Pyle, J.
Case Summary
Crystal LaMotte (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error requesting a new final hearing in the dissolution of her marriage to Stephen LaMotte, Jr. (“Father”). Mother specifically argues that her due process rights were violated because the trial court judge who issued the dissolution order did not hear the evidence or observe the witnesses. Concluding that Mother’s due process rights were violated, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion to correct error and remand with instructions for the trial court to hold a new dissolution hearing.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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Mother contends that her due process rights were violated because “a successor judge made factual findings and legal conclusions without a trial de novo following the departure of the original judge who conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing but did not issue an order.” (Mother’s Br. 4). We agree.
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We addressed this issue in In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)…
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On appeal, the father argued that his due process rights had been violated because the magistrate who had conducted the evidentiary hearing was not the same magistrate who had made and reported the recommended findings of fact and conclusions thereon to the juvenile court. We agreed and explained as follows:
Indiana courts have long held that “[a] party to an action is entitled to a determination of the issues by the jury or judge that heard the evidence, and where a case is tried by the judge, and the issues remain undetermined at the death, resignation, or expiration of the term of such judge, his successor cannot decide, or make findings in the case, without a trial de novo.” Wainwright v. P.H. & F.M. Roots Co., 176 Ind. 682, 698–99, 97 N.E. 8, 14 (1912) (providing that a judge did not have a right to decide the issues presented in a case in which he had not heard the evidence, and, accordingly, the case should have been retried); see also Dawson v. Wright, 234 Ind. 626, 630, 129 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1955); State ex rel. Harp v. Vanderburgh Cir. Ct., 227 Ind. 353, 363, 85 N.E.2d 254, 258 (1949); Bailey v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). This is because due process requires that the trier of fact hear all of the evidence necessary to make a meaningful evaluation in a case where the resolution of a material issue requires a determination as to the weight and credibility of testimony. Farner v. Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
“When a successor judge attempts to resolve questions of credibility and weight of evidence without having had an opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses, he is depriving a party of an essential element of the trial process.” Urbanational Devrs., Inc. v. Shamrock Eng’g, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 416, 421, 372 N.E.2d 742, 746 (1978). “Such an undertaking by the successor judge is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court and amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Id. “To hold otherwise would be to grant a power of review to the successor judge that is not even claimed by appellate courts.” Id.
D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1232. See also In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 753 (Ind. 2014) (citing Harp, 227 Ind. 353, 85 N.E.2d at 258, for the proposition that “[a] party is entitled to a determination of the issues by the judge who heard the evidence, and, where a case is tried to a judge who resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo.”).
We further note that we have “a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters[]” because the judge presiding at a family law hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing witness credibility and weighing evidence. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (further explaining that appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Magistrate Mattingly’s successor in this case, Judge Broadwell, reviewed the record and made factual findings and conclusions thereon. We note that Judge Broadwell held a hearing that was limited to child custody and parenting time. However, she allowed only Mother and Father to testify. Father questioned Mother about the custody evaluator’s report that had been admitted into evidence at the November 2020 hearing and referenced it in his closing argument. In addition, Judge Broadwell allowed the GAL to explain the recommendations in her updated report. Mother and Father were also allowed to question the GAL but only about the updated report. Judge Broadwell then issued an order denying Mother’s request for rehabilitative maintenance, dividing the parties’ property, awarding custody of A.L. to Father, and awarding Mother supervised parenting time.
Based on these facts, we conclude that Mother’s due process rights were violated. Judge Broadwell could not have properly resolved questions of credibility and weight of the evidence from the November 2020 hearing because she did not have an opportunity to hear that evidence or observe the demeanor of those witnesses. See D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1233 (and cases cited therein). To hold otherwise would be to grant of power of review to Judge that is not even claimed by this Court on appeal. See id. (and cases cited therein).
Having concluded that Mother’s due process rights were violated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court for a new dissolution hearing on all issues. See D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 133. Any subsequent factual findings and conclusions thereon should be issued in accordance with this opinion. [Footnote omitted.] See id.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Robb, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.