Bradford, C.J.
Case Summary
T.L.J. (“Mother”) is the mother of K.D.G., a transgender child (“Child”). After Child informed Mother that Child identified as transgender, Mother began working with medical and mental-health professionals to determine an appropriate course of action. On September 21, 2021, Mother filed petitions to legally change Child’s name and gender marker on Child’s birth certificate. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s petitions, finding that Mother had failed to prove that the requested changes were in Child’s best interests. Mother challenges the trial court’s denial of her petitions on appeal. As for the denial of Mother’s request to amend Child’s birth certificate to change Child’s gender marker, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court did not have the statutory authority to grant Mother’s petition. As for Mother’s request to legally change Child’s name, our review of the trial court’s decision is limited by the trial court’s failure to provide any findings explaining why it determined that the requested change was not in Child’s best interests. We therefore affirm in part and remand the matter to the trial court for additional findings.
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….We recognize that other panels of this court have interpreted Indiana Code section 16-37-2-10 as providing a mechanism by which a parent can seek to have a child’s gender marker changed on the child’s birth certificate…However, we do not believe that the statute can be read in such a broad manner.
As Judge Pyle, a member of this panel, pointed out in his dissent in Matter of A.B., a plain reading of the text of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-10 reveals that the statute has nothing to do with amending a birth certificate to reflect a parent’s desire to change a minor child’s gender to reflect their gender identity and presentation. Instead, it clearly applies only to the use of DNA testing or other documentary evidence in order to establish paternity for the purpose of including the proper parent’s name on a child’s birth certificate. Given the statute’s unambiguous language, we must apply the statute’s plain and ordinary meaning without enlarging or restricting the obvious intent of the legislature. See In re S.H., 984 N.E.2d 630, 635 (Ind. 2013) (providing that when a statute is unambiguous, courts apply its plain and ordinary meaning without enlarging or restricting the obvious intent of the legislature). The statute does not provide a mechanism for the trial court to grant the requested belief.
Furthermore, as Judge Bailey, also a member of this panel, pointed out in In re H.S., 175 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied, to date, the Indiana General Assembly has not addressed this emerging area of the law, leaving us “again asked to expand upon the generic language for birth certificate alteration found in Indiana Code section 16-37-2-10(b).” Because we do not believe that Indiana Code section 16-37-2-10 provides the court with the authority to grant the requested relief, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Mother’s petition to change Child’s gender marker.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and the matter is remanded with instructions.
Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur