Brown, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, William F. Braun Milk Hauling, Inc., (“Braun”) and Joseph Daugherty appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 19, 2019, Peggy Malanoski was driving a vehicle and was in a collision with a semi-tractor and trailer operated by Daugherty. On September 24, 2021, Malanoski filed a complaint against Daugherty and Braun. Malanoski alleged that Daugherty was an employee of Braun and working within the scope of his employment and his negligent conduct was a responsible cause of the collision and her harm. [Footnote omitted.]
On November 1, 2021, Braun and Daugherty filed a motion to dismiss. They argued the complaint alleged the accident occurred on August 19, 2019, and Malanoski failed to timely commence her lawsuit prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. They also argued “[t]he Indiana Supreme Court granted two Petitions for Emergency Relief for the courts of Marion County, on March 13, 2020, and March 23, 2020, in response to Covid-19” and “[n]either order extended the statute of limitations applicable to this lawsuit.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 13.
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Braun and Daugherty maintain Malanoski’s complaint was untimely. They argue the only order “which arguably extended or tolled a statute of limitations period” was the Indiana Supreme Court’s first order on March 23, 2020, “which according to its most liberal reading, extended Malanoski’s limitations period 15 days.” Appellants’ Brief at 9. Malanoski argues that, through its emergency orders, the Indiana Supreme Court “tolled all statutes of limitation from March 16, 2020, through August 14, 2020, for a total of 151 days” and that the statute of limitations for her case “was tolled (stopped running) for 151 days.” Appellee’s Brief at 13. She argues the order which specifically mentioned statutes of limitations was extended by the subsequent orders.
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We note that the Indiana Supreme Court’s order issued at 2:12 p.m. on March 23, 2020, unambiguously “tolls all . . . statutes of limitations” in all civil matters before Indiana’s trial courts. Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 91. Typically, when a statute of limitations is “tolled,” the “limitations period is suspended (stops running) . . . , then starts running again when the tolling period ends, picking up where it left off.” See Artis v. Dist. of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 601 (2018) (referring to tolling provision of federal Supplemental Jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)); see also Jordan v. Deery, 609 N.E.2d 1104, 1107-1108 (Ind. 1993) (describing effect of medical malpractice tolling statute); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1716 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “toll” as “to stop the running of; to abate ”). The Court’s next three emergency orders (dated April 3, April 24, and May 13, 2020) specifically state that they are extending “[t]he effective date of all orders granting emergency relief to trial courts under Administrative Rule 17, . . . including but not limited to” tolling of time limits. Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 95, 101, 106 (emphasis added). To the extent that the tolling of statutes of limitations could be construed as something different from the tolling of time limits, the all-encompassing italicized phrase clearly extends the tolling of statutes of limitations through at least May 30, 2020. Accordingly, the limitations period for Malanoski’s personal injury claim was tolled for over two months, and her complaint was timely filed.
This interpretation of the emergency orders is consistent with the plain language of the orders and also with the important policy considerations behind them. The national, state, and local executive-branch emergency orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic severely restricted travel and in-person interactions, both of which are critical to the functioning of the judicial system in general and the attorney-client relationship in particular. Those restrictions undoubtedly had an adverse impact on the ability of clients, especially those of modest financial and technological means, to seek and consult with counsel, as well as on the ability of attorneys to investigate claims and draft appropriate pre-litigation correspondence and good-faith pleadings on behalf of their clients. The Indiana Supreme Court recognized as much in its first March 23, 2020 emergency order, see id. at 90 (observing orders declaring a public health emergency in Indiana and implementing statewide restrictions on travel and business operations and stating “[t]his emergency will impede litigants’ and courts’ ability to comply with statutory deadlines and rules of procedure”), and the Court took the corrective steps necessary to ensure that the wheels of justice would not run roughshod over the rights of injured Hoosiers. Malanoski filed her complaint before the expiration of the applicable limitations period as tolled by the Indiana Supreme Court’s emergency orders, and her complaint was timely.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
Mathis, J., and Crone, J., concur.