Tavitas, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Peter D. Juan Dontrell Parker challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress, claiming that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to find that defensive collateral estoppel applied and had preclusive effect, and (2) the evidence, nonetheless, should have been suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We conclude that collateral estoppel does not apply and that the seizure of the evidence in question did not violate Parker’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, we affirm.
Parker presents two issues for review, which we restate as follows: I. Whether the ruling of a federal district court in a case arising out of the same encounter as the present case in which the federal district court granted Parker’s motion to suppress has preclusive effect in this state criminal case. II. Whether the traffic stop of Parker’s vehicle, during which police found Parker in possession of a handgun, was supported by reasonable suspicion as required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
…
Parker claims that the trial court erred by failing to give preclusive effect to the federal district court’s decision granting Parker’s motion to suppress in the federal case.
…
The doctrine of res judicata, which acts to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, is divided into two branches: (1) claim preclusion and (2) issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Parker’s claims sound in collateral estoppel. Parker seeks to prevent the State from re-litigating the issue of the lawfulness of the traffic stop that the federal government already litigated and lost in the federal court action. Thus, the “defensive” collateral estoppel analysis is appropriate. See Reid v. State, 719 N.E.2d 451, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Small v. Centocor, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
There are three requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of the issues; and (3) the party to be estopped was either a party or had privity of a party in the prior action. See Small, 731 N.E.2d at 28. Furthermore, two additional considerations are relevant here; namely “whether the party against whom the judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel.” Id.; Nat’l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012). The burden is upon the party asserting collateral estoppel to show they are entitled to its use. Reid, 719 N.E.2d at 456.
As for the first requirement, there is no dispute the federal district court was a court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, the federal district court’s ruling is a final judgment because the ultimate effect of the order was to preclude further prosecution of Parker at the federal level.
…
Turning to the second requirement—identity of the issues—neither party claims that the issues presented in the present state court action differ from those in the federal court action. Parker’s motions to suppress in both courts challenged the constitutionality of the stop and the ensuing search. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 30, 57, 71, 163. Thus, the second requirement has been met.
As for the third requirement, Parker argues that, though the State was not a named party to the federal litigation, the State, and its interests, were nonetheless otherwise fairly represented by the federal government. We find our earlier decision in Reid to be controlling here.
In Reid, this Court first addressed the concept of prosecution by the same sovereign when analyzing the use of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel. See 719 N.E.2d at 455. We concluded that “nonmutual collateral estoppel has no applicability in criminal cases,” and that in criminal cases, “mutuality of estoppel and identity of the parties” is required. Id. at 456 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 (1980) (rejecting the use of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel in trial of accessory where the principal was acquitted due to concerns that the government did not have full and fair opportunity to present its case); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1195 (1970) (holding that collateral estoppel applied in second state-court action where the identification evidence was weak and defendant was acquitted in prior state court action on same evidence); United States v. Lahey, 55 F.3d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A criminal defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction simply because it was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on another count.”)).
Our Supreme Court denied transfer in Reid, and other decisions have followed Reid’s conclusion that the use of nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel was unavailable in criminal cases. See, e.g., Olson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that State was not barred from prosecuting defendants under doctrine of collateral estoppel because neither defendant was a party in juvenile court case in which the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove that juvenile was involved in the same robbery as the defendants), trans. denied; Martin v. State, 740 N.E.2d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that post-conviction petitioner could not avail himself of collateral estoppel based on successful post-conviction petition of another petitioner who was also involved in the same kidnapping, murder, and rape for which petitioner was convicted because there was no identity of parties), trans. denied; see also Lahey, 55 F.3d at 1296 (“[N]onmutual offensive collateral estoppel cannot be applied against the government in criminal cases.”) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, a defendant cannot avail himself the rulings in another case involving another party in his own criminal case. There must be an identity of parties or their privies and mutuality of estoppel for another ruling to have preclusive effect in a criminal case.
Nevertheless, Parker urges us to look “beyond the nominal parties and treat[ ] those whose interest[s] are involved as the real parties.”
…
[H]ere we are presented with two different governments, federal and state, and charges brought under statutes that are unique to each. See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Though the facts and issues necessary to both are the same or similar, the sovereigns are not. “It is well established that states are separate sovereigns with respect to the federal government because each State’s power to prosecute is derived from its own inherent sovereignty, not from the Federal Government.” Jackson v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). “The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of a government. When a defendant in a single act violates the ‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct offences.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88, 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985) (citation and internal quotations omitted); Loretta H. Rush, A Constellation of Constitutions: Discovering and Embracing State Constitutions as Guardians of Civil Liberties, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1353, 1358 (2018-2019) (noting that results reached under state constitutions derive from a different source of sovereign authority).
Parker, whose possession of a firearm was illegal under both state and federal law, committed two distinct offenses against two sovereigns. Because there is neither identity of parties nor mutuality of estoppel as between the parties to the federal-court action and the state-court action, Parker is not entitled to the preclusive effect of the use of defensive collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give preclusive effect to the federal district court’s decision granting Parker’s motion to dismiss in the federal court action.
…
Parker also argues that, even if the federal court’s ruling does not have preclusive effect, the federal court’s conclusion that the stop of Parker’s car violated the Fourth Amendment was nevertheless correct, and the trial court here improperly concluded otherwise. Thus, Parker argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the handgun found during the stop.
…
Once the officers detained Parker, they almost immediately found that he was in possession of a firearm, which ultimately led to Parker’s arrest. The duration of the investigatory stop was, therefore, brief. Cf. Coates, 534 N.E.2d at 1092 (holding that half-hour length of stop did not amount to a de facto arrest where defendant’s lack of proper identification extended the length of his detention).
In summary, the stop of Parker’s vehicle was an investigatory stop that was supported by reasonable suspicion. The stop did not become an arrest simply because the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Parker. For these reasons, the stop of Parker’s car did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Parker also claims that the stop of his car violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
…
Here, the police here were looking for suspects and a car involved in a recent, violent crime. Parker’s car matched the description given over the radio, and Parker attempted to avoid being seen. The police action of stopping Parker’s car to determine if he was involved in the burglary was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. We expect police officers to stop a vehicle matching the description of a vehicle used in a robbery. We cannot expect officers to investigate all details before stopping a possible getaway car. This is not reasonable when responding to violent crimes and apprehending fleeing suspects. Just because it was ultimately determined that Parker was not involved in the robbery does not negate the fact that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop of Parker’s vehicle in a manner to protect police officers’ lives. We, therefore, conclude that the stop of Parker did not violate his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
The trial court properly concluded that the federal district court’s decision was not entitled to preclusive effect in Parker’s state-court criminal case. The trial court also properly concluded that the stop of Parker’s car was an investigatory stop that was based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts. The stop did not become an arrest requiring probable cause simply because the officers drew their weapons and handcuffed Parker. The actions of the police here, therefore, did not violate Parker’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The actions of the police were also reasonable for purposes of Article 1, Section 11, under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Baker, Sr.J., and Najam, Sr.J., concur.