Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
N.H. filed a petition to expunge his criminal convictions and arrest record which the trial court granted. However, N.H. then filed a motion to correct error claiming the trial court omitted required language in its order granting expungement. The trial court denied N.H.’s motion to correct error. N.H. now appeals, raising one issue for our review which we restate as whether the trial court erred by striking language included in Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c) from its order granting expungement. Concluding the trial court erred, we reverse and remand.
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N.H. argues the trial court’s rationale for striking the “proper person” language from its expungement order is contrary to law. [Footnote omitted.] Appellant’s Brief at 14. The trial court stated that it struck the provision related to N.H.’s status as a proper person because:
There are fourteen (14) criteria that must be met in order for someone to be a proper person as defined under IC 35-47-1-7. Most of these conditions would not be known by a Court that is simply considering a Petition for Expungement. Not having a felony conviction is merely one (1) of the fourteen (14).
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 9. N.H. contends that although this is true, there is “only one criterion for being a proper person under I.C. § 35-47-1-7(2) – and that criterion was fully established upon the expungement of N.H.’s felony convictions[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 14-15. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35- 47-1-7(2), a person cannot “have a conviction for a crime for which the person could have been sentenced for more than one (1) year” and be considered a proper person.
The trial court’s omission of the phrase “to be a proper person under IC 35-47- 1-7(2)” in paragraph 7 of its order was error. Contrary to the trial court’s explanation in its order denying N.H.’s motion to correct error, because the phrase is specifically limited to subsection 7(2) it does not implicate the remaining subsections of section 35-47-1-7. The inclusion of the phrase does not require that the trial court make a determination as to whether a defendant is a proper person pursuant to the entirety of Indiana Code section 35-47-1-7, it merely acknowledges that a defendant’s previous convictions, now expunged, no longer prevent him from being determined to be a proper person. Interpreting Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c) to be a referendum on all fourteen subsections of Indiana Code section 35-47-1-7 when it explicitly includes only subsection 7(2) would be illogical. See In re J.J., 912 N.E.2d at 910 (“The legislature is presumed to have intended the language used in the statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result.”).
The trial court also states the following:
[I]t is not prudent for the Court to draw the conclusion necessary to make the statement espoused in IC 35-47-1-7(2) that the Petitioner does not have a conviction for a crime for which the person could have been sentenced for more than one (1) year as the Court has insufficient information to make that statement other than as related to the Petition in front of it.
Appellant’s App., Vol 2 at 8. The expungement process only covers the convictions listed in the petition, and only convictions in that county. Ind. Code § 35-38-9-9(h). However, it appears from the record that the only convictions on N.H.’s criminal record were being expunged by the trial court’s order. See Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 14-18. Further, if the trial court did not have sufficient information regarding the proper person language, then it similarly did not have sufficient information to declare the remaining rights restored because they too could be affected by other convictions or circumstances that fall outside the purview of the expungement order. Again, this would be an illogical rendering of the statute. See In re J.J., 912 N.E.2d at 910. The inclusion of language from Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c) in an expungement order simply denotes that the convictions expunged in the order no longer preclude a defendant from exercising the enumerated rights. It does not blindly restore rights to a defendant.
We conclude that the trial court erred by omitting a portion of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c)’s language from its order granting expungement. [FN: We note that the trial court was not required to include the language of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c) in its order. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6(h), if the court issues an order granting a petition for expungement, “the court shall include in its order the information described in section 8(b) of this chapter.” Indiana Code section 35-38-9-8(b) does not include the language from section 10(c) nor does it include any rights restored by the expungement. However, we conclude that the trial court’s inclusion of some rights enumerated by Indiana Code section 35-38-9-10(c) and its improper exclusion of one right constitutes reversible error.] Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to reissue its order and either include the proper person language it omitted or exclude paragraph altogether. [Footnote omitted.]
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court’s omission of language from Indiana Code 35-38-9- 10(c) in its order granting expungement constituted error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions.
Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Foley, J., concur