Riley, J.
Appellant-Defendant, Brian Gates (Gates), appeals his conviction for intimidation, a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A).
We affirm.
Gates presents this court with two issues, which we restate as: (1) Whether the intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague; and (2) Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates committed the offense of intimidation.
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Gates argues that the Level 6 felony intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague as it applies to him. However, a challenge that a criminal statute is void for vagueness must be raised prior to trial through a motion to dismiss, or else it is waived. Rhinehardt v. State, 477 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ind. 1985). Gates did not raise his claim below in any manner, let alone via a timely motion to dismiss, and so we conclude that he has waived his claim. See id.
His waiver of the issue notwithstanding, Gates has failed to show that the intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague.
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The State charged Gates with Level 6 felony intimidation and supported the charge at trial in part with evidence that during an argument about his clothes, Gates left an angry voice message for Holderbaum informing her that he was going to blow up her car. The relevant statute provides that the offense is a Level 6 felony as follows:
A person who communicates a threat with the intent . . . that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out, [commits a Level 6 felony] if the threat is . . . to commit a forcible felony.
I.C. §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A) (2019). “Threat” is further defined as “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to . . . unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person, or damage property[.]” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(d)(1) (2019).
Gates argues that the intimidation statute is unconstitutionally vague in his case because it “requires no additional evidence for a conviction other than proof [that] he made a threat. There is no line drawn between simply making a threat and making a threat ‘with the intent’ that the other person essentially believe that the threat is going to materialize.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Gates contends that, as a result, the portion of the intimidation statute under which he was charged does not adequately convey what conduct is proscribed.
We cannot agree. Contrary to Gates’ assertions, the statute does not simply require that, in order for the State to obtain a conviction, it must merely show that a threat was made. By its clear and unambiguous terms, the statute also requires that the State show that the threat was made with the intent “that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out[,]” thus creating a line between what is lawful (conduct or making a statement) and unlawful (conduct or making a statement with the intent to make another person afraid that it will be carried out). I.C. §§ 35-45-2-1(a)(4); (b)(1)(A). Although we agree with Gates that the statute does not require any additional action apart from the making of the threat, the statute clearly proscribes the conduct it renders unlawful by detailing the intent when making the threat that is prohibited. In addition, “individuals of ordinary intelligence” would comprehend that, in the midst of an argument, angrily informing another person that you will blow up her car in order to make that person afraid that you will do it is conduct that falls within the prohibitions of the statute. See Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d at 656. Accordingly, we conclude that, even if Gates had preserved his argument, he has not met his “heavy burden” of showing that application of the intimidation statute to his conduct is unconstitutionally vague. Pittman, 45 N.E.3d at 816.
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, even if Gates had preserved his claim regarding the constitutionality of the intimidation statute, it was not void for vagueness under the facts and circumstances of his case. We further conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates committed the offense with the requisite intent.
Affirmed.
May, J. and Tavitas, J. concur.