Tavitas, J.
A.R. appeals the juvenile court’s order that he register pursuant to the Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), Indiana Code Chapter 11-8-8. A.R. contends that: (1) the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to determine if A.R. should register pursuant to SORA; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the determination that he register; and (3) the registration requirement violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. We conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to consider the issue, that the juvenile court’s determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that A.R.’s constitutional claims are waived. Accordingly, we affirm.
A.R. raises two issues, which we revise and restate as: I. Whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to determine if A.R. should register pursuant to SORA. II. Whether the juvenile court’s determination that he must register pursuant to SORA is supported by sufficient evidence. III. Whether the juvenile court’s determination that A.R. must register pursuant to SORA violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.
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A.R. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order A.R. to register pursuant to SORA because the juvenile court did not follow the proper statutory procedures to reinstate jurisdiction. A.R. argues that the juvenile court could only reassert jurisdiction upon its own motion or upon the motion of the DOC—not upon the motion of the deputy prosecutor.
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Indiana Code Section 31-30-2-1(a) provides, in part: Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (h), the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a delinquent child or a child in need of services and over the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian continues until: (1) the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless the court discharges the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian at an earlier time; or (2) guardianship of the child is awarded to the department of correction. Subsections (b), (c), and (h) are not applicable here. Accordingly, the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over A.R. when guardianship of A.R. was awarded to the DOC.
Procedures exist, however, for the juvenile court to reinstate jurisdiction over a child. Indiana Code Section 31-30-2-2 provides: If the department of correction is awarded guardianship of a child under section 1(a)(2) of this chapter (or IC 31-6-2-3(a)(2) before its repeal), the department of correction shall notify the court awarding the guardianship when the department will release the child from the department’s custody. The notification must be sent to the court at least ten (10) days before the child’s release.
Here, on July 30, 2021, the DOC notified the juvenile court that A.R. would be released on August 9, 2021. Indiana Code Section 31-30-2-3 provides: After receiving notification under section 2 of this chapter (or IC 31-6-2-3(b) before its repeal), a juvenile court may within thirty (30) days after notification, on the court’s own motion, reinstate jurisdiction over the child for the purpose of modifying under IC 31-34-23 or IC 31-37-22 the court’s original dispositional decree.
Additionally, under Indiana Code Section 31-30-2-4(a), the DOC may petition the juvenile court to reinstate the court’s jurisdiction. Here, well within the thirty days that the juvenile court was given to act, the deputy prosecutor petitioned the juvenile court to reinstate jurisdiction, and the juvenile court did so.
Because the deputy prosecutor, rather than the DOC or the juvenile court on its own motion, petitioned the juvenile court to reinstate jurisdiction, A.R. contends that the juvenile court’s acquisition of jurisdiction was improper. The juvenile court here was empowered by the statute to reinstate jurisdiction within thirty days after receiving notification from the DOC, which it did. We cannot find that the juvenile court is denied the ability to reinstate jurisdiction simply because the deputy prosecutor filed a superfluous motion. The denial of jurisdiction to the juvenile court under such circumstances would “create an absurd result,” which we seek to avoid when interpreting statutes. Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass’n, 174 N.E.3d at 605. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to consider the registration issue.
Next, A.R. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he is required to register under SORA. A.R. contends that the juvenile court’s determination was not supported by the evidence because: (1) at the time of the registration determination, he was not a “child” under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5; (2) Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5 required A.R. to be fourteen years old at the time of the delinquent act; and (3) insufficient evidence existed to prove that A.R. was likely to reoffend.
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SORA imposes prerequisites for juvenile registration, which “implicitly recognizes, and attempts to balance, the tension between [the] registration’s harsh effects and the juvenile system’s rehabilitative aims.” J.D.M. v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1073, 1077 (Ind. 2017). Our Supreme Court has held that strict construction of the juvenile sex offender registration requirement is necessary to accomplish the express statutory goal of “ensur[ing] that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.” Id. at 1078 (citing, in part, Ind. Code § 31-10-21).
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A.R. first argues that he was not a “child” when the juvenile court determined A.R. was required to register pursuant to SORA. A.R. contends that, under SORA, a child is a person younger than eighteen.
SORA does not define the term “child.” We note that, for purposes of juvenile law, however, a child means, in part: “a person: (A) who is eighteen (18), nineteen (19), or twenty (20) years of age; and (B) who either: (i) is charged with a delinquent act committed before the person’s eighteenth birthday; or (ii) has been adjudicated a child in need of services before the person’s eighteenth birthday . . . .” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-13(d)(2). Thus, under Indiana Code Section 31-9-2-13(d)(2), A.R. remained under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction until he turned twenty-one years old. A.R. was seventeen years old when the juvenile court reinstated jurisdiction, and A.R. turned eighteen during the pendency of these proceedings.
Under A.R.’s interpretation of SORA, he would be a child for purposes of juvenile law, but the juvenile court would be unable to address the applicability of the registration statutes. The State also points out that, under A.R.’s interpretation, “the 16-year-old offender who remained in detention for two years would be free from any registry requirement even though the 16-year-old who committed the same offense and had the same risk of re-offending but was released from detention a couple months earlier would be required to register.” Appellee’s Br. p. 23. We agree that A.R.’s interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd results. Accordingly, we conclude that A.R., who was still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, qualifies as a “child” under Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5.
Next, A.R. argues that Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5 does not apply to him because he committed his offense when he was thirteen years old and Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5 applies only if the juvenile was fourteen years old when the offense was committed. The State argues that Indiana Code Section 11-8-84.5 “does not require the offender to be at least 14 years old at the time of the act; it requires him to be at least 14 years old at the time the registration requirement is imposed.”
The use of the present tense “is” throughout the requirements of Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5(b)(2)(A)-(C) indicates that the child must be at least fourteen years old at the time that the registration requirement is imposed. This portion of the statute is not referring to the age of the child at the time of the commission of the delinquent act. “To decide differently would require this Court to rewrite clearly written statutes, violating bedrock separation-of-powers principles. This we will not do… Thus, Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5(b)(2), when read as a whole, refers to the age of the child when the registration requirement is considered. See Consumer Att’y Servs., P.A. v. State, 71 N.E.3d 362, 366 (Ind. 2017) (noting that statutes should be read “as a whole”).
Finally, A.R. argues that, even if Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-4.5 applies to him, the evidence was insufficient to conclude that he should be required to register.
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Under these circumstances, A.R.’s arguments are merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See B.W., 909 N.E.2d at 476. We conclude that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that A.R. was “likely to repeat an act that would be an offense described in subsection (a) if committed by an adult.” I.C. § 11-8-8-4.5. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that A.R. must register pursuant to SORA. See B.W., 909 N.E.2d at 479-80 (declining to reweigh the evidence regarding whether the juvenile offender was likely to reoffend).
A.R. contends that his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution were violated by the juvenile court’s order that he register pursuant to SORA. A.R., however, did not raise these arguments below. Accordingly, A.R.’s Eighth Amendment and Indiana Constitution claims are waived. See Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972, 976 (Ind. 2015) (declining to address constitutional claims that were not raised at trial); Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Ind. 2001) (“Defendant’s argument on appeal is different than his argument at trial, and his objection is therefore waived.”).
We conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to determine if A.R. should register pursuant to SORA and that the evidence was sufficient to support the determination that he must register. Additionally, A.R.’s claims under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution are waived. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
May, J., concurs.
Riley, J., dissents with separate opinion
Riley, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court had jurisdiction in this matter. Indiana Code section 31-30-2-3 provides that after receiving notification from the DOC that a juvenile is to be released from its custody, “a juvenile court may within thirty (30) days after notification, on the court’s own motion, reinstate jurisdiction over the child for the purpose of modifying . . . the court’s original dispositional decree.” (Emphasis added). The plain and unambiguous language of the statute belies that there is no provision for a prosecutor to move a juvenile court to reinstate jurisdiction, as was the case here. When construing an unambiguous statute, we are obligated to refrain from reading terms into it. See N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002). In addition, juvenile courts “may exercise authority over cases only as permitted by statute.” D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1213 (Ind. 2020). Because the juvenile court in this case lacked the statutory authority to reinstate its jurisdiction based on the prosecutor’s motion, I cannot agree with the majority that the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction over A.R.’s case.
I also respectfully part ways with the majority regarding its conclusion that A.R. was subject to SORA and, therefore, that the evidence supported the trial court’s registration Order… SORA mandates that, in making its determination that there is clear and convincing evidence of a likelihood to re-offend under subsection (b)(2)(C), the court “shall consider expert testimony concerning whether a child is likely to repeat an act that would be an offense described in subsection (a) if committed by an adult.” I.C. § 11-8-8-5(c). These additional prerequisites for juvenile registration are the legislature’s implicit recognition of, and attempt at balancing, the tension between the registration’s harsh effects and our juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative aims. J.D.M. v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1073, 1077 (Ind. 2017). Our supreme court has recognized that a strict construction of SORA’s juvenile registration provisions is necessary “to accomplish the express statutory goal of ‘ensur[ing] that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.’” Id. at 1078 (quoting Indiana Code section 3110-2-1(5), the “Policy and purpose” provision of Title 31, the Family Law and Juvenile Law statute).
A.R. is not a ‘child’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2). The term ‘child’ is not further defined within Title 11 or SORA itself. Neither party has identified any ambiguity in the language of the statute, and I would not find it to be ambiguous. Therefore, I would provide the word ‘child’ with its plain and ordinary meaning. A ‘child’ may be defined as an “unemancipated person under the age of majority.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The age of majority in Indiana is eighteen. I.C. § 1-1-4-5. Therefore, a plain reading of the unambiguous wording of SORA requires that a person must be under the age of eighteen to be subject to its juvenile registration requirement. A.R. was over eighteen years old when the juvenile court entered its Order requiring him to register and, therefore, was ineligible for SORA.
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Given these conclusions, I would not have reached the issue of whether the evidence presented at the hearing was sufficient to support the trial court’s registration Order. However, it is deeply troubling that, in light of the mandate of Indiana Code section 11-8-8-5 that a trial court “shall consider expert testimony” concerning whether a child is likely to sexually re-offend, the expert who testified at the hearing failed to offer an opinion on A.R.’s likelihood to reoffend. It is equally troubling that, given that the results of risk assessment tools relied upon by the majority were the main evidence presented at the hearing, the same expert testified that there are no empirically validated instruments that can accurately estimate the risk of an adolescent’s risk of sexual re-offense. For these reasons, I dissent.