Robb, J.
James Saucerman appeals the revocation of his probation. Saucerman raises two issues for our review, of which we find the following dispositive: whether he was deprived of due process because the trial court did not advise him of certain rights in the probation revocation proceedings. Concluding Saucerman was denied fundamental due process because he was not advised as required by statute, we reverse and remand.
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Saucerman contends he was denied fundamental due process at the probation revocation hearing because he was not properly advised of his rights before the trial court accepted what it considered an admission and revoked his probation.
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When a petition to revoke probation is filed, “the court shall conduct a hearing concerning the alleged violation.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(d). At such a hearing, evidence must be presented in open court, and the probationer is “entitled to confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). If a probationer chooses to admit to a probation violation rather than have an evidentiary hearing, he must be advised that he is giving up those protections. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(e).
In Hilligoss, the probationer admitted to a violation but was not first advised of the due process rights he was forfeiting by doing so. In reviewing his claim of fundamental error, we noted that “a probationer’s admission that he violated the terms of probation does not entitle him to less due process than a probationer who contests the asserted violations.” 45 N.E.3d at 1231 (quoting United States v. Holland, 850 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, we held that “a trial court’s failure to ensure that a probationer who admits to a probation violation has received the advisements as required under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(e) constitutes a fundamental violation of the probationer’s due process rights.” Id. at 1232.
Saucerman asserts, and the State concedes, that “[j]ust as with Hilligoss,” the trial court did not advise him prior to accepting what the trial court considered an admission that he was giving up his rights to have an evidentiary hearing where the State proves the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Brief of Appellant at 11; see Brief of Appellee at 7. We agree: the trial court’s failure to properly advise Saucerman denied him fundamental due process and entitles him to a new hearing. See Hilligoss, 45 N.E.3d at 1232.
We reverse the trial court’s revocation of Saucerman’s probation and remand for a new hearing on the alleged violations.
Reversed and remanded.
Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.