Altice, J.
Case Summary
Lake County Sheriff Oscar Martinez, Jr. (the Sheriff), in his official capacity, executed a contract with Correctional Health Indiana, Inc. (CHI) for CHI to provide medical and healthcare services to inmates in the Lake County Jail (the Jail) during the 2022 calendar year. The Lake County Board of Commissioners (the Board), as executive of Lake County, Indiana government, refused to approve the 2022 contract and indicated that the Board would approve contracting with CHI but only at the 2021 rate and on a month-to-month basis.
The Sheriff filed a complaint against the Board1 seeking, in relevant part, a declaration that the Sheriff has the authority to enter into contracts related to the operation of the Jail and the care of its inmates. The Board filed a counterclaim in which it sought a contrary declaration that the Board has the sole authority to approve any contract with CHI for the provision of medical services at the Jail.
The Board appeals the trial court’s declaration, by way of partial summary judgment, that the Sheriff, without approval of the Board, has the authority to enter into contracts to take care of the Jail and its inmates, so long as the Sheriff is spending funds within his approved budget. The Board also appeals the trial court’s order directing the Board and the Auditor to process, approve, and pay the invoices submitted by the Sheriff pursuant to the 2022 contract with CHI.
We affirm and remand.
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The Board relies on I.C. § 36-2-3.5-4 for its position that the Board has the exclusive authority to contract for medical services on behalf of the Jail and to determine whether invoices submitted by the Sheriff for said services should be paid by the county. Subsection (a) of the statute provides: “All powers and duties of the county that are executive or administrative in nature shall be exercised or performed by its executive, except to the extent that these powers and duties are expressly assigned to other elected officers.” Subsection (b) then sets out specific duties of the executive, including that it shall “control all disbursements and expenditures” and “negotiate contracts for the county.” I.C. § 36-2-3.5-4(b)(7) and (9). The Board argues that the power to contract for the Jail has not been expressly assigned to the Sheriff and, therefore, remains with the Board.
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Unlike county commissioners or county councils, the Indiana Constitution expressly establishes sheriffs, among others, as elected county officials. Ind. Const. Art. 6, § 2(a). Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5 sets out express powers and duties of county sheriffs. Among these, as relevant in this instance, is the sheriff’s duty to “take care of the county jail and the prisoners there.” I.C. § 36-2-13- 5(a)(7). Further, it has long been settled that “prisoners are entitled to medical care” and that “a sheriff has a duty to exercise reasonable care to preserve a prisoner’s health,” which generally “includes the duty to pay for medical treatment.” Ne. Ind. Colon & Rectal Surgeons v. Allen Cnty. Comm’rs, 674 N.E.2d 590, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see also Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Marion Cnty., 470 N.E.2d 1348, 1358-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied. This legal duty to provide and pay for medical services for prisoners necessarily requires authority to contract for such medical care. Cf. Health & Hosp. Corp., 470 N.E.2d at 1360 (observing that a “hospital could assume that since a sheriff has a legal duty to provide medical services for prisoners, he has authority to contract or make arrangements for hospitalization of a prisoner”) (citation and quotation omitted).
In Alexander v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff, 891 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, we recognized “the special and complex nature of maintaining jail … facilities.”… We ultimately held that the sheriff’s decision to contract with and grant exclusive rights to one telephone service provider for inmates was a matter within the sheriff’s authority to operate and maintain the jail. Id. at 96.
The role of the Board is to “act as ‘a general overseer or manager” of the county. Local 1963 of UAW, 999 N.E.2d at 954 (quoting Roberts v. State ex rel. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 278 N.E.2d 285, 292 (1972)). While the Board is statutorily required to build and maintain a county jail, that duty extends only to keeping it open and in good repair. Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 118- 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); see also Ind. Code § 36-2-2-24(a). The law is well settled that the Board does not have control over the acts of the Sheriff, who occupies a “constitutionally-created office that is separate from the county executive” and who is charged with “[a]ctual administration of the jail and treatment of prisoners.” Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d at 119.
We agree with the Sheriff that his express duty to take care of the Jail and its prisoners includes the authority to enter into contracts for this purpose. Cf. Local 1963 of UAW, 999 N.E.2d at 958 (holding that board of commissioners did not have authority to bind elected officer to collective bargaining agreement (CBA) despite its general authority to execute contacts on behalf of the county because the CBA “obstructed the independence of the Officials to staff their offices as they deem best”). Indeed, if the Board had the exclusive right to enter into such contracts, as it claims, the Sheriff would be transformed into a passive manager, a mere department head, notwithstanding his constitutional office, and would have limited ability to take care of the Jail and its prisoners. As the trial court observed, statutory assignment of the Sheriff’s take-care duty “could not be more expressed.” Appellants’ Appendix Vol. 2 at 19. The General Assembly’s grant of power and authority to the Sheriff must allow for him to fulfill this statutory duty. In other words, by assigning the Sheriff the take-care duty, the General Assembly granted him the authority to enter into jail-related contracts. This interpretation harmonizes and gives effect to both I.C. § 36-2- 3.5-4 and I.C. § 36-2-13-5(a)(7). [Footnote omitted.]
The Council and the Board continue to have a check on the Sheriff through the budgeting process. But, here, there is no dispute that the Sheriff’s 2022 approved budget includes funds allocated for the Second CHI 2022 Contract…While this statute provides the Board with discretion to consider the validity of invoices filed with the Auditor, it does not allow the Board to abuse that discretion by refusing to pay valid invoices submitted by officials for budgeted items that have been fully appropriated and for which the funds remained unencumbered. The trial court did not exceed its authority by ordering the Board and the Auditor to process, approve, and pay invoices submitted by the Sheriff related to the Second 2022 CHI Contract. [Footnote omitted.]
Judgment affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Brown, J. and Tavitas, J., concur.