Vaidik, J.
In Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), our Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a search or seizure under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is generally determined by balancing three factors: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield went on to specify that trash searches require a specific degree of suspicion— reasonable suspicion, that is, “articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a ‘Terry stop.’” A few years later, in Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, trans. denied, this Court similarly held reasonable suspicion is needed for law enforcement to conduct dog sniffs at the front door of a private residence, reasoning that, as with trash searches, dog sniffs of residences implicate serious concerns over police entering private property arbitrarily.
Here, officers conducted a dog sniff in the outdoor walkway of a hotel and, in part using information from that sniff, obtained and executed a search warrant for one of the hotel rooms. Narcotics and firearms were found in the room, and the room’s occupants were charged with a variety of drug and firearm offenses. One of these occupants, Courtney Elizabeth Crabtree, moved to suppress evidence found in the room, arguing in part that the dog sniff of her hotel-room door violated Article 1, Section 11 because the officers did not have the reasonable suspicion required under Hoop to conduct the dog sniff. The trial court denied the motion, and Crabtree now appeals.
Because we do not believe Hoop’s reasoning extends to these circumstances, reasonable suspicion is not required here. Instead, using the comprehensive three-factor balancing test, we conclude the dog sniff was reasonable. While we agree with Crabtree that other evidence used to procure the search warrant was illegally obtained, because the dog sniff and other evidence provided sufficient legally obtained information to support the issuance of a search warrant, we affirm.
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Crabtree’s argument is three-fold. She contends: (1) the dog sniff of the hotel room door violated Article 1, Section 11, (2) the officers’ warrantless entry into the hotel room violated Article 1, Section 11, and (3) without this illegally obtained evidence, the search warrant for the hotel room was not supported by sufficient probable cause and any evidence obtained should be excluded.
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As noted above, we generally determine the reasonableness of a search under Article 1, Section 11 using the three-factor balancing test articulated in Litchfield, and the State contends we should do so here. However, Crabtree argues in this situation, as a matter of law, the degree of suspicion required is reasonable suspicion. She cites Hoop, 909 N.E.2d at 470, where we addressed the reasonableness of a dog sniff conducted at the front door of a private residence. In doing so, we noted that our Supreme Court in Litchfield required police to have reasonable suspicion to search a citizen’s trash due to concerns over police entering private property arbitrarily. We found the same concerns present for purposes of dog sniffs of private residences, and therefore held such searches require a showing of reasonable suspicion.
But the reasoning in Hoop centered on the sniff occurring at a private residence, which is distinguishable from this case. And although we have held the inside of a hotel room is akin to the home for purposes of Article 1, Section 11, Harper v. State, 963 N.E.2d 653, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, we do not believe this extends to a hotel’s exterior walkway. Thus, we distinguish Hoop and hold Terry-level reasonable suspicion is not an absolute necessity for a dog sniff of a hotel-room door. Instead, the degree of suspicion is just one factor to be considered under the general Litchfield balancing test.
Crabtree concedes the sniff was “minimally intrusive”—it occurred in the outdoor walkway of a hotel, and by all accounts Crabtree was completely unaware it was occurring.
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As for law enforcement needs, officers needed to continue pursuing their investigation, as at this point they were reasonably certain criminal activity was occurring. So while the degree of suspicion and extent of law enforcement needs here were not the highest possible, we believe they were sufficient to conclude the dog sniff was reasonable, especially considering the low degree of intrusion.
The trial court did not err in determining the dog sniff of the hotel-room door did not violate Article 1, Section 11.
Crabtree also contends the officers’ warrantless entry into the hotel room violated Article 1, Section 11. We agree with Crabtree that, under Litchfield, the warrantless entry was unreasonable: while the officers’ degree of suspicion was high, so too was the degree of intrusion, and their need to enter was low, considering they had time to secure a warrant. No exigent circumstances support the officers’ entry—there was no indication in the record that there was a threat to officer or public safety, and while the officers may have reasonably feared Crabtree would destroy evidence, this fear was unfounded until officers knocked and alerted Crabtree to their presence. See Hawkins v. State, 626 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ind. 1993) (police’s warrantless entry into a suspected drug house was not reasonable as there was time to apply for a warrant and no exigent circumstances existed before police forcibly entered the building). And officer created exigencies cannot justify a warrantless entry. Id.
Crabtree argues that the evidence obtained from the hotel room should be suppressed because, without the dog sniff and warrantless entry, there is not enough information to support the search warrant. This argument presupposes the illegality of the dog sniff, which we have held was reasonable. Thus, the question is whether the warrantless entry alone requires the exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. We conclude it does not.
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While the warrantless entry violated Article 1, Section 11, the later search was done pursuant to a search warrant supported by sufficient legally obtained information. Thus, we find the search of the hotel room reasonable under the Indiana Constitution.
Affirmed.
Crone, J., concurs.
Tavitas, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
Tavitas, Judge, concurring in result.
I agree with the majority that the trial court properly denied Crabtree’s motion to suppress, but I do so on a different basis. Accordingly, I concur in result.
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In my view, the dog sniff of the outdoor hotel walkway was not a search or seizure at all. To be sure, a dog sniff of a porch of a private home has been held to be a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11-12, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013) (“The government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Perez v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1144, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that warrantless canine sniff of defendant’s front door physically intruded onto the curtilage of his home and, therefore, was an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment) (citing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10, 133 S. Ct. at 1416).
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A dog sniff of a hotel common area is also less intrusive than a trash search, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Article 1, Section 11. See Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364-65. A search of trash has the potential to reveal information about the residents’ intimate personal information that, even if not criminal, could be embarrassing. A dog sniff of a hotel hallway, on the other hand, would reveal only the potential presence of contraband. In this sense, it is more akin to a dog sniff of a car, which is generally not considered a search under Article 1, Section 11. See Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that a dog sniff of a vehicle is generally not considered a search under Article 1, Section 11 or the Fourth Amendment) (citing Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013)); State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010) (holding that warrantless search of vehicle based in part on dog sniff was reasonable under Section 11 Article 11). Similarly, a dog sniff of luggage at an airport is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07, 1013 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 (1983). The hotel common area was not part of a protected curtilage, and the dog sniff of the common area was not a search under Article 1, Section 11.
I also conclude that the alert by the police dog when sniffing the truck, plus the items seen inside the truck and the anonymous tip, were sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant to search the hotel room. Accordingly, I concur with the majority that the search of the hotel room did not violate Article 1, Section 11.