Tavitas, J.
Jeffrey Awbrey appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, a Level 6 felony. He contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was intoxicated to the point that he was impaired. The State argues that general testimony from a toxicologist about levels of methamphetamine consistent with those in Awbrey’s blood supports the inference that Awbrey was impaired. We disagree with the State, find that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the statutorily required impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s faculties, and accordingly, reverse Awbrey’s conviction.
Awbrey raises a single issue: whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
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Awbrey argues that the State failed to elicit sufficient evidence to establish that he was intoxicated… Specifically, Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-86(2) includes being under the influence of “a controlled substance” and both amphetamine and methamphetamine are considered to be Schedule II controlled substances under Indiana Code Section 35-48-1-9 and Indiana Code Section 35-48-2-6(d).
Thus, for purposes of Awbrey’s operating while intoxicated conviction, the State was required to prove that Awbrey was “under the influence of [an intoxicant] such that there [was] an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s faculties . . . .” Chissell v. State, 705 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Hornback v. State, 693 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). “Impairment can be established by evidence of the following: ‘(1) the consumption of a significant amount of [an intoxicant]; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of [an intoxicant] on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; and (6) slurred speech.’” Wilkinson v. State, 70 N.E.3d 392, 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Outlaw v. State, 918 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), opinion adopted, 929 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 2010)). We must conclude that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish impairment.
The State makes no argument that it presented any evidence of the foregoing factors other than the first factor, which was uncontested. The State argues that: “Awbrey’s prior use of methamphetamine earlier that day supported the inference that he was impaired.” Appellee’s Br. p. 10. We disagree. In the context of operating while intoxicated under Indiana Code Section 9-13-286(1), where alcohol is the intoxicant, we have held that “[t]he State is required to establish the defendant was impaired, regardless of his blood alcohol content.” Fields v. State, 888 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Miller v. State, 641 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied). In other words, we have held that the sheer amount of the intoxicant consumed, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding of impairment. We are aware of no case, and the State cites none, to the contrary.
The State next argues that “Awbrey’s request not to be taken to jail was indicative of his impairment because, as Trooper Wyatt noted, asking not to be taken to jail is ‘an indicator normally of something criminal going on[.]’” The State does not explain how, and we do not accept that, such evidence reasonably gives rise to an inference of impairment. Awbrey was driving on a suspended license. Any inferences of guilt from his statements could reasonably be related to driving with a suspended license.
Finally, the State points to the testimony of the toxicologist: that she would expect impairment, given the levels of methamphetamine in Awbrey’s blood. But the toxicologist did not actually opine that Awbrey was impaired. And testimony that someone would theoretically be impaired is not the same as testimony that somebody is impaired.
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Here, Awbrey’s admitted use of methamphetamine supports a finding of intoxication in a general sense, but the State’s burden was to prove intoxication to the degree that Awbrey was impaired at the time he was stopped. A plain reading of the ordinary language of the statute demonstrates that it requires proof that Awbrey’s condition of thought and condition of action were impaired, as well as proof that he had lost the normal control of his faculties. The State provided no evidence that Awbrey’s condition of thought or action was impaired or that he had lost the normal control of his faculties. I.C. § 9-13-2-86.
The State provided insufficient evidence to establish that Awbrey was impaired beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence, therefore, is insufficient to support the requisite finding of intoxication, and we are duty-bound to reverse Awbrey’s conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
The evidence is insufficient to sustain Awbrey’s conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. We reverse.
Reversed.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.