Foley, J.
A.C. (“Petitioner”) was convicted of Level 6 felony assisting a criminal and was sentenced to time served and one day of probation to facilitate an alternative out-of-state placement as a victim of human trafficking. In June 2021, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, seeking relief under the Vacatur Statute, Indiana Code section 35-38-10-2. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner appeals from that denial, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying her petition because she met the elements of the Vacatur Statute, and the post-conviction court did not have discretion to deny her petition as a matter of public policy. Because we find that the post-conviction court erred in denying Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate Petitioner’s conviction pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-10-2.
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In filing her petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner sought relief under Indiana’s Vacatur State, Indiana Code section 35-38-10-2. That statute states: A person who committed an offense that did not result in bodily injury to another person is entitled to have the person’s conviction vacated if the person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the person was a trafficked person at the time the person committed the offense; (2) the offense did not result in bodily injury to another person; and (3) at the time the person committed the offense, the person was: (A) coerced; or (B) under the control of; another person. Ind. Code § 35-38-10-2. A “trafficked person” is a person who was the victim of human trafficking, regardless of whether the person who committed the human trafficking offense was charged, tried, or convicted. I.C. § 35-38-10-1. Under statute, “coercion” means, but is not limited to a person: (1) causing or threatening to cause physical harm to a human trafficking victim; . . . . (5) using blackmail or threatening to cause financial harm for the purpose of exercising financial control over the human trafficking victim; or (6) facilitating or controlling a human trafficking victim’s access to a controlled substance. I.C. § 35-42-3.5-0.5(b)(1), (5), (6).
Accordingly, in order to have her conviction for Level 6 felony assisting a criminal vacated under the Vacatur Statute, Petitioner was required to prove that she was a trafficked person at the time she committed the offense, that the offense did not result in any bodily injury to another person, and that at the time she committed the offense, Petitioner was coerced or under the control of another person. During the post-conviction proceedings, the parties agreed that Petitioner was a seventeen-year-old trafficked person at the time of the offense and that the offense did not result in bodily harm to another person. Therefore, the only prong of the Vacatur Statute that was in dispute at the post-conviction relief hearing was whether Petitioner was coerced or under the control of another person at the time she committed the underlying offense.
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In enacting the Vacatur Statute, the General Assembly determined that a trafficked person who meets the statutory elements should be entitled to have their conviction vacated. I.C. § 35-38-10-2. The relief is not discretionary if the statutory elements are met… The post-conviction court therefore did not have discretion to make a determination that the statute was “irrelevant” or that the proceedings were “unnecessary.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II p. 14. A determination on the necessity for and availability of this form of relief for trafficked individuals is not committed to the trial court. The post-conviction court erred by denying Petitioner’s petition on the basis that an alternate remedy existed.
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The post-conviction court further erred in its statement that, even though it did not decide the case under the Vacatur Statute, “[i]f the [c]ourt were going to base a decision on this statute, the [c]ourt’s position would be that she has not met her burden as a matter of public policy, because characterizing these circumstances as ‘coercion’ or ‘control,’ would he an insult to victims of coercion and control.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). The Vacatur Statute does not include a public policy exception. As we have already stated, there is no discretion, and if a petitioner presents evidence by a preponderance of the evidence on the three prongs, the petitioner “is entitled” to have the conviction vacated. See I.C. § 35-38-10-2. Here, Petitioner presented undisputed evidence at the post-conviction hearing to satisfy the three prongs of the Vacatur Statute, and the post-conviction court erred when it denied her petition for post-conviction relief.
The post-conviction court stated in its order that finding Petitioner was under “coercion” or “control” at the time of the crime “would be an insult to victims of coercion and control.” There is no factual support for this finding. Petitioner’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing was uncontroverted. The post-conviction court’s order fails to provide any support for its conclusion that Petitioner was not truthful in her account or otherwise not credible. Petitioner clearly met her burden of proof under the Vacatur Statute and is entitled to the relief afforded by that statute.
We, therefore, reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition and remand with instructions to grant the relief sought by Petitioner and to vacate her conviction for Level 6 felony assisting a criminal.
Reversed and remanded.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur