Vaidik, J.
Case Summary
Indiana Code section 31-34-12-2 provides “a finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence.” The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof in termination cases satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Today, we hold the clear and convincing evidence standard also satisfies the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution.
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Indiana Code section 31-34-12-2 provides “a finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence.” Mother contends this standard is unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides in part that “every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Mother asserts “Indiana’s Constitution demands the highest level of proof for injuries to reputation” and thus the proper standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. Mother’s Br. p. 17.
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Mother acknowledges that Santosky “sets the minimum burden of proof in termination cases at ‘clear and convincing’ evidence,” but encourages us to “accept the Supreme Court’s invitation” to examine this issue under our state constitution and “hold that under Indiana’s constitution the parent-child relationship should only be terminated upon the State proving its case ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Mother’s Br. pp. 11, 17-18. Specifically, Mother points to the textual differences between the two clauses, emphasizing that Indiana’s Due Course of Law Clause, unlike the federal Due Process Clause, protects from reputational injury and asserts that “[p]erhaps nothing is more essential to a parent’s character and reputation than the parent’s relationship with his children.” Id. at 17.
But our Supreme Court has held that, even when analyzing claims of reputational injury, we employ the same methodology to claims of denial of procedural due process in violation of Article 1, Section 12 as the U.S. Supreme Court uses to analyze claims of violation of the federal Due Process Clause. Doe v. O’Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind. 2003); Matter of D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 n.16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he due process analysis under [the state and the federal constitutions] is the same.”). Santosky shows that procedural due process requires a standard that reflects the interests of both the state and parents in termination proceedings as well as the risk of error. The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the clear and convincing evidence standard does this, and we see no reason to reach a different conclusion here.
Mother argues injuries to reputation “demand . . . the highest level of proof” under the Indiana Constitution. Mother’s Br. p. 17. But she gives no support for this assertion. And given that this Court has found that the clear and convincing evidence standard is sufficient to protect a parent’s liberty interest in their child, we see no reason why this standard would not sufficiently protect their reputation. See Waltz v. Daviess Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 579 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (the clear and convincing evidence standard “follows from the fact that termination severs all of a parent’s rights to the child, thereby extinguishing the constitutionally-protected right of the parent to make a home and raise the child, which has been recognized as one of the basic civil rights of man”), trans. denied. Mother’s argument would have us hold that a higher burden is required in termination cases not based on a parent’s rights over their child but based on the reputational harm of termination. We do not believe there is support for such a holding.
Mother has not shown the clear and convincing evidence standard violates the Indiana Constitution.
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Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.