Vaidik, J.
T.D. admitted committing acts constituting Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult, and the trial court found him to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Indiana Department of Correction. About a year later, T.D. filed an Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside, arguing his delinquency adjudication was void because the trial court accepted his admission without ensuring that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights as required by the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1. The court denied the motion. Because the record shows that the court did not ensure that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights when he admitted to auto theft, we find that his delinquency adjudication is void and should be set aside. We therefore reverse the trial court.
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T.D. contends the trial court erred in denying his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We first note that because a delinquency adjudication is civil in nature, post-conviction procedures are unavailable. A.S. v. State, 923 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied. According to our Supreme Court, Trial Rule 60 is the “appropriate avenue” through which a juvenile must assert any claims of error related to an agreed delinquency adjudication (which is the juvenile-law counterpart to an adult defendant’s guilty plea). J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1204, 1207-08 (Ind. 2019).
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T.D. argues his agreed delinquency adjudication is void and should be set aside because the trial court accepted his admission “without inquiring as to whether [he] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his statutory and constitutional rights” as required by the juvenile waiver statute, Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1.
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These rights spring from the United States Constitution and are guaranteed to juveniles. See In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004) (noting that juveniles have the following constitutional rights: the right against double jeopardy, the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to an attorney, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses); see also A.M. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 361 (Ind. 2019), reh’g denied; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), abrogated on other grounds.
The juvenile waiver statute provides “only” three ways to waive rights that state or federal law grants to juveniles—waiver by counsel; waiver by a parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem; or waiver by the juvenile…
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Under all three options, the juvenile’s waiver must be knowing and voluntary. Juvenile admissions are equivalent to adult pleas of guilty… Under Boykin, a conviction must be vacated if the defendant was not advised at the time of his plea—and did not otherwise know—that he was waiving his Boykin rights. Id. Given the constitutional rights and special protections afforded to juveniles, the standard for challenging juvenile waivers should be the same as that for adult pleas of guilty, even though juveniles must request relief under Trial Rule 60(B) rather than the post-conviction rules. A juvenile must freely and with informed consent enter into an admission.
For its part, the State doesn’t dispute that the trial court failed to ensure that T.D. knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights when he admitted to auto theft. As already noted, at the omnibus hearing the trial court did not discuss T.D.’s rights, reference a video, or explain that T.D. was waiving his rights by admitting to auto theft… In other words, the State claims that the trial court’s failure to follow the juvenile waiver statute was a “procedural error” that made T.D.’s delinquency adjudication voidable, not void. Id. at 17. In support, the State relies on two cases from our Supreme Court, K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 2006), and In re Guardianship of A.J.A., 991 N.E.2d 110, 115 (Ind. 2013).
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The juvenile waiver statute applies to “[a]ny rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law”— not just the right to counsel. Thus, under A.S., a trial court’s failure to ensure that a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his rights when the juvenile admits to being a delinquent child means that the agreed delinquency adjudication is void under Trial Rule 60(B)(6). See also N.M., 791 N.E.2d at 802 (reversing trial court’s denial of juvenile’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion because juvenile did not knowingly and voluntarily waive right to counsel).
Because the record shows that T.D. did not freely and with informed consent enter into his admission, he has met his burden of proving his delinquency adjudication is void and should be aside.
Reversed.
Riley, J., concurs.
Bailey, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Bailey, J., dissenting
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the court did not adequately advise T.D. of his rights prior to accepting his admission such that his admission was not knowing or voluntary. Indeed, as discussed by the majority, at no point during the omnibus hearing did the court explain T.D.’s rights to him or his mother or otherwise ask if either had viewed the video or understood what it had explained. However, I cannot agree with the majority that the error rendered the judgment void.
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Still, we note that the majority likens juvenile admissions to adult guilty pleas, states that an adult conviction must be vacated if the adult did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his rights prior to pleading guilty, and concludes that the judgment following a juvenile’s admission is void if it was not made knowingly or voluntarily. However, I find two problems with this analysis. First, it is well settled that “[p]roceedings in juvenile court are civil proceedings, not criminal in nature” and that “[a]n act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime.” M.R. v. State, 605 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also T.K. v. State, 899 N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Further, juveniles are not defendants. See T.K., 899 N.E.2d 686, 688 (holding that, because the juvenile “was never a defendant,” Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) did not apply). In addition, “the purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different from the criminal justice system.” R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In particular, “the goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation so that the youth will not become a criminal as an adult.” Id. (emphasis removed). Thus, on its face, I cannot compare a juvenile proceeding to an adult criminal proceeding.
Second, while the majority is correct that an adult’s guilty plea must be vacated if it was not made knowingly or voluntarily, that does not render the judgment against the adult void. Again, an “order is void only when the action or subject matter it describes has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification.” M.S., 938 N.E.2d at 284. “Voidable, however, describes an action or subject matter which nonetheless operates to accomplish the thing sought to be accomplished, until the fatal flaw is judicially ascertained and declared.” M.S., 938 N.E.2d at 284 (quotation marks omitted). Should an adult plead guilty despite an unknowing or involuntary waiver of his or her rights, that guilty plea remains in full force and effect unless it is challenged. Thus, the judgment is merely voidable, not void. Similarly, here, at most, an admission following the unknowing or involuntary waiver of a juvenile’s rights results in a judgment that is merely voidable, not one that is void.
That is not to say that T.D. was without recourse. T.D. could have filed, and indeed did file, a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8). Under that rule, a court may grant relief from a judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8). However, as the majority acknowledges, that rule requires a movant to “allege a meritorious claim or defense,” which requirement T.D. wholly failed to satisfy. Trial Rule 60(B) (emphasis added). While I would not hold that the judgment against T.D. is void, it is entirely possible that, had T.D. properly pled his claim under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), he would have been successful.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.