Vaidik, J.
The police stopped Dylan Noel Theobald after he allegedly struck an officer’s side mirror while driving on his motorcycle. Theobald denied doing so but offered to pay the officer whose mirror was hit $100. The police arrested Theobald for bribery, among other offenses. Theobald later moved to suppress the $100 offer because he hadn’t been given Miranda warnings even though he was interrogated while in custody. We adopt the federal new-crime exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Under this exception, a statement made by a person who is subject to custodial interrogation but not given Miranda warnings is still admissible if the statement itself is evidence of a new crime (such as bribery or a threat). We agree with the trial court that Theobald’s offer of money to the officer is admissible but disagree with the trial court that another statement Theobald made while in custody is admissible.
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Theobald contends the trial court erred “by failing to suppress self-incriminating statements that were wrongfully elicited from [him] while he was in custody and subject to interrogation in violation of his constitutional rights.” Notably, Theobald asks for only two statements to be suppressed: (1) “the statement made by [him] regarding payment for damage to the vehicle [(Ex. 1 (20:05-20:12)]” and (2) “statements made in response to questions about where he was driving to or from and regarding his driver’s license status. [Ex. 1 (39:35-41:30)].”
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The State makes two arguments on appeal. First, it argues the trial court properly denied Theobald’s motion to suppress both statements because Theobald was neither in custody nor subject to interrogation and thus not entitled to Miranda warnings. We disagree. Theobald was in custody: he was handcuffed on the side of the interstate for around forty-five minutes and told he was not free to leave. See Wright, 766 N.E.2d at 1230 (“[W]e have previously held that the use of handcuffs would cause the reasonable person to feel that one was not free to leave, and that one’s freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.”).
Theobald was also subject to interrogation. He was pulled over when driving at least 100 miles per hour, which can constitute a crime. He was accused of striking Detective Mercer’s undercover car but not stopping, which can also constitute a crime. Detective Mercer gave Theobald two options: admit to hitting his side mirror or go to jail. In other words, Theobald could admit to a crime or go to jail. Under these circumstances, Detective Mercer’s statements and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Loving, 647 N.E.2d at 1126 (“[W]hen Office Benton asked the defendant’s name, address, and so forth, no Miranda violation had yet occurred. However, before the officer asked what happened at the crime scene, the Miranda warnings should have been given.”).
In the alternative, the State argues the trial court properly denied Theobald’s motion to suppress the first statement about offering Detective Mercer $100 because that statement constituted a new crime, that is, bribery. The State points out that federal appellate courts have recognized a “new-crime exception” to the Miranda exclusionary rule, under which a statement made by a person who is subject to custodial interrogation but not given Miranda warnings is still admissible if the statement itself is evidence of a new crime. See, e.g., United States v. Paskett, 950 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding a defendant’s offering of cash to a DEA agent—“an attempt to bribe”—was properly admitted into evidence even though no Miranda warnings had been given because “no person has a constitutional right to be warned of his rights before he commits a crime” (quotation omitted))
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The State acknowledges “no Indiana courts have applied the new-crime exception in the context of Miranda before” and asks us to do so here because Theobald committed bribery by “offering to pay Detective Mercer money in exchange for being released…” Theobald doesn’t dispute there is a new-crime exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. But he claims it doesn’t apply here because he didn’t make “an offer of money in exchange for being allowed to leave.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 4. Instead, he claims he made “an admission to causing the damage by offering to pay restitution.” Id. at 3.
While Theobald might have a convincing argument that he was offering to pay for the damage to Detective Mercer’s car rather than bribing him (especially depending on what Theobald said during the unintelligible part of the footage), the State can present evidence of Theobald’s statement in prosecuting him for bribery. Whether the trier of fact finds Theobald guilty of bribery is another matter.
We reverse the trial court’s denial of Theobald’s motion to suppress the second statement about where Theobald was driving because he was subject to custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Theobald’s motion to suppress the first statement about offering Detective Mercer $100 under the new-crime exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.