Massa, J.
The Gary Housing Authority acquired 624 Broadway, LLC’s property through an administrative taking. It only provided notice of its taking and hearings by publication, despite knowing how to contact 624 Broadway. And it refused to postpone its final meeting—when it awarded damages— to allow 624 Broadway to obtain an appraisal. 624 Broadway alleges the notice was constitutionally deficient. Because we agree and cannot deem it harmless, we reverse and remand.
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The federal Constitution establishes important limits on the government’s ability to take private property for public use: It must provide just compensation, a hearing on just compensation, and sufficient notice. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. XIV, § 1; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The Housing Authority only provided notice of the taking and its hearings by publication—even though it knew how to provide personal notice. Its deficient notice deprived 624 Broadway of a meaningful damages hearing.
I. The Housing Authority provided constitutionally deficient notice to 624 Broadway, which was prejudicial.
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Here, the Housing Authority complied with the governing statutes when it provided notice by publication. See I.C. §§ 32-24-2-6(b), -8(c). Statutory requirements, however, are not necessarily “constitutionally sound.” Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 221 (Ind. 2022) (Slaughter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). “[N]otice . . . that may technically comply with a state statute . . . does not necessarily comport with due process.” In re Adoption of L.D., 938 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 2010). Certainly, a statute can provide more protection than the Constitution. But when a statute provides less, the government must do more.
Notice by publication may be sufficient “where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,” like when the intended recipient is missing. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. But it “is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the proceedings in question.” Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212–13 (1962).
The Housing Authority admittedly knew the identity and address of 624 Broadway’s registered agent. Indeed, its September 19 damages resolution included his address. 624 Broadway’s articles of organization, filed with the Indiana Secretary of State, listed its registered agent, his address, and an email address for service. Further, the Housing Authority demonstrated its ability to successfully communicate with 624 Broadway during its eminent domain lawsuit. See L.D., 938 N.E.2d at 671 (finding notice by publication insufficient when a party “had successfully given notice” in a previous case but “made no attempt to do so” in the instant case). Yet once it transitioned to an administrative taking, it apparently became incapable of sending a letter or email to 624 Broadway. An administrative taking may be a “streamlined procedure for taking private property,” Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 985 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 2013), but it cannot circumvent the Constitution. “[W]hen notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Because the Housing Authority knew how to provide personal notice, its notice by publication was a “mere gesture.”
Despite the insufficient notice, 624 Broadway still learned of the Housing Authority’s meetings, attended and spoke at them, and submitted written remonstrances. But we cannot say 624 Broadway was not prejudiced: under our harmless error standard, an error’s “probable impact” is “sufficiently minor” if it did not “affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). The Housing Authority passed its first resolution on August 15. More than three weeks later, Allen learned of the September 19 meeting. Had the Housing Authority provided constitutionally sufficient notice at the outset, it is probable that 624 Broadway would have presented its appraisal before or at the final meeting. Instead, 624 Broadway’s appraiser issued his report less than two weeks after that meeting. Ultimately, the Housing Authority must persuade us that the probable impact of its deficient notice was so minor that it did not affect 624 Broadway’s substantial rights. But given the significant disparity between the owner’s $325,000 appraisal, the Housing Authority’s $24,000 appraisal (which lacked an updated interior inspection), and the final $75,000 award, we are not confident that 624 Broadway’s appraisal did not affect the Housing Authority’s decision on just compensation. Thus, we decline to hold that the deficient notice was harmless.
II. 624 Broadway is entitled to a damages hearing
When the Court of Appeals reversed, it ordered vacatur of the taking. 624 Broadway, LLC, 181 N.E.3d at 1025. However, just compensation is generally the appropriate remedy when the government, duly authorized by law, takes property for a public purpose. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ind. 2010); cf. Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 1999) (acknowledging “injunctive relief may be necessary to remedy interference with landowner rights for a private purpose”). A court cannot enjoin or reverse a lawful taking when an adequate legal remedy— compensation—is available. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167–68 (2019); Murray, 925 N.E.2d at 732; United States v. Herring, 750 F.2d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1984).
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We cannot vacate the Housing Authority’s taking—statutorily authorized and for a public purpose—simply because insufficient notice may have impacted the damages award. 624 Broadway’s sole remedy is just compensation, and it is entitled to a hearing on damages where it can present its appraisal and other pertinent evidence.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the Housing Authority on 624 Broadway’s due process claim. We remand for it to enter summary judgment in favor of 624 Broadway on that claim and hold a damages hearing.
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.