jury. Nor will we divide and conquer the evidence by interpreting each piece individually in the defendant’s favor, rather than considering the composite picture and drawing reasonable inferences in support of the verdict. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146; McGrath, 95 N.E.3d at 529.
Young contends that there was a “gap in the evidence” supposedly placing him in the alleyway. Appellant’s Br. at 11. He argues that Detective Adams’s own testimony cast doubt on whether the cigarette recovered from the alleyway was the item shown on the Broadway video. Young cites the following exchange between the State and Detective Adams: Q: Okay. And you said you saw somebody throw down a cigarette or a cigar? A: Correct. Q: Did you know which one? A: No. I
d. at 12 (quoting Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 33–34).
According to Young, Detective Adams meant that he did not know whether the cigarette he found was the one that was discarded in the video. We read the testimony differently. Detective Adams appears to have meant that he did not know whether the lit item in the video was a cigarette or a cigar. In any case, the jury heard testimony that the police carefully directed their attention to the place where the lit item appeared to fall and that, although it was two days later, only one cigarette was found in the immediate area. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 27-28, 34, 88-89, 97-98; Tr. Vol. V, p. 8. It was the jury’s responsibility to weigh all the evidence. It cannot be said that no substantial probative evidence identified the cigarette that was found with the item shown in the video
Young argues that a comparison of his appearance in the gas station interior video and the figure in the Broadway video demonstrates that they are not the same person. According to Young, he had a thicker build and was wearing black headgear, whereas the figure in the alleyway was slimmer and wore white headgear.
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Young argues that, since he could not physically be in the alleyway and at the gas station simultaneously, no reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter at the gas station.
We conclude that this inconsistency in the evidence did not compel a finding of reasonable doubt. It was precisely the kind of dispute which the jury was responsible for deciding by weighing the evidence and resolving conflicts in it. Trials are intended for this purpose. Young had the opportunity to cross-examine Detective Sanders about the timestamps and to argue about them to the jury. The jury, having listened to Detective Sanders testify and having assessed his credibility, did not have to believe every word he said. See Wood v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1054, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Even if the jury believed everything Sanders told them he observed, the jury did not have to take his inductive conclusions at face value. 5 Sanders did not testify as to when he inspected the Broadway video system and found its timestamp to be accurate. See Tr. Vol. III, p. 134. It was not certain that it was perfectly accurate on May 3. Nor was evidence presented to show that the timestamp on the Bugsy’s Tavern video system had sped up at a constant rate over the course of fifteen months. This was an unspoken assumption. The jury could reasonably have determined, considering all the evidence, that the most likely explanation for the inconsistent timestamps was a slight error of a few seconds either in Sanders’s observations or in his inferences about the state of the video systems on the day of the shootings. The jury was not required to find that the apparent incompatibility of the timestamps outweighed the rest of the web of facts that suggested Young was indeed the shooter. Looking, as we must, at the evidence favorable to the verdict, and drawing only favorable inferences, we cannot say there was no substantial probative evidence of Young’s guilt.
We reiterate the point made by Judge Crone, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, that the evidence of guilt reviewed on appeal “need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” to pass muster. Young, 187 N.E.3d at 976. It is sufficient that a reasonable jury could have inferred that the defendant committed the crimes charged. We leave the weighing of all the evidence and resolution of conflicts in it to the jury. Because a reasonable inference that Young was guilty as charged may be drawn from the whole picture of the evidence in this case, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Molter, JJ., concur.